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
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MAP SHOWING FORMER PORTUGUESE POSSESSIONS IN INDIA



PORTUGUESE RULE IN GOA
(1510-1961)

Portuguese Rule in Goa

1510-1961

R. P. RAO



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TO
MY MOST AFFECTIONATE PARENTS

PREFACE

THERE are many books, a vast majority of them mere pamphlets, dealing with various aspects of the life of Goans and the Goa problem. Almost all of them were written before the liberation of Goa, Daman and Diu. Each highlights a particular issue and to that extent the scope tends to be limited.

With the end of Portuguese rule, a chapter in the history of colonialism comes to an end and a new era dawns for the people. It is now possible to present a complete picture of Goa in its proper perspective in a chronological narrative. The need for a book on Goa set against an Indian background was never greater than at present. This book is an humble effort in that direction.

Portuguese Rule in Goa is the story of Goa from the earliest times to the integration of the former Portuguese colonies into the Indian Union.

This book would not have been but for the encouragement given by my friend Mr I. Divakaran of New Delhi. There were moments of despair when I thought of giving it up, but he insisted on my completing the project. The book is in the hands of the readers because of his persistence.

I am also highly obliged to Mr S.L. Poplai, Secretary-General of the Indian Council of World Affairs, for allowing me to draw upon the Council library.

R. P. R.

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CHAPTER I

RIGHT TO USE FORCE

INDIA'S freedom became complete with the liberation of Goa, Daman and Diu, the last vestiges of colonialism on the Indian subcontinent. The period of deliverance from bondage which began at midnight on August 14/15, 1947, when Britain transferred power to India, ended on December 19, 1961, with the surrender of the Portuguese at Panjim.

The jubilation of Indians on that December day was similar to that on Independence Day in 1947. In the words of Prime Minister Nehru, "nothing has happened in India, since Independence, fourteen and a half years ago, which has excited and thrilled the people of India as this liberation of Goa."

While Indians and the people of Goa were rejoicing over the liquidation of the longest colonial rule in history, which was also the worst judged by any standard, the Western nations and their press attacked India for taking armed action in Goa.

Some asked whether India was legally right. Others said India had gone against its own principles of nonviolence. Still others expressed the fear at a meeting of the Security Council, called at Portugal's request to hear its complaint of Indian aggression, that the Indian action had weakened the United Nations.

Indians considered these charges baseless. A closer examination of these may enable foreigners to understand the factors that precipitated the Indian action.

During the days of the freedom struggle, India had stated that its goal was independence for the entire subcontinent. This meant that not only the British but also the French and the Portuguese should withdraw. The French and the Portuguese pockets were so small that not much importance was given to them. The aim of the freedom fighters was to make the British quit first. Once this was achieved, they thought, the others

would automatically follow suit. The tiny pockets, which were like pimples on the face of India, received greater attention after independence.

The French took a few years to settle the issue. Once the principle of liquidation of colonialism was accepted, the differences between the two countries were discussed, resolved and the *de facto* and *de jure* transfer took place.

The Government of India approached Lisbon also with the suggestion that it should withdraw. But the latter maintained that the settlements were part of metropolitan Portugal and it was "unable to discuss, and much less accept, the solution proposed by the Indian Government."[1]

Meanwhile, there were developments on other fronts. Portugal became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in a joint statement Mr John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State, and Mr Paulo Cunha, Portuguese Foreign Minister, stated that Goa was an overseas province of Portugal. The statement angered Indians, who vehemently condemned it. In the existing circumstances, they interpreted this statement as an interference of NATO in India's internal affairs. They feared that NATO's colonial members such as Portugal would make use of the organization to cling to their colonies.

India saw a new danger in this regional defence pact, particularly in view of the not too happy relations between the two Power blocs on the one hand and between India and Pakistan on the other. Indians thought that in any future world war, Goa would become a base of operation and any such step would willy-nilly drag India into that war.

The Portuguese who overlooked the interests of their oldest ally, and acted in a manner prejudicial to British interests in World War II in the Goan waters, were surely not likely to consider the feelings of the people of India or their security in the event of a world war.

During World War II, the strategic importance of Mormagao and Panjim came to be realized fully. German merchant ships took shelter in Goa and were found transmitting meteorological reports and other valuable information

[1]Information Service of India, India House, London, *The Story of Goa*, p. 20.

regularly to the German Navy. The situation was remedied by the Portuguese at Sir Winston Churchill's intervention.[2]

These factors gave greater urgency to the question of liberating the enclaves.

When the Government of India banned the mass satyagraha movement in 1955, it took upon itself the responsibility of freeing these pockets. Between 1956 and 1961, hundreds of resolutions were adopted by Indian parties demanding the early liberation of the settlements; and seminars were held, public meetings organized and Goa Days and Goa Weeks were held at regional and all-India levels. Hundreds of adjournment motions were moved in the Lok Sabha to discuss matters pertaining to Goa. The nation was uneasy over the state of affairs in Goa and the Government's silence.

The disturbances in Angola and Portuguese ruthlessness had a profound effect on the Indian mind. In a flash, they reminded Indians of the 450 years of Portuguese black deeds in India.

Prime Minister Nehru was already thinking whether force was the only language the Portuguese would understand. He had warned the world that if the Goa issue was not settled, India might be forced to adopt "other methods" for meeting the situation. The "Sabarmati" and other incidents of November 1961, were the final provocations from the Portuguese. Mr Nehru said later that he had no doubt, at any time during the 14 years after India became free, about the full justification for the use of force against the Portuguese in Goa. He did not want to use it because of certain consequences outside India and Goa. There was no doubt that any such thing, however justified, would open the door to other actions right or wrong. It was with great reluctance that he took the course he did. It was the choice of a lesser evil.

The settlements had to become free like any liberated area in Asia or Africa. If the 18th century has become memorable because of the emancipation of slaves, the history of the present century will be written in golden letters in view of the liberation of many colonies in Asia and Africa. The very conception of human dignity has undergone change, thanks to those nations and statesmen who had foreseen the future and brought about

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

the changes. It was this changed outlook and a desire to live in peace which led leading statesmen towards the end of World War II to think in terms of setting up a world organization on bases sounder than those of the League of Nations. If such an organization was to command the respect of all nations, there was no place in it for discrimination on grounds of race, creed, colour and region. This meant there could not be two types of world citizens, one free and the other slave. Hence, in the middle of the 20th century, colonial areas are shrinking and free areas expanding.

If Great Britain could allow the sun to set on its empire and grant freedom to India, always described as the brightest jewel in the British Crown, and to a number of colonies, it was unrealistic on the part of Portugal to cling to a 1,537 square-mile area in the Indian subcontinent and put forward the fantastic argument that these areas were a part of metropolitan Portugal situated about 6,000 miles away.

Portuguese sovereignty over Goa, Daman and Diu was not conceded even by the people of the settlements. Geographically, culturally, economically and even religiously, it had no justification to be there. The people of Goa and Portugal had nothing in common, to begin with. The Goans had little to do with the religion of the foreigners until the "infamous court"[3] of inquisition resorted to mass conversions by adopting all types of third degree methods. Many Western historians have exposed and condemned the Portuguese for these unchristian conversions.

The Portuguese continued to rule Goa not because the local people wanted them. The Goans had raised their banner of revolt almost a year after the conquest in the 16th century. The last of these uprisings took place in 1912 and many in India still remember it. All these struggles were put down with such cruelty that the wrongs perpetrated by other Powers in their colonies faded into insignificance. The leaders of metropolitan Portugal never thought of framing an enlightened colonial policy.

The Portuguese were in Goa by right of conquest and the settlements were under their occupation. If the sons of the soil revolted against the occupation in 1961 and overthrew the occu-

[3]T. B. Cunha, *Goa's Freedom Struggle*, p. 12.

pying Power, the latter has no right to complain. The Indian action stirred Western nations deeply, but they never sincerely supported Portuguese colonial policies. Portugal received what limited support it did because of its membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and regional considerations. These friends of Portugal knew that anything more than mere legal and verbal support would mean going against world currents.

Further, the Indian action did not come as a surprise when it did Many governments knew that India had exhausted all methods open to it for a friendly parting of the ways with Portugal, as in the case of Britain and France. Soon after Independence, India sought diplomatic negotiations for the liberation of the settlements. Portugal refused even to discuss the subject. Later, the people resorted to *satyagraha*, a method successfully used against the British. The Portuguese failed to understand the spirit of satyagraha and ruthlessly shot dead several unarmed and non-violent volunteers. After the indiscriminate shooting of *satyagrahis* in 1955, the Government of India stepped in to stop the movement because it feared that if the merciless methods of the Portuguese were allowed to continue they might produce strong and violent reactions in India and ultimately lead to a clash between the two countries.

India expected friendly nations to help in this problem. She might not have specifically requested these nations to come to its aid, but these Powers knew the situation only too well. If only they had a will to help, they would have definitely found the way.

India would have attempted to obtain a peaceful solution through the good offices of the United Nations. But here too its hopes were dashed to pieces. Portugal maintained that Goa was no colony and refused to supply the U.N. with the information it called for under the Charter. It was unyielding in spite of the world body's decision that Goa was a colony and reports should be submitted about its progress.

In addition, the ruthless suppression of freedom fighters in Angola agitated Indians. Having passed through similar circumstances, Indians have a soft corner for freedom fighters in all parts of the world. They feared the Angolan tragedy might

be repeated in Goa, leading to a head-on collision between India and Portugal.

Above all, the Indian public had become restless and critical of the Government over the slow pace of freeing Goa. The Indian authorities could not ignore the wishes of the people for long. Ultimately, when the Portuguese resorted to shooting at Indian ships and fishing craft and trespassing into Indian territory in November 1961, the Government had no other go but to move troops into Goa.

The argument that India abandoned nonviolence is based on a wrong assumption. Acceptance of nonviolence as interpreted by Mahatma Gandhi would have meant that India should keep no army, no air force and no navy, except a small police force. Obviously, India has not adopted this concept of nonviolence as its creed. It maintains a defence force to protect its territory and sovereignty. It honours the idea of nonviolence and would like to act up to it. Mr Nehru has said that he doubts if any government as at present constituted can do it. It is not quite clear how the nonviolent technique which India adopted in its freedom struggle can be adopted against a foreign country or against foreign posse ssions. Nor is it easy to visualize how any nation can adopt it as its policy. Nations may rely on peaceful methods, but then failure may lead to worse consequences. India's approach to all problems has been peaceful. There is a great deal of difference between the nonviolent and peaceful approaches. In the latter, every effort is made to solve the problem through peaceful means, without resorting to force. When peace ful methods fail, as they did in the case of the Portuguese, force is used. An impartial observer will find that the use of force under this circumstance is justified.

The chief United States delegate, Mr Adlai Stevenson's speech in the Security Council on December 19 came as a rude shock to India because it never expected him to use such strong language. It was difficult to understand his arguments. If the invasion of Egypt, Cuba and Hungary by powerful permanent Council members did not weaken the world organization, how could India's action to liberate a part of its territory produce such a disaster?

The Soviet Union vetoed the resolution and saved India the embarrassment of having to ignore a resolution of the Council.

Mr Stevenson's harsh words against India did not impair Indo-U.S. relations. This is largely because of the vast understanding between the two Governments and their people. The U.S. knew the reluctance with which India took the final decision. India postponed the action twice after fixing "vague dates"—first, when some Latin American countries wanted to bring about a peaceful settlement, and on the second occasion on a suggestion from the U.S. itself. Only after the United States informed India that the "Purtuguese response to the American initiative had been a negative one"[4] did this country decide in favour of police action and that too most reluctantly. The action came after India and other friendly nations had given up the hope of a peaceful settlement. All the same, the anxiety of the U.S. Government to help in solving this issue was much appreciated by India. Thanks to the efforts of President John F. Kennedy and the American Ambassador in India, Mr J.K. Galbraith, Indo-U.S. relations are at their most felicitous at present.

Since its independence, India has shown more than once how it stood firmly by the world organization. Irrespective of the regions in which troubles arose, it has placed at the disposal of the U.N. its services, including its armed forces.

Another factor which came to light during the police action was that no Portuguese soldier was prepared to risk his life either for Dr Salazar or to preserve Goa as a colony. The Portuguese soldiers seemed more anxious to retreat. They had no heart to resist. An Indian journalist reported: "A largely conscript army, devoid of professional pride and incapacitated by lethargic inactivity and easy soft life, punctuated with wine and women, the Portuguese soldiers had no stomach for fighting. A majority of them were physically poor specimens—pot-bellied overweights or anaemic pasty-skinned, spindly-legged, whose faces blanched at the very thought of having to march 17 miles from the POW camp to their new camp in Ponda. Many reported physically

[4]Prime Minister Nehru's press conference in New Delhi on December 28, 1961.

unfit and requested to be transported in trucks to their new camps. They carried Dunlop pillows to the trenches where at dusk their wives and girls visited them. These 'forward positions' were littered with empty beer and wine bottles. A Portuguese tank captured was found to be lined inside with beer bottles."

In the words of Prime Minister Nehru, "there was practically no resistance; there was no mind to resist. Not that the Government there did not want to resist. The orders were to resist, but there was no mind to resist. They realized that they had no business to be there. They had to go."

Recent revolts in Portugal itself have proved the unpopularity of Dr Salazar's regime. What to talk of Goans, even the people in Portugal itself have started expressing their strong desire for liberty and a democratic form of government.

After months of hesitation, indecision and anger, Portugal agreed to repatriate the 3,500 of its soldiers in detention in Goa. With the completion of the recall of soldiers and a sympathetic solution of the problem of Indian settlers in Portugal's Asian and African colonies, the relations between India and Portugal would be like those between any two countries in the world. The future relations between the two countries would mainly depend on the attitude of Portugal, because in keeping with their tradition, Indians have no bitterness towards the Portuguese for their misdeeds of 451 years in their colonies in this subcontinent.

CHAPTER II

PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY

THE former Portuguese colonial possessions in India consist of Goa, Diu and Daman and its enclaves Dadra and Nagar Aveli, with a total area of 1,537 square miles. Their population is 637,591—distributed racially, 636,153 Indians, 517 Europeans, 336 Eurasians, 258 Africans, 226 mixed and 101 others—according to the Portuguese census of 1950. The people of Goa speak Konkani. Like Marathi and Gujarati, Konkani is derived from Magadhan Prakrit, an offshoot of Sanskrit. The language of Daman and its enclaves and Diu is Gujarati. The customs and manners of the people in all the Portuguese settlements, whether Hindus or Christians, are similar to those prevailing in the adjoining parts of India with whose people they share a common cultural heritage.

Of the five Portuguese pockets only Goa was of any considerable area—1,309 square miles. It is on India's western coast about 250 miles south-south-east of Bombay, between 14 degrees 53 minutes and 15 degrees and 48 minutes North latitude and between 73 degrees 45 minutes and 74 degrees 24 minutes East longitude. In the north the Tirakul or Auraundem river separates it from the former Savantwadi State and in the east the Western Ghats separate it from Belgaum district. To its south is North Canara district and to the west the Arabian Sea. The extreme length from north to south is 62 miles and the greatest breadth from east to west 40 miles.

Goa is hilly, particularly those areas which the Portuguese acquired later and were known as the Novas Conquistas (New Conquests). Its distinguishing feature is the Sahyadri mountains or Western Ghats, which after skirting a considerable distance of the north-eastern and south-eastern border, branch off westwards across the territory into numerous spurs and ridges. Of the many isolated peaks with which these ranges are studded, the most important are Sonsagar (3,827 feet), Catlanchimaule (3,633 feet), Veguerim (3,500 feet) and Morlemchogor (3,400

feet), all in the Satari Mahal in the north, and Sidnato at Ponda, Chandarnate at Chandrawadi, Consid at Astragar and Dudegar at Embarbakam in the east and west.

The territory is intersected by numerous rivers, which are generally navigable. The Tirakul, so called from the fortress of that name guarding its estuary, has its source in the Western Ghats, in the former Savantwadi State, flows south-west for 14.5 miles and after forming the northern boundary of Pernem district, and also of Goa, discharges its waters into the Arabian Sea. The Chapora or Colvalle, 18 miles long, rises at Ram Ghat, and after separating Bardez and Sanquelim from Pernem, takes a zigzag direction to the south-west through Salem, Revore and Colvalle villages and empties itself into the sea close to Chapora village.

The mile-long Baga and the 3.7-mile-long Sinquerim rise in Bardez; the former passes a redoubt of the same name, and the latter, after describing almost a right angle westward and southward and forming the peninsula of Aguada, falls into the bay of the same name. The Mandavi, 38.5 miles long, is the most important river, both the ancient and modern capitals being situated on its bank. It rises at Parwar Ghat in Satari district, flows north-west of Ponda, and then south-west of Bardez and after forming several islands and passing Panjim or New Goa, joins the Bay of Aguada. The Juari, 39 miles, rises at the foot of Digny Ghat in Embarbakam, runs northwards, separating Salcete from Ponda, and falls into the Bay of Mormagao. Like the Mandavi, it has numerous offshoots, one of which joins the former river between Marcaim and Sao Lourenco after forming the island of Tissuadi. The Sal, 15 miles, runs close to the town of Margao and falls into the sea near the fort of Betul. The seven-mile-long Talpona rises at Ambughat and, running westwards through Canacona district, meets the sea near the small fort of Talpona.

Goa possesses a natural harbour formed by the promontories of Bardez and Mormagao. Half-way between these extremities projects the Cabo—cape—from the island of Goa, dividing the harbour into two anchorages, known as Aguada and Mormagao. Both the harbours are capable of safely accommodating large ships from September to May. Aguada is virtually closed

during the south-west monsoon because of high winds and the rough sea and the formation of sand-banks in the estuary of the Mandavi at that period. But Mormagao is accessible throughout the year. Though an excellent natural harbour it has not been fully developed. As a result of the intersection of rivers, many islands—mainly 18—have been formed. Miles of navigable channels link the lower reaches of the Mandavi and the Juari.

The average rainfall of the region is about 100 inches. Laterite stone is found in abundance. Iron is found at Baga Satari, Pernem and in some of the other districts. The geological resources of Goa have not yet been scientifically explored. Stately forests abound in the New Conquests.

The ancestors of the present Goans were not the original inhabitants of Goa but came from other parts of India. The earliest settlers were a Dravidian clan called Kannadigas. Their kings invited Brahmin priests of the Saraswat caste to their courts from North India. These Brahmins settled in Goa to preach and thus Hinduism came to prevail in Goa. It was believed for a long time that the Cunbis of Goa were the original residents of the region, but now they are grouped with the non-Aryan remnants of the Dravidians, who probably peopled the territory before the Aryans pushed them southwards more than 2,000 years ago.

Goans are the offsprings of Aryan-Dravidian marriages which took place in the course of centuries. Certain words of Dravidian origin still persist in the Konkani language and some customs among the lower classes indicate the Dravidian origin of these people. According to the 1950 census of the Portuguese, the population of Goa is 547,448 including 307,000 Hindus and 230,000 Catholics. About 100 years ago (1851), the same area was inhabited by 363,788 people.

The inhabitants may be divided into three groups—Indians, Europeans and descendants of Europeans. The Indians fall into two subdivisions—Hindus and Christians. The Shenvis, Chitpavans, Karadas, Mahars and Chamars are in the Hindu fold. The Christians are the descendants of Hindus converted to Christianity after the Portuguese conquest and can still trace the caste to which they originally belonged. Among the Christians the men normally wear Eurpoean dress but the women

continue to use the sari. In habits, dress, customs and social matters the majority of the Goans even to this day cannot be distinguished from the people in the adjoining parts of India.

All classes of people except the Europeans who never were more than a thousand use the Konkani language, occasionally with a mixture of Portuguese words. Portuguese, the official language, is spoken hardly by three per cent of the population. The people are conversant more with English than Portuguese in spite of 450 years of Portuguese rule. The majority of the Christians are Roman Catholics and are subject in spiritual matters to an archbishop, who has the title of Primate of the East and exercises jurisdiction over the Catholics of all Portuguese colonies in the east and of a great portion of the former British India. The King of Portugal with the concurrence of the Pope nominated the archbishop. The main Hindu temples are those of Mangesh, Malsha, Santadurga, Kapleshwar, Nagesh and Ramnath, all of which are situated in the New Conquests.

Although a predominantly agricultural region with a fertile soil, Goa does not produce enough food to meet its requirements. The soil is argillaceous but also contains light sand and more or less decayed vegetable matter. In many parts, it is full of stone and gravel. The fertility varies according to the quality of the soil, situation and water supply. Manure such as fish, ashes and dung is largely employed. As a rule, cultivation is done on a better scale in the Old Conquests than in the New. A holding of 15 to 20 acres is considered a good-sized farm in both the divisions. The majority of the agriculturists belong to the small-holder class.

The main produce is rice, harvested twice a year. The crops are raised by means of artificial irrigation from reservoirs, ponds and wells. Rice is cultivated in low-lying fields on the banks of rivers, hill slopes and on firm as well as sandy soil. Coconut is second only to rice in importance and there are luxuriant groves on the coast and on land where rice is not cultivated. There are arecanut groves in the New Conquests and they are irrigated from rivulets. The hills and land with inferior soil are generally used for the cultivation of cereals such as nachinim, urd, culita, mung and tori. Among the most important fruit trees are mango, jack fruit and cashew. Potato,

radish, yam, melons and cucumber are some of the vegetables grown. Chillies, ginger, turmeric and onion, daily consumed by the people, are also cultivated extensively in some of the villages.

Seldom has this region been swept by great floods, though some of the districts occasionally suffer from partial inundation after heavy rains. Formerly Goa was frequently famine-stricken, the worst being in 1553, 1570 and 1682.

Fishing is also an important source of livelihood. During the past three or four years greater attention has been given to mining and iron and manganese ores are exported on a large scale. Between 10,000 and 15,000 people are employed in the mines.

In its days of glory, Goa was the chief centre of commerce between the east and the west. But with the downfall of the Portuguese empire it lost its commercial importance and its trade dwindled into insignificance. With the growth of the mining industry exports are on the increase. There is hardly any other industry of importance. The main exports are coconuts, betelnuts, mangoes, melons, jack fruit, pepper, salt-fish, gum, coir and coir products, firewood and fowls. Salt forms one of the principal sources of revenue. The chief imports are rice, cloth, refined sugar, tobacco, glassware and other goods. The value of imports largely exceeds that of exports, thus causing an adverse balance of trade, which is corrected by the steady flow of money from Goans residing in India.

A railway line connects Mormagao Port with Castle Rock on the Western Ghats in Mysore State. The length of the railway track in Goa is 49 miles.

Goa is divided into 11 concelhos—administrative districts or counties. Four of these, Bardez, Ilhas (Isles of Goa), Salcete and Mormagao, occupied by 1543, form the Old Conquests. The others, Pernem, Sanquelim, Satari, Ponda, Quepem, Sanguem and Canacona, are the New Conquests. These were acquired by the middle of the 18th century.

The settlement of Daman in Gujarat State is about 100 miles north of Bombay. Including the pargana of Nagar Aveli and Dadra its area is about 214 square miles. It is bounded by the Bhagwan river in the north, Gujarat State in the east, Kalem

river in the south and the Gulf of Cambay in the west. Daman proper has an area of 21 square miles and is at the entrance of the Gulf of Cambay. The Daman-Ganga river divides it into two tracts known as Daman Grande (Great Daman) and Daman Piquene (Little Daman).

The enclaves of Dadra and Nagar Aveli are separated from Daman by a narrow strip of land five to seven miles wide and intersected by the Western Railway.

The pargana of Nagar Aveli and Dadra is surrounded by the Umargaon taluka of Surat district and Dahanu taluka of Thana district in the west, Pardi taluka of Thana district in the south and Dharampur taluka of Surat district and Jawar taluka of Thana district in the east.

The nearest railway station is Vapi, 11 miles from Silvassa, the capital of Nagar Aveli. Nagar Aveli is separated by two miles of Indian territory from Dadra, located to its west. The pargana was ceded to the Portuguese by the Marathas as indemnification for piratical acts committed against a ship flying the Portuguese flag, in accordance with a treaty signed on January 6, 1780 at Poona.[1]

The principal rivers are the Bhagwan, forming the northern boundary, Kalem, running along the southern boundary and Sandalkhal or Daman-Ganga, a deep navigable stream rising in the Ghats about 40 miles east of Daman proper. Those rivers fall into the Gulf of Cambay. The Daman-Ganga has a bar at its mouth, dry at ebb tide but with 18 to 20 feet of water at high tide. Daman was once famous for its docks and ship-building yards, mainly because of the excellent teak with which it is covered. The climate is generally healthy throughout the year. The settlement is not believed to contain minerals but possesses stately forests in the pargana of Nagar Aveli. Teak (Tectona grandis) grows in about two-thirds of these forests.

The principal crops in Daman are rice, wheat, inferior cereals common in Gujarat and tobacco. Only about a twentieth part of the territory is under the plough. In the pargana the greater part of the land belongs to the Government and is leased to cultivators. A tax is levied on all lands, whether alienated or

[1] *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. V, p. 87.

State property. There is, however, no fixed rate of assessment and the tax is regulated by a general estimate of the productiveness of each village.

Daman had extensive trade relations, especially with the eastern coast of Africa, before the decline of the Portuguese power in the east. Cotton fabrics prepared in Gujarat were exported in vessels flying the Portuguese flag. Between 1817 and 1837 there was a flourishing trade with China in opium imported from Karachi. But following the conquest of Sind by the British the transport of opium was prohibited and Daman was deprived of its chief source of revenue. Daman was once noted for its weaving and dyeing. It has a prosperous deep-sea fishing industry employing about 150 vessels, each with a crew of about 30 *khandis*. The population of 69,005 comprises 61,607 Hindus, 2,644 Catholics, 4,400 Muslims and 295 others, according to the Portuguese census of 1950.

The central parts of the enclaves are flat and the north-east, east and south extremely hilly. The slopes are generally steep. The soil has been formed by disintegration and weathering. In the central parts the soil is deep clay which cracks during the summer. In the northern and southern parts the soil tends to be shallow with a considerable portion of *murram*, on account of erosion caused by the practice of shifting cultivation and is generally moist and fertile. Forests form the main wealth of Nagar Aveli. The nonforest area is used partly for cultivation of rice and other grains and partly kept fallow for grazing. The area under rice is 22,560 acres. The standard of cultivation is generally low.

According to a census conducted in 1960, Nagar Aveli has a population of 50,873 and 9,877 households. About 44,500 or approximately 88 per cent are Adivasis, 1,252 Scheduled Castes and 5,075 belong to other communities of which the prominent are Rajputs and Bhandaris. There are 49,772 Hindus, 585 Christians, 366 Muslims, 111 Jains and 39 Zoroastrians.

A geological survey is yet to be conducted, but the area is reported not rich in minerals. The majority of the people depend on agriculture for livelihood. Land is concentrated in the hands of certain classes. The exports are rice and wood.

There are 38 miles of road and 125 miles of cart tracks. Because of heavy rain, about 125 inches spread over 80 days, and the absence of bridges at many points, most of the roads are usable only during fair weather.

The island of Diu in west India is situated at latitude 20 degrees 43 minutes and 20 seconds North and longitude 71 degrees two minutes and 30 seconds East. It is separated from the mainland by a narrow channel through a considerable swamp from the southern extremity of the Kathiawar peninsula. Its length east-west is about seven miles and its greatest width north to south two miles. In the south, the face of the island is a sandstone cliff washed by the sea, with deep water close beneath. Coconut groves dot the island. The hills attain an elevation of about 100 feet.

Diu has a small but excellent harbour. Agriculture has been much neglected. Wheat, millet, nachinim, bajra, coconuts and fruit are the main crops. In its palmy days, Diu town was a prosperous commercial centre with about 50,000 inhabitants. Not long ago it maintained mercantile relations with several parts of India and Mozambique, but at present its trade is almost stagnant.

The capital of the former Portuguese colonies in India, Goa is situated near the mouth of the Mandavi river 15 degrees 30 minutes North latitude and 73 degrees 57 minutes East longitude.

Some of the islands of Ilhas are mere dots in the sea. The largest—the main island of Goa—is about 48 square miles. Both the old capital called Velha Goa and the new capital, Nova Goa, are located on this island. It is at the confluence of the two rivers Mandavi and Juari. The western end of the island, called the cape or *Cabo*, forms a part of Nova Goa.

The island of Goa consists of three cities which represent three successive stages in the history of western India. The ancient Hindu city built by the Kadambas on the banks of the Juari river was the earliest. No trace of the buildings of this city exists at present.

The second city, known as Old Goa, was the first capital of the Portuguese and still continues to be the ecclesiastical metropolis of Roman Catholics in India. This city, about five miles

to the north of the ancient Hindu city, was built by Mohammedans in 1479, some 19 years before the arrival of Vasco da Gama in India. After its capture by Albuquerque in 1510, this city became the capital of the Portuguese empire in Asia. At one time it enjoyed the same privileges as Lisbon. It reached the zenith of its glory during the 16th century but with the decline of the Portuguese power in the following century, it gradually began to lose its importance, except as an eccelesiastical metropolis. Panjim, the third city, later became the seat of the Portuguese administration.

Repeated outbreaks of plague led to the shifting of the Government to Panjim. The city which was once pulsating with life and had 200,000 inhabitants was left with hardly 2,000 poverty-stricken people to look after the few religious edifices. Foremost among the surviving structures are the cathedral dedicated by Afonso de Albuquerque to St. Catherine in commemoration of his entry into Goa on the day of her festival. Built as a parish church in 1512, it was reconstructed in 1623 in its present majestic proportions. The church was elevated to the rank of a primatial See about a century before the reconstruction and has to this day retained this position. Service is held every day by canons attached to it. The chapel of St. Catherine was erected in 1551 on the site of the gate of the Mohammedan city through which Albuquerque entered after his victory.

The convent of St. Francis was originally a mosque. The Portuguese converted it into a church and it was the first structure consecrated to Catholic worship in Goa. Though the convent was reconstructed in 1661, its chief portal, considered the earliest specimen of Portuguese architecture in India, has been preserved to this day.

Construction of the church of Bom Jesus was begun in 1594 and was consecrated in 1603. This fine edifice enjoys worldwide fame for holding the remains of the apostle of the Indies, St. Francis Xavier, the events of whose life are represented around the shrine. Work on the convent of St. Monica was started in 1606 and completed in 1627. Built in the middle of the 17th century by an order of the Theatines, the convent of St. Cajetan resembles St. Peter's in Rome.

Many other historical edifices which embellished Old Goa are no more there, and hardly few traces remain to tell visitors of its beauty and magnificence. The once famous palace of the viceroys, the spacious Customs House and many other public buildings have been completely destroyed. The college of St. Roque belonging to the Order of Jesus, the Senate houses, the once famous palace of the Inquisition, the church of the Miraculous Cross, the college of St. Paul, the hospital of St. Lazarus, the church and convent of St. Augustine as well as the college of the same name close by, are all in ruins. The chapel of the Cinco Chagas (the five wounds) and the ecclesiastical jail still stand in a dilapidated condition. As long as it can boast of monuments of Christian piety and retains the shrine of the great eastern evangelist, Old Goa will continue to attract pilgrims from all parts of the Catholic world.

In 1759, the viceroy shifted his residence to Panjim and expelled Jesuits from the region. With the departure of the Jesuits the last sparks of commercial enterprise died out and Old Goa became a suburb of Panjim. Only 1,600 of the population of 30,000 continued to stay there. All efforts to repopulate it have failed. "The river," wrote Dr Russell in 1877, "washes the remains of the great city—an arsenal in ruins; palaces in ruins; quay walls in ruins; churches in ruins; all in ruins. We looked and saw the site of the Inquisition, the bishop's prison, a great cathedral, great churches, chapels, convents, religious houses on knolls surrounded by jungle. We saw the crumbling masonry which once marked the lines of streets and enclosures of palaces, dockyards filled with weeds and obsolete cranes."

Nova Goa, the last capital of Portuguese India, consists of Panjim, Ribandar and the old city of Goa and is six square miles in extent. While Panjim is the capital of the territory of Goa, Nova Goa is the capital of all the three Portuguese enclaves in India. Panjim, the capital town, is one of the wards of Nova Goa. It is on the left bank of Mandavi river, about three miles from its mouth. Ribandar, a suburb, is connected with central Panjim by a causeway, about 300 yards long, through which the main road to Old Goa passes. Panjim stands on a narrow strip of land enclosed by the causeway in the east, the village of St. Ignez in the west, the river on the north and a hill walling it in the south.

Before the shifting of the capital, it was a fishing village with a few huts and was noted only for the fortress built by Yusuf Adil Shah, which now houses the governor-general's palace. As in Bombay, the land surface here has been formed by filling up hollows gradually and reclaiming large tracts of marshy land.

Panjim, which was chosen as the residence of the Portuguese viceroy in 1759, was formally raised to the rank of the capital of Portuguese India by a royal decree in 1843. With a row of public buildings and elegant private residences, the city looks picturesque from the river. This impression gains strength as one goes into the interior along the neat and spacious roads with beautiful houses on either sides. One of the important public structures is the barracks, an immense quadrangular edifice, the eastern wing of which accommodates the College of Lyceum, the public library, and the professional institute for teaching chemistry, agriculture and other sciences.

The island of Anjadiv is irregular in shape and measures about half a square mile in area. Its only anchorage is on the landward side. Vasco da Gama visited the island in 1498. In 1505 a fort was constructed but was later demolished as it was found useless. Later in 1682, another fort was built. The island is unhealthy and it was used by the Portuguese as a penal settlement.

CHAPTER III

EARLY HISTORY

GOA has a hoary history spanning 5,000 years. The epics of Ramayana and Mahabharata and the Puranas contain references to Goa. In ancient times Goa was known by various names such as Gomanchala, Goapuri, Gopakapur, Gopakapatna and Gomant.

Gomant means a cool and fertile land, a correct description of Goa. The glamorous territory attracted not only ancient but also modern writers, who described it in generous terms such as Goa the Golden, Rome of India and Rome of the Orient.[1]

The Sahyadri Kanda of the Skanda Purana says that Aryans were brought to Goa by the mythological hero Parasurama from Tribotrapur or Mithila, the modern Tirhut. Certain inscriptions recently deciphered corroborate the evidence of the Puranas. Investigations have also helped to identify Goa as the Sindabut of Arab writers.

Goa's earliest settlers belonged to a Dravidian clan called Kannadigas. Their kings invited to their courts Brahmin priests of the Saraswat caste from North India. These priests settled in the territory to preach Hinduism. During the period of Emperor Asoka, Buddhism spread to Goa and struck root there. After Asoka, Goa passed under the sway of the Kadambas of Banavasi about 200 B.C. Trilochana Kadamba, the three-eyed Kadamba, who was believed to have sprung from a drop of Siva's sweat which fell at the foot of a Kadamba tree,[2] was a powerful king of this dynasty in 120 A.D. (After the defeat of Pingal, the prince of Saurashtra, Goa was acquired by Chandragupta Maurya and formed a part of the Aparanta province of Chandragupta's empire.) For many centuries, the Batpuras, descendants of Trilochana Kadamba, ruled over Goa. King Jayakeshi of this dynasty made Goapuri his capital. The Kadambas of Goa were a branch of the famous Kadamba

[1]Remy, *Goa—Rome of the Orient.*
[2]C.F. Saldanha, *A Short History of Goa*, p. 29.

dynasty of the Carnatak, a Canarese royal family whose ancestor was Tirulochana Kadamba.

A branch of the Kadamba family settled in Chandor, Goa, and although it acknowledged the Chalukya overlordship it maintained itself more or less independent. It ruled over that part of modern Goa to the south of the Juari, while the Silaharas of Bali held sway over the island of Goa with its great commercial centre at Goapuri. After a short period, the Kadambas ruled over the greater part of Goa which they unified into a prosperous kingdom.[3]

During the reign of the Hindu kings, Goa was a flourishing city. Gopakapatna or Goapuri became the permanent residence and capital of the kings. Its trade relations extended from Zanzibar in Africa to Bengal and from Ceylon to Saurashtra.

By 1126 A.D., the Kadambas of Goa had extended their kingdom to Unakal near Dharwar in the east, Sampgaum, Halsi and Haive in north Canara and as far as Salsette near Bombay in the north. Though Jayakeshi II, the then ruler of Goa, could not call himself Konkana Chakravarti, he wielded all power like an emperor over this vast territory. He maintained a strong army and his fleet gained the supremacy of the seas.

These Hindu kings built a number of palaces, temples, forts and other edifices. Goa became a centre of trade and commerce and a great emporium of the orient unrivalled in the whole of India.

Islam came to Goa with Malik Kafur, a general of Sultan Allauddin of Delhi, in 1312 A.D. He turned his attention to this territory after destroying the Yadava empire and razing its capital Devagiri. He overran Goa and the western coast as far as the cape of Rameshwaram with plunder as the aim. He burnt Gopakapatna and his troops occupied it. Kamadeva, the then Kadamba ruler, took refuge in Chandor, where he died in 1310 A.D. When the Mohammedan plunderers withdrew, Kamadeva's son and successor recovered the entire territory and entered into an agreement with Ballaladeva III, Emperor of the Hoysalas, against the Mohammedans. This ruler stayed in Chandor as the city of Goa had already lost its splendour

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

and naval supremacy. Thus Chandor, the capital of Goa at the beginning of the Kadamba dynasty, again became the seat of the Kadamba kings.

Peace in the territory was short-lived. In 1327 A.D. Muhammad bin Tughlak, Sultan of Delhi, sent an army to conquer South India and Goa fell for a second time to the Muslim invaders. The ruler, son of Kamadeva, fell defending his capital, but when the invaders left after plundering Goa, Kamadeva's grandson proclaimed himself king of Goa and did his best to help it stand on its feet. One of his sons quarrelled with him and turned traitor by inviting Jamal-ud-din, the Nawab of Honavar, to come and conquer Chandor.

Jamal-ud-din appeared with a fleet of 52 ships at Mormagao. During the battle that ensued the king managed to escape and the invaders occupied the palace. After some time, he returned with an army of faithful men and occupied the capital. But the Mohammedan invaders returned and besieged the city. The king died fighting. The queen was not in the capital. The princesses and the women of the court, in desperation, destroyed their jewellery and jumped from the city walls into the river. This was the end of the Kadambas.

In 1347 A.D. Hasan Gangu Bahamani, the founder of the Bahamani dynasty of Kalburga, seized Goa but later lost it to Vidyaranga Madhava of the powerful Vijayanagar empire. Mahmud Khwaji, the Bahamani vazir, recaptured Goa in 1472. After the downfall of the Bahamani empire, Goa became a part of the territory of the Sultan of Bijapur.

Under the Muslim rulers, during the 15th century, Goa made great progress. It became the meeting place of sailors of all eastern trading nations and also a focal point for all Muslims in South India. Muslim pilgrims to Mecca embarked from here. The rulers built some of the finest mosques in this area. Yusuf Adil Shah, Sultan of Bijapur, spent most of his time in these territories and even wanted to make Goa the capital of his empire in the Deccan.

In the 15th century Europe was speculating about new trade routes to the east, and the Portuguese, who were well advanced in nautical astronomy, were keen on reaching India by going round the African coast. The discovery of the West Indies by

Columbus spurred the Portuguese to renew their attempts to reach India by the South African route.

The first Portuguese to set foot on Indian soil was Poru de Covilha, an adventurer and the personal agent of King John II. Disguised as an Arab merchant he arrived at Cannanore in 1488 aboard an Arab trading ship. He visited Goa, Calicut and several other port settlements on the Malabar coast to gather information about western India. The voyage in the Arab ship helped him to know the sea routes to India and navigation conditions on the way. In 1491, he secretly sent all this information to the agent of the King of Portugal at Cairo. His reports played an important part in the Portuguese expeditions to India.

The reasons that impelled the Portuguese to embark on their perilous voyages across unknown seas were the need for finding a direct sea-route to India, famous for spices, and their zeal to spread Christianity to the ends of the earth. There is a history behind this crusading spirit. The Christians of Portugal languished for centuries under the heels of the Saracens until Count Henry of Burgundy founded the country of Portugal in 1084 by expelling the Saracens from the northern part of Portugal. Thereafter, the Portuguese Christians fell upon the decaying Muslim kingdoms of the region and drove them away from their territory.

Vasco da Gama, the great Portuguese admiral, who left Lisbon for India on July 8, 1497, at the head of three vessels, varying from 60 to 150 tons, rounded the Cape of Good Hope and reached Zanzibar. The people there knew India very well and it was not difficult for him to obtain the services of an experienced Arab pilot. With his help, the Portuguese explorer crossed the Indian Ocean and anchored off a small village eight miles north of Calicut on May 17, 1498.

"It is not without significance that the first landing of these men, whose main object was to usurp the spice trade, hitherto a monopoly of the Mohammedans, should have been on Hindu territory. One wonders what might have been the fate of da Gama and his companions if the landing had been attempted, say, in some part of the powerful Muslim kingdom of Gujarat. As it turned out, the Hindu ruler of Calicut, whose hereditary

title was Zamorin, gave a friendly reception to these strangers, had them conducted by a pilot to a safer anchorage and invited da Gama to pay him a visit in Calicut. In response to this invitation a party of fourteen set out for the Zamorin's capital."

Vasco da Gama secured from the Zamorin, who was then the most important naval power in that part of India, permission to set up a factory in the town. But, he was jealous of the Arab and Persian traders who had firm trade relations with the Malabar coast and who wielded high influence in Calicut. Further, the articles he had brought failed to impress the people. After ascertaining the kind of articles most useful for barter trade and securing samples of pepper and other products of Malabar, he sailed home on August 29, 1498. But before the return voyage, he carried with him five out of the 12 inhabitants he had taken prisoner as a reprisal for the detention of some of his goods, ultimately restored to him. Thus at their very first visit to India, the Portuguese exhibited the type of hospitality that could be expected of them.

The voyage was a great success and da Gama returned to Lisbon after an absence of two years with two of his three ships and 55 men out of the original company of 170—not only with a rich cargo of spices and pepper but also with the knowledge that the Portuguese, because of their superior naval power, could command the eastern trade monopoly against the Arabs, their age-old enemies.

Though Vasco da Gama was a famous explorer from the Portuguese point of view, historians have a different opinion. He was considered intellectually mediocre and ruthlessly cruel. After spending three months in a Hindu country, he left the place without discovering the existence of the Hindu religion or Hindu society. According to him the people in India, other than Mohammadans, were Christians "but of course, bad Christians as they were not Catholics. . . . Still it remains a mystery why they failed to discover that the Zamorin was neither a Christian nor Muslim, seeing that they were for so long in daily intercourse with him."[4] So great was his ignorance of things that he mistook a Hindu temple for a chapel, and though he

[4] *The Cambridge History of India*, Vol. V, p. 4.

found the Hindu idols a little unorthodox in type, he and his party nevertheless entered the temple and prayed there.

Two years later, Pedro Alvarez Cabral, commanding a fleet of 13 ships and 1,200 men, left for India on March 9, 1500. Following negotiations on arrival at Calicut, a factory was set up and 70 Portuguese carried on trade. Cabral felt unhappy over the influence of Arab and Persian traders in Malabar. He provoked the Muslims and in the fight that followed 50 of the 70 Portuguese were killed and the factory was destroyed. Cabral retreated hastily from the town, but before doing so with only two ships laden, "he put to death 600 innocent boatmen who had had nothing to do with the riot and for two days bombarded the town."[5]

On December 24 he reached Cochin, where the Raja, an enemy of the Zamorin, welcomed him and gave him facilities for trade. Here he loaded the remaining ships. Hearing that a large fleet was sailing down the coast from Calicut to attack him, Cabral stole away on the night of January 9, 1501, leaving in Cochin about 30 Portuguese. Cabral's account of the Zamorin's naval power and trade difficulties in Calicut angered the King of Portugal, who decided to obtain mastery of the Indian Ocean.

The Raja provided Cabral with all supplies to enable him to sail home. "Eventually Cabral reached Portugal with five vessels so richly laden that the expenses of the whole expedition were more than covered. But the most important result of this journey, disastrous in many ways, was the discovery of the Cochin harbour, which was greatly superior to Calicut as an anchorage, and the further knowledge of Indian politics, which taught the Portuguese that in the Raja of Cochin, the enemy of the Zamorin, they might find a constant ally."[6]

The King of Portugal sent Vasco da Gama to India with a fleet of 20 ships in February 1502, and Estavao da Gama with five vessels in April. In September the combined fleet assembled off Anjadiv Island and perpetrated one of the most dreadful deeds in the annals of the period. The Portuguese intercepted a Muslim pilgrim ship on its way to India from

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 5. [6] *Ibid.*

the Red Sea and sank it without any provocation. There were a number of children and women on board, but no mercy was shown, and da Gama watched the scene through a port-hole.

He reached Calicut on October 29, 1502, and called on the Zamorin and demanded the expulsion of the Arabs and the Persians, He also demanded that the Portuguese be given the coastal trade monopoly. The Zamorin replied that the Portuguese were free to carry on trade along with the Arabs and the Persians whom he refused to turn out of the country. This angered da Gama, who fired at Calicut from the sea. He also captured 800 innocent fishermen and chopped off their hands, legs and heads. The bodies were put in a vessel and allowed to drift ashore. He sailed for Cochin where he erected a factory. He also visited Cannanore to strengthen the factory there before reaching Lisbon on September 1, 1503.

In April that year, three small squadrons sailed for India under the respective commands of Afonso de Albuquerque, his cousin Francisco d'Albuquerque and Saldanha. Francisco, who was the first to arrive in India, found the Zamorin still at war with Portugal. The Zamorin's troops, which had overrun Cochin to punish the Raja for his deeds, were driven away by Francisco who started constructing a fortress at Cochin—the first to be built by the Portuguese. After the arrival of Afonso the remaining part of the Raja's territory was also cleared of the Zamorin's troops and a treaty was concluded between the two Hindu princes, under which the Zamorin agreed to give the Portugese 4,000 cwt of pepper. On January 31, 1504, the Albuquerques left for home. On the way, Francisco disappeared mysteriously and Afonso reached Lisbon with only two ships.

By 1505 the Portuguese realized that there was little use of their sending fleets at regular intervals to India to keep the Malabar coast trade for themselves. It was decided to appoint a viceroy who would remain at his post in India for three years. With this aim, Francisco d'Almeida was sent out to India with a large fleet and 1,500 soldiers with orders to build fortresses at Kilwa, Anjadiv, Cannanore and Cochin, and to cut the trade communications of the Arab and Persians by seizing Malacca, Ormuz and Aden.

Soon the Portuguese established themselves so strongly on the western coast that no Indian vessel could ply safely without carrying a pass issued by the commandants of these fortresses. This and the preparations of Almeida alarmed the Zamorin, who recognized in them a new challenge to his power. In 1507 he sent word to Melique Az, described as the Lord of Diu and captain under the Sultan of Gujarat, to seize any Portuguese ship seen carrying pepper and drugs to ports in Gujarat and to make war on the Portuguese. He assured Melique Az of all assistance in the task.

At this very time, the Sultan of Cairo, who lost his chief source of revenue because of the Portuguese activities, sent a large fleet commanded by Mir Homez to India to fight the Portuguese. On the way, Mir Homez touched Diu and came to an agreement with Melique Az for a joint operation against the Portuguese.

Almeida came to know of all these arrangements and decided to crush his opponents individually, a process which always paid rich dividends to foreigners. He fitted out a fleet with his son Don Lourence as commander. The fleet captured seven Mohammedan ships off Chaul and slaughtered all the crew. On seeing a huge fleet of the Zamorin awaiting him at Dabhol, he hastily retreated. One of his captains took over a ship at Cannanore and butchered all the Mohammedans in it. Among those killed was a rich merchant, whose body was washed ashore. This incident provoked the King of Cannanore and he broke off relations with the Portuguese and stormed the Portuguese fleet at Cannanore with a large army of 60,000 Nairs, including 20,000 provided by the Zamorin. The siege lasted several days during which the garrison was practically starved and forced to subsist on rats and lizards. The Nairs, in a great land and sea assault before *Onam*, their harvest festival, entered the fort. During the fight many Portuguese were killed and many others were wounded. At this critical hour, help came from a Portuguese fleet just arrived from Europe under the command of Tristao da Cunha. The reinforced Portuguese drove back the attackers and the King of Cannanore sued for peace.

Meanwhile, Don Lourence, who was out to attack the fleets of Cairo, Gujarat and Calicut, met the ships from Cairo off

Chaul. In the engagement Lourence was getting the upper hand when Melique Az arrived with his Gujarat fleet. The Portuguese were routed and Don Lourence was killed.

In 1508 Almeida sailed from Cannanore towards Diu to avenge his son's death. His fleet reached Diu in February 1509, after destroying Dabhol on its way. Almeida defeated the combined force of Melique Az and Mir Mozem of Cairo, massacred his opponents and burnt the entire fleet. On his triumphal return journey, Almeida halted at different ports and subjected the Mohammedans to all types of tortures.[7]

The three-year viceroyalty of Almeida was coming to a close and Afonso d'Albuquerque, sent by the King of Portugal to succeed Almeida with only the lower title of governor of India, arrived at Cannanore with a fleet in December 1508. When he arrived, Almeida was preparing to leave for Diu. He met the Muslim fleet off Diu and defeated it in February 1509. On his return to Cochin in March, instead of handing over power to Albuquerque, Almeida imprisoned the future governor and sent him in a ship to Cannanore to be shut up there in the fort. At this time, Marshal Countinho of Portugal, who had power to appoint and dismiss even viceroys, reached Cannanore. He was related to Albuquerque. The marshal promptly set the governor-designate at liberty and made him governor on November 5, 1509.

The King of Portugal had sent the marshal with the specific order to destroy Calicut because the Zamorin had not agreed to drive away the Mohammedan traders. Against the advice of Albuquerque, the marshal proceeded to Calicut with a large army and after destroying many ships in port and killing a large number of people in the town, turned towards the Zamorin's palace. The Marshal was killed in battle and most of his men wiped out. The few Portuguese who survived were seriously wounded. This was a great setback to the Portuguese until the conquest of Goa by Albuquerque.

By now the Portuguese had increased their armed forces in India and had also built and fortified the Anjadiv island, Cannanore and Cochin from where they plundered and destroyed Indian and Arab merchant ships. Almeida, the first Portuguese

[7]K.N. Menon, *Portuguese Pockets in India.*

viceroy, had secured a few ports as trading depots, where he built factories and naval bases to maintain Portuguese naval supremacy in the east. Portugal was a small country and could not furnish a large army of occupation necessary for any territorial conquest.

Afonso d'Albuquerque, who succeeded Almeida, had come to India charged with the task of destroying every Mohammedan ship to ensure for Portugal complete mastery over the Indian Ocean. The new governor soon realized that unless the Portuguese possessed some territory in India from which they could draw reserves and reinforcements in times of emergency, all efforts to obtain trade supremacy would be in vain.

He, therefore, thought of founding a Portuguese empire in the east. He had heard of the island city of Goa with its highly strategic position. Possession of Goa, he knew, would help him dominate the Arabian Sea.

His first expedition was against Calicut, but he achieved nothing beyond the destruction of a few buildings. During the engagement, Albuquerque himself received two wounds in the shoulder. But no sooner had he become fit than he set out to re-equip the whole fleet with the object of proceeding to the Red Sea in search of the fleet of the Sultan of Egypt. On February 10, 1510, he sailed from Cochin with 23 ships, but learning that Goa was defenceless he diverted his course and anchored off his destination on February 28.

The Goa of those days had attained a degree of progress and prosperity not witnessed anywhere in India. Long before Portugal became a nation, Goa had seen days of glory. It was a great emporium of the east and had a highly organized administrative system, currency and coinage. It had drafted mercantile laws and appointed Customs officers.

Some Hindu chiefs of Goa invited Albuquerque to help them relieve the Hindu population from the fanatical oppression of Adil Shah's governor at Goa. External and internal strife and the aggrieved party approaching a foreign power for help have been features of Indian history. The foreigners took advantage of these invitations and not only defeated the enemy of the Indian friend but later subjugated the friend himself.

A mendicant or *yogi* had forecast the conquest of Goa by people from a distant land. The prediction had its own effect when Goa was besieged by the Portuguese. On March 1, 1510, when the Sultan was temporarily away from Goa, Albuquerque sailed up the Mandavi river with his fleet and captured 24 ships belonging to various nationalities lying at anchor in Goa harbour and looted them. Disheartened, eight leading citizens presented the keys of the city to Albuquerque on their knees. They also presented him with a large banner, which was unfurled only on ceremonial occasions. Mounted on a steed, Albuquerque entered the city at the head of a triumphal procession to the beating of the drums and the blowing of trumpets. The Portuguese banner was carried by the flower of Lisbon nobility and clergymen were at the head of the procession. The immense multitude welcomed the foreigner by showering on him flowers and garlands of gold and silver threads.

Two months later, Yusuf Adil Shah, the King of Bijapur, sent to Goa a large army which drove the Portuguese into the sea. Later in the year Albuquerque obtained reinforcements, returned to Goa with a larger fleet and attacked it. Yusuf Adil Shah was dead and his son Ismail Adil Shah was in process of stabilizing himself. Though the fortress of Goa had been strengthened it could not resist the superior force of the Portuguese.

On the morning of November 25, 1510, the day of St. Catherine, Albuquerque attacked the city and some of his men entered it by climbing the wall. There was fierce street fighting, followed by a terrible slaughter of men, women and children. For three days the citizens were subjected to every type of atrocity. Mohammedans were the worst victims. Albuquerque described the battle in his letter to the Portuguese King in the following words: "I then burnt the city and put everything to sword, and for days continuously the people shed blood. Wherever they were found and caught, no life was spared to any Musalman, and their mosques were filled up and set on fire. We counted 6,000 dead bodies. It was, my Lord, a great deed, well fought and well finished."

He also wrote: "My determination now is to prevent any Moor entering Goa, to leave a sufficient force of men and ships

in the place, then with another fleet to visit the Red Sea and Ormuz."

Almost within a week of his march into Goa, Albuquerque repaired the fortress and started construction of a chapel to St. Catherine. Muslim Government employees, who survived the three-day slaughter, were replaced by Portuguese and to encourage mixed marriages, Portuguese with Indian wives were treated as a privileged class for appointment to petty offices and given portions of the conquered territory. Newly converted Christians who married Hindu or Muslim women were also treated as a privileged class.

Even after the conquest of Goa, the Portuguese continued to plunder and extort money from the people. A fifth part of the plunder reserved for the Crown amounted to £20,000. The Portuguese also inaugurated slave trade by seizing able-bodied men and women in the neighbouring Indian territory and selling them. They opened a slave market in Goa.

The following year the Sultan of Bijapur attacked Goa but the Portuguese under the command of Albuquerque defeated him. After strengthening the garrison, Albuquerque left for Cochin in 1513 and then for Diu where the Sultan of Gujarat had offered him a site for a fortress. Angered by the highhandedness of the Portuguese in Goa, the Zamorin and the rulers of Cochin and Cannanore wrote to the King of Portugal that it would be in his interests to abandon Goa. When Albuquerque returned from his visit to Diu, he found a dispatch from the King awaiting him. In his letter, the King asked Albuquerque to consult the King's council about the future of Goa and abandon it if it decided that keeping it was not in the King's interest. Albuquerque first succeeded in getting the Zamorin poisoned and wrote a haughty reply to the King. He also managed to get the King's council vote in favour of retaining Goa.

Having heard that Lopo Soares had been appointed captain-major in India and that he himself had been recalled, Albuquerque wrote to King Manoel on December 6, 1515: "This letter to Your Majesty is not written by my hand, as when I write I am troubled with hiccup which is a sign of approaching death. I have here a son to whom I bequeath the little I possess. Events in India will speak for themselves as well as for me. I leave the

chief place in India in Your Majesty's power, the only thing left to be done being the closing of the gates of the straits. I beg Your Majesty to remember all I have done for India, and to make my son great for my sake."

"He died on 16 December 1515, having done more than any other Portuguese leader to establish the prestige of his King, and to make the name of his fellow-countrymen respected and feared. He realized that the three keys to the eastern trade were Malacca, Ormuz and Aden. He obtained complete control of the first two, and almost secured the third. He combined the most resolute determination with the greatest personal bravery. He was scrupulously loyal to his master; and the only blot on his character was his ruthless cruelty towards his enemies, the Mohammedans."[8]

Goa, thus, became the first Indian territory to be ruled directly by Europeans after Alexander the Great. Afonso d'Albuquerque was responsible for the establishment of the Portuguese colonial rule in India for the first time.

After the capture of Goa, the Portuguese turned their attention to Diu, another important port in that part of the Arabian Sea. When the Sultan of Gujarat came to know of the fall of Goa and the great massacre of Mohammedans there, he felt that sooner or later the Portuguese would send an expedition to Diu and capture it. Already, Almeida had burnt the city of Diu in 1509 to avenge his son's death. To avoid war and bloodshed, the Sultan made a conciliatory offer by sending an ambassador to Albuquerque offering the island of Diu as the site for a fortress for the Portuguese.

Albuquerque accepted the offer and visited Diu in 1513 with the object of setting up a naval base there. Melik Az, governor of Diu, warmly received him. He left after satisfying himself about the situation of the island and leaving behind ships and men and merchandize for sale.

About the same time, a messenger from the Sultan of Cairo brought presents to the Sultans of Gujarat and Bijapur and other ruling chiefs of India. A letter requested them to make constant war on the Portuguese. On receipt of this message, the Sultan of Gujarat changed his mind about allowing concessions

[8] *The Cambridge History of India*, Vol. V, p. 12.

to the Portuguese at Diu. He sent a messenger to Albuquerque informing him that he would allow the latter to build a fort only at a place other than Diu. The messenger met Albuquerque at Chaul, and the latter sent an ambassador to the Sultan at Cambay insisting on the implementation of the earlier offer. The Sultan replied that the Portuguese could build a fort at Bakhar instead of Diu. When the Portuguese general refused the second offer also, the Sultan asked him to consider alternative sites at Broach, Surat and Mahim. Albuquerque stood firm by Diu. The Sultan ordered the governor of Diu to attack Portuguese ships. The majority of the ships were destroyed and the few undamaged fled.

Albuquerque's dream of conquering Diu could not be fulfilled as by now he was superseded by Lopo Soares, captain-major. His four successors also could not make much headway in taking over Diu. Nuno da Cunha, the sixth successor of Lopo, shifted his headquarters from Cochin to Goa early in 1530 so that he might be nearer his target.

In January 1531, Nuno da Cunha sailed with a fleet of 400 vessels and thousands of troops for the final attack on Diu. On the way, he killed thousands of people at Daman and proceeded to the Gulf of Cambay. From the island of Bete, about 24 miles from Diu, da Cunha sent word to the Sultan asking him to give up Diu. When the people of Bete replied to this demand with a volley of fire, the Portuguese governor overran it and ordered his men to butcher every living being. He fortified the islet as a base and attacked his target with his entire fleet.

Anticipating the attack the Sultan had put 10,000 men and heavy artillery on the island. But, when the more powerful Portuguese fleet surrounded the island and started bombarding, Diu offered to surrender on condition that the women and children were allowed to leave the place unharmed. The governor refused to agree. The people, finding no way of escape, killed their own wives and children so that they might not fall into the hands of the enemy. The garrison took positions for the last fight, but was overpowered and destroyed.

A large Turkish fleet soon appeared on the horizon. Estimating their own poor strength, the Portuguese hastily retreated and were hotly pursued by the Turks. Sixty Portuguese vessels

were destroyed and a large number of their soldiers were killed. But Nuno da Cunha managed to escape to Goa with the remaining ships.

In October 1535, while the forces of Humayun were advancing in Gujarat after an attack, Sultan Bahadur Shah appealed to the Portuguese for help. He agreed to give them a footing at Diu in return for a contingent of 500 Portuguese. The previous year, he had already made considerable concessions by ceding to the Portuguese the island of Bassein with all its dependencies and revenues. When Humayun suddenly withdrew in 1537 the Sultan felt that the troubles were over and regretted his offer to the foreigners. Now he wanted to negotiate with Nuno da Cunha for his withdrawal from Diu. Incidentally, the Portuguese contingent of 500 had not as yet arrived.

To negotiate for the renewal of the treaty, Sultan Bahadur Shah invited the Portuguese governor to Cambay. But Nuno da Cunha insisted on a meeting at sea aboard a Portuguese ship. Each was suspicious of the other. However, the Sultan agreed and met da Cunha on board the ship off Diu. A scuffle is reported to have taken place during which Bahadur Shah fell into the sea. From then on, the Portuguese held sway over Diu. "The exact circumstances which led to the drowning of Bahadur Shah will never be known. The various narratives first time here come in conflict, each side blaming the other for for the the disaster, which occurred on 13 February, 1537."

Muhammad III, nephew of Bahadur, wanted to avenge his uncle's death and besieged Diu in 1538. The Portuguese resisted until they received reinforcements. The besiegers withdrew.

Taking advantage of the chaotic conditions in Gujarat following the death of Sultan Bahadur Shah, Gracia de Noronha, nephew of Albuquerque, who had reached Goa as viceroy superseding Nuno da Cunha, persuaded Muhammad III to sign a peace treaty in March 1539, under which the Portuguese were allowed to retain Diu along with a third of the Customs receipts from the port. One more attempt was made in 1546 by the Sultan of Gujarat to recapture Diu. The siege lasted eight months and both sides suffered heavy losses. Finally, on the arrival of Portuguese reinforcements, the Gujarat army withdrew.

Martin Affonso de Sousa, the next governor, arrived in India in 1542, bringing with him the Jesuit saint, Francisco Xavier, who had been selected by Ignatius Loyola and appointed nuncio by Pope Paul III. Affonso de Sousa was a bad and greedy governor. His successor, Don Joao de Castro, who arrived in India in August 1545, was the last of the great Portuguese governors in India. With his death, in June 1548, began the decline of Portuguese power and prestige in the eastern seas.

A description of the first 100 years of Portuguese Rule given in the *Cambridge History of India* is of great interest. It says: "It will be evident from the brief narrative we have attempted that this history of one hundred years of Portuguese adventure in the eastern seas contains little or no indication of any effort to found an empire; never at any stage did the Portuguese captains assume the offensive on shore, nor did they actually come into contact with any of the great fighting races of India. They depended solely on their control of the high seas; their main objective was always the capture and occupation of the most important ports and their defence when occupied. For this purpose were needed not administrators, but brave soldiers and sailors; and success was due, first, to the high military qualities and personal courage and endurance of most of the captains, and secondly, to the rich rewards which attracted so many to undertake perilous journeys (on an average not 60 per cent of the men who left Portugal reached India, so great was the mortality on the crowded vessels) and face the countless risks which awaited them at the other end.

"The ultimate decline of Portuguese power in India was due primarily to two causes: first, the encouragement of mixed marriages at home and abroad, and secondly, religious intolerance. The former policy had been adopted, as we have seen, by the great Albuquerque, who probably foresaw that the constant drain on the male population of a relatively small country like his own must ultimately lead to a shortage of manpower; the latter was pushed to its utmost extreme by the zealous fervour of the Jesuits who selected Goa as their second headquarters outside Rome, soon after the foundation of their order. The arrival of St. Francisco Xavier in India in 1542 was

an event of the utmost far-reaching importance and laid the foundations of that eccelesiastical supremacy in Portuguese India which sapped the financial resources and undermined the civil administration of its governors. Albuquerque and his immediate successors left almost untouched the customs of the people of Goa, only abolishing as did the English later, the rite of *sati*. It may be recalled, however, that after the arrival of the Franciscan missionaries in 1517 Goa had become the centre of immense propaganda and already in 1540 by the orders of the King of Portugal all the Hindu temples in the island of of Goa had been destroyed. The inquisition was introduced into Goa in 1560."

Governor Nuno da Cunha's main aim was to terrorize the people of the coastal towns. Having failed to punish the Zamorin as he wanted, he sailed with his fleet up the coast of Daman and burnt Surat and killed all the men, women and children there. When the fleet approached Daman, its inhabitants fled fearing another Surat. The Portuguese set fire to the entire town. Later, he reached Daman and killed all the people who had returned to rebuild it. When Martin Afonso de Sousa, a Portuguese admiral, approached Daman at the head of 40 vessels in 1534, the people took shelter in the fort after destroying the town themselves. The Portuguese overpowered the fort and killed the people in it.

Dom Constantine Braganza, viceroy, decided in 1558 to exploit the chaotic situation in Gujarat that followed the death of Sultan Bahadur Shah and with this aim took possession of Daman. This gave greater security to the town of Bassein which was already under Portuguese control. As his fleet approached Daman, the people fearing butchery fled from both the fortress and the town. The Portuguese occupied them.

During the 18th century, a Maratha fleet, stationed at Kolaba, once captured some Portuguese ships by mistake and looted the cargo. The Portuguese promptly complained to the Peshwas about what they described as the piratical act of the Marathas and demanded the formal handing over of the port of Daman as indemnity. The Peshwas agreed and a treaty was signed at Poona on January 6, 1780, under which Madhava Rao, instead of ceding the entire Daman handed over the

pargana of Nagar Aveli which had an annual income of Rs. 12,000 on the express condition that Portugal would not construct any fort therein.

The Portuguese did not give out the fact that they were already in control of Daman and so they came to possess Daman island as well as Nagar Aveli.

After the defeat of the powerful forces of Ali Adil Shah which had besieged the city of Goa in 1570 at the hands of a small garrison led by Viceroy Dom Luis de Athaide, the history of Goa has been one of luxury, ostentation and decay. Goa reached the summit of its prosperity towards the end of the 16th century. When the English East India Company was struggling for its existence, Goa Dourada or Golden Goa appeared a place of fabulous wealth to the plain merchants who were destined to be the founders of the British empire. According to a proverb of those days, "whoever hath seen Goa need not see Lisbon." Travellers to Goa in those days described the city as a scene of military, ecclesiastical and commercial magnificence which had no parallel in the European capitals of India. Descriptions of the city of Calcutta in the last quarter of the 18th century and the first quarter of the 19th pale into insignificance compared to the accounts of Goa written 300 years ago. Only Agra and Delhi at the zenith of the Moghul prosperity could be compared with Goa.

Goa's grandeur was due not only to the fact that it was a flourishing harbour but also because it was the centre of a great military and eccelesiastical power. The Portuguese, who conquered by the sword, laboured to consolidate their possessions by a proselytizing organization which threw the missionary efforts of other European Powers in India into the shadow. After Albuquerque and the early viceroys had spent their energies, the Portuguese in Goa became a vast idle population. The days of conquest were over and a gay and wealthy society of conquerors with nothing to do were left behind. W.W. Hunter in his *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. V., has described the life of the Portuguese during those days thus: "Every Portuguese in India, says a traveller, set up as a 'Fidalgo' (*sic*). These gentlemen had to be amused. There were no hotels or inns in the city but many boarding houses and gambling saloons. The

latter, writes a voyager in the 17th century, were sumptuously furnished and paid a heavy tax to the Government. People of all classes frequented them, and entertainments were provided for the lookers-on by jugglers, dancing girls, musicians, wrestlers and native actors or buffoons. Those who were inordinately fond of gambling stayed there sometimes for days together, and were provided board and lodging.

"Such gambling houses were not places for respectable women, and while the male society thronged their saloons, the Portuguese ladies were rigorously shut up at home. The family income was derived from the labour of slaves, and as no 'Fidalgo' (*sic*) could follow a trade or calling without disgrace, so neither could his wife busy herself in domestic affairs without losing her social importance. The society of Goa, therefore, divided itself into two idle populations—an idle population of men in the streets and gambling houses and an idle population of women in the seclusion of their own homes. This was one of the first results of the intensely military spirit, with its contempt for peaceful forms of industry, on which rested the Portuguese power in India. The ladies of Goa soon obtained an unenviable notoriety in books of travel. Excluded from male society, they spent their time in indolence, quarrelling and frivolous pursuits. A European zenana life grew up, and brought with it some very ugly consequences. A lady valued herself in her female coterie upon the number and daring of her intrigues. Almost every traveller who visited Goa during its prime tells the same curious story regarding the rashness with which the Portuguese matrons pursued their amours. Both Pyrard and Linschoton relate, in nearly the same words, how the ladies of Goa were wont to stupefy their husbands with dhatura, and then admit their lovers. The perils of such interviews became almost necessary to give a zest to their profligacy, and the Goanese became a byword as the type of an idle, a haughty and a corrupt society.

"...At home, both ladies and gentlemen dressed much like the natives, except for the large rosaries which they wore round their necks. While untidy and careless in their dress at home they made an ostentatious display when they stirred abroad. When a gentleman rode out, he was attended

by a throng of slaves in gay and fanciful liveries, some holding large umbrellas, others bearing richly inlaid arms; while the horse itself was loaded with gold and silver trappings, the reins studded with precious stones, with jingling silver bells attached, and the stirrups wrought into artistic shapes in gilt silver. The poor followed the example of the rich and resorted to amusing makeshifts to maintain an air of dignity and grandeur. The gentlemen who lived together in a boarding house had a few suits of silk clothes between them in common. These they used in turns when they went out, and hired a man to hold an umbrella over them as they strutted through the streets."

After throwing off the Spanish yoke, the Dutch wanted to dislodge the Portuguese from the Indian Ocean. With this aim, they blockaded Goa in 1603. The attempt proved abortive, but marked the beginning of a struggle between the two nations which in the next 70 years shattered the Portuguese power in India. The Portuguese began to lose one by one their possessions in this country to the Dutch, who captured the fleets of the former and forced them to take shelter in their forts. As a result of this, Portuguese commerce suffered heavily. The situation further worsened when diseases broke out in 1635 and inflicted heavy casualties. The Dutch made a second attempt to blockade Goa in 1639, but were again compelled to withdraw.

Tavernier who visited Goa in 1648 admired the architectural grandeur of the city, but was struck with the indigence of several Portuguese families whom he had earlier seen as affluent and prosperous. Many who had six years previously enjoyed an ample income had been reduced to the necessity of secretly begging for alms. "Yet they did not put aside their vanity. The ladies were particularly observed going in palanquins to seek charitable relief, attended by servants who conveyed their messages to the persons whose assistance they implored."

"The city," Thevenot said in 1666, "is great and full of beautiful churches and convents, and well adorned with palaces. There were few nations in the world so rich as the Portuguese in India; but their vanity is the cause of their ruin." In 1675, Dr Fryer described Goa as the "Rome in India"—"looks

well at a distance—stands upon seven hills; everywhere colleges, churches and glorious structures; but many houses disgracing it with their ruins."[9]

At last a time came when the Portuguese were unable to hold their capital even against the local banditti. Goa narrowly escaped falling into the hands of Sambaji whose roving Marathas plundered areas up to the very gates of the city. All hopes of resistance were given up when suddenly a powerful Moghul force appeared from the Ghats and forced the Marathas to come to terms. Later, the Bhonslas of Savantwadi invaded Goa. Though in the initial stages they partly gained successes, they were defeated by the Portuguese who in return conquered from them the islands of Conjuem and Panelem and destroyed their fortress of Bicholim. As a precaution the then viceroy built a fortress on the frontiers of Bardez and another at Chapora. But when the Marathas attacked again the Portuguese had to lose some of their important possessions towards the north of Goa.

The Marathas again invaded the peninsulas of Bardez and Salsette and actively threatened the city of Goa itself. The Bhonslas overran the settlement. A new viceroy, Marquis of Lourical, arrived with 12,000 men and the Marathas were defeated in encounters at Bardez and other places and forced to withdraw.

In 1750, the Marathas and Bhonslas jointly attacked the fortress of Noutim but were compelled to raise the seige. Shortly after, the Portuguese lost to the Marathas Rarim and Nautim.

The Government of Goa and other Portuguese settlements received little attention from Lisbon from 1794 to 1814, owing to various reasons, the chief of which was the French invasion of the Iberian peninsula. To protect Goa against any contingency, an English auxiliary force was obtained to garrison the two fortresses commanding the port, until peace was established in Europe after the battle of Waterloo.

[9]W.W. Hunter, the *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. V.

CHAPTER IV

SPREAD OF CHRISTIANITY

ONE of the reasons for the decline of the Portuguese power in India was the religious intolerance carried to extreme limits by zealous Jesuits who selected Goa as their second headquarters outside Rome soon after the founding of their order.[1]

The Portuguese resorted to mass conversion with the two objects of consolidation and political domination of the conquered areas and spreading of the Catholic faith. "The first conversions made by the Portuguese in India were of women."[2]

The choice the foreign rulers offered Indians was the cross or the sword. From the time of Albuquerque religion was the main instrument of Portuguese domination, except perhaps for a short period after the proclamation of the new republic in 1910. The Salazar regime recognized that the church enjoyed a special mission in the colonies. Both the Colonial Act and the Organic Charter of the Colonial Empire stipulate that "Catholic missions in the overseas territories are instruments of civilization and national influence."

This meant that the rulers of Portugal linked religion with the current cult of Portuguese sovereignty, an idea which received the full support of the church. In one of his sermons the Patriarch of Goa, Dr Jose Alvernaz, said: "Nevertheless we find ourselves today in Holy See, primatial of the East and patriarchal of the East Indies, an old and majestic witness of our past greatness, and of our will to continue to be the bearers of a message brought to this land by the Caravels, flying the Cross of Christ, to thank God for the favour granted during these past years and chiefly the fact of the recognition by the Court of International Justice of our right to continue to be what we are for the last four and a half centuries."[3]

[1] *The Cambridge History of India*, Vol. V., p. 17.

[2] T.B. Cunha, *Goa's Freedom Struggle*, p. 11.

[3] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, *Goa and the Charter of the United Nations*, p. 14.

Another example of the political-cum-religious rule of the Portuguese is furnished by the Portuguese political constitution which states: "The Portuguese Catholic missions overseas and the institutions for preparing the personnel for their services and those of the padroado shall enjoy juridical personality, and shall be protected and assisted by the State, as institutions of teaching and assistance and under the terms of the concordats and other agreements signed with the Holy See."

Even during their early visits to Cochin, the Portuguese leaders allowed their sailors to mix with beautiful and attractive women only after the latter had been baptized. This was done to prevent the men from sinning with heathen women. The Portuguese gave rich presents to those women who were prepared to embrace Christianity and act according to their pleasure. In Goa, Albuquerque persuaded his soldiers to marry the wives and daughters of Turkish officers. The officers, trusting his words, had accepted hospitality in his ship but had been murdered and their women converted.[4] Albuquerque always advised the King of Portugal to banish from Goa the natives and reserve their lands for Europeans married to Moorish captives. This was intended to stabilize the colonies.

In his letters to the King of Portugal and the Society of Jesus, St. Francis Xavier repeatedly stated that conversions could not be made in India without the active interference of the Government. In a letter to Father Simao Rodrigues on January 20, 1548, he said: "If in the spreading of the Christian religion the authority of His Majesty and of the viceroy is not made felt nothing can be done." He submitted to the King a plan for conversion under which Hindu temples would be destroyed and other coercive methods adopted.

Persecution of Hindus for conversion began in 1541. An order of the governor on June 30 stated: "All the Hindu temples be destroyed, not leaving a single one on any of the islands." Property of the temples was taken away for the maintenance of newly built churches and monasteries. Under Jesuit influence, King D. Joao III ordered Viceroy D. Joao de Castro to destroy Hindu temples, forbid Hindu festivals, banish their priests,

[4]T.B. Cunha, *Goa's Freedom Struggle*, p. 11.

punish makers of idols and give public jobs to new converts. Under another law issued on May 23, 1559, Hindus were prevented from holding public offices. In 1560, Viceroy D. Constantino de Braganza banished Hindus from Ilhas.

The Holy Court of Inquisition was set up in Goa in 1560 to give effect to laws forbidding the practice of non-Christian rites and punishing the heresies of the new Christians. The torture, which the people were subjected to by the Inquisition, is described by the Archbishop of Evora at the time of the third centenary of the Cathedral of Lisbon. He says: "If everywhere the Inquisition was an infamous court, the infamy, however base, however vile, however corrupt and determined by wordly interests, it was never more so than the inquisition of Goa, by irony of fate called the Holy Office. The inquisitors even attained the infamy of sending to their prisons women who resisted them, there satisfying their beastly instincts and then burning them as heretics."[5] The inquisitors enriched themselves at the cost of the natives under the cloak of religion.

In 1567, Diogo Rodrigues, captain of the fort of Rachol, pulled down 280 temples in Salsete alone. He did not spare even a single place of worship. The fourth Bishop's Council of Goa ordered Christians not to go to Hindu barbers for a shave. Hindus took revenge in 1583 by killing some Jesuits, who came to be known as the martyrs of Cuncolim. To punish these Hindus, the Portuguese confiscated their properties and gave them away to Portuguese families. Some of the viceroys and governors tried to water down the intolerant laws in process of enforcement, but the priests' influence was so great on the fanatical kings that the latter repeatedly asked their representatives to observe the orders strictly or face severe penalties.

During mass conversions, the Portuguese found that only the lower classes of people were available for a change of faith. Brahmins and other classes were not easily won over. The effect of these conversions was that the Brahmins had nothing but hatred towards the aliens and their religion.

St. Francis Xavier made it a point not only to convert the people but also destroy the idols and ancient places of worship. In one of his letters to the Society of Jesus in Paris he said:

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

"There is in these parts among the pagans a class of men called Brahmins. They are as perverse and wicked a set as can anywhere be found, and to whom applies the Psalm which says: 'From an unholy race, and wicked and crafty men, deliver me, O Lord.' If it were not for the Brahmins, we should have all the heathens embracing our faith."[6]

Prior to the advent of the Portuguese, Goa could boast of some of the finest temples and mosques and forts and palaces in India. In a rare iconoclastic frenzy, the Portuguese vandals destroyed most of these shrines and works of art. In one of his letters, Albuquerque wrote to the King of Portugal: "I leave no town or building of the Mussalmans. Those who are taken alive, I order them to be roasted...."

All the Hindu temples on the island of Goa were demolished by 1540. In 1560, the year the Inquisition was set up, 13,092 Hindus were forcibly converted. In 1578, the Paulist group of missionaries pulled down 350 temples and converted 100,000 people.

Albuquerque built the cathedral of St. Catherine on the site of a large mosque he had destroyed. The Reis Magos church in Bardez replaced a temple. The stones of the temple tank were removed to build a cemetery. The church in Mapuca was built on the ruins of a temple.

The temples of Sri Damodar and Sri Shanti Durga, now in Sanguem and Quepem, were originally in Margao and Cincolin, but during the mass conversions and destruction of the temples the holy images were rescued by Hindus who fled with them to their present places.

Under the constitutional regime some religious freedom was restored. But even then, Catholicism was the State religion. After the advent of the republican regime in 1910, the church and the State were separated, but this law was not extended to the colonies. Probably the rulers believed that what was harmful for Portugal was good for the colonies.

Both the persecution of Hindus and the material benefits offered to the new converts induced many to embrace Christianity, but many others preferred to face exile rather than abandon their faith. "The Hindus who welcomed the Portu-

[6]Armando Menezes, *Goa Today*.

guese to inflict revenge on the Mahomedans found that the God of the Christians was much more ferocious than that of the Mahomedans."[7]

Despite these cruel methods of conversion the caste system exists among the Goan Catholics. This is a peculiarity unparalleled in the Christian world. Though converted centuries ago, the Christians of Goa still follow the ancient Hindu usages and customs. They hold fast to the old traditions despite all efforts by the authorities, civil and religious, to suppress them on the ground that they militated against the basic principles of Christianity which enjoined equality on its followers. Goan Christians who were originally Brahmins do not generally intermarry with converts from other castes. The caste system is prevalent even among Goan priests and this leads to rivalries and factions among them to such an extent that there are different institutions to meet the requirements of various castes.[8]

Gilberto Freire, a noted Brazilian sociologist, after a short visit to Goa under the patronage of the Portuguese Government, was amazed to find that "the spirit of casteism still survives inside Christianity itself. Even in the churches it is common, at present, to see Catholics of Brahmin origin maintaining themselves strictly apart from the Catholics belonging to castes considered by them 'inferior.' The clergy have adapted themselves to the situation."

Pro-Portuguese elements have often maintained and argued that the reunion of Goa and other pockets with India would constitute a threat to Christianity. Such baseless fears do not have to be countered, but these people might be reminded that Christianity in India dates back to the first century A.D. and the Syrian church was established in India centuries before the Portuguese came. There are more than eight million Christians in India today, of whom five million are Catholics. India has the largest Christian population in Asia.

The best answer to these critics would be to quote what Valerian Cardinal Gracias, Archbishop of Bombay, said on

[7]T.B. Cunha, *Goa's Freedom Struggle*, p. 13.

[8]*Goa and the Charter of the United Nations*, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, p. 15.

August 15, 1954: "Fears have been entertained in some quarters about the safety of the relics of St. Francis Xavier and about religious freedom in the Indian Union. I should not have thought it necessary to allay such fears, but I ask—have we no shrines of national importance in various parts of India? And has there ever been any cause for misapprehension regarding them? I ask further—do we not enjoy freedom of worship and religious life?"

The Portuguese pockets, whose total area was about a third of an ordinary Indian district, had a revenue about the same as that of some minor municipalities. The governor-general, the administrative head, was the highest authority in civil and military matters. Appointed by the Lisbon Government, he was subject to the control of the Overseas Minister. Within the enclaves, the governor-general was supreme and could overrule all agencies—executive, judicial or elected. He also controlled the treasury. The governors of Daman and Diu were subordinate to him and helped him in the discharge of his duties.

A council of 13, of whom eight were nominated, assisted the governor-general. The council functioned in a purely advisory capacity. After August 1955, a legislative council, consisting of 23 members, 11 of whom were elected, five nominated by the governor-general and seven by public bodies and associations, started functioning. However, the governor-general continued to be the unchecked authority with powers even to decide whether the measures proposed by the council should be placed on the agenda for discussion.

In spite of such concentration of power, no bill adopted by the council and approved by the governor-general became law unless the Colonial Minister in Lisbon concurred.

The council did not have the power to pass the budget. The governor-general used to submit it to the Colonial Minister who was the final authority in all matters. Laws adopted by the Portuguese National Assembly applied automatically to the settlements.

Next to the governor-general and the governors were administrators in charge of the 14 *concelhos* into which the territories had been divided. The administrators were ap-

pointed by the governor-general. Administration on democratic lines had not been introduced even at the municipal level. There were no elected municipalities or local boards. Administrative committees nominated by the governor-general were in charge of civic matters. In short, the entire administrative structure in the settlements was colonial, with no semblance of selfgovernment.

The official language was Portuguese. Until two years ago the use of languages such as Konkani, Marathi, Kannada or Gujarati was prohibited even in petitions and representations. Officials were forbidden to speak in any Indian language in offices and on public occasions.

All political parties except the Uniaco Nacional, the party in power, were illegal. This was in keeping with the one party dictatorial set-up in force in Portugal and in its colonies. Freedom was a word little understood by officials.

Although there were more than 4,500 civil servants, the police, posts and telegraphs, agriculture, health services, treasury and public works departments were, with hardly any exception, manned by the Portuguese. This belied the oft-repeated statements that the people in the colonies were treated on a par with those in the mother country. The chief of the Cabinet and the head of the armed forces were Portuguese, and Goans and Africans could rise only up to the rank of corporal in the army. Only Portuguese were appointed to even minor posts such as district officers.

The Government maintained an iron grip over the settlements with one soldier or policeman for every 40 citizens. A military tax, unheard of in this part of the globe, was levied in lieu of compulsory military service.

The judiciary was not separated from the executive. An example of how the judiciary was at the mercy of the executive is illustrated by the case of Dr Furtado, judge of the Administrative Court at Panjim.[9] Official pressure was brought to bear on him to sign a letter of protest against the Indian Prime Minister for purposes of publicity abroad. The Portuguese authorities had told the judge that he would be exiled if he did

[9] *The Story of Goa*, issued by the Information Service of India, India House, London, p. 18.

not sign the letter. Dr Furtado refused and consequently was dismissed from service.

In his letter to the governor-general, Dr Furtado said: "When you summoned me to your office and asked me the reasons for my not signing the protest against Pandit Nehru's declaration, it was easy to foresee what the future held in store for me. My frank answer that I was not against India and, therefore, found it hard to sign, irritated Your Excellency so much that that you ordered the Director of Civil Administration to immediately dismiss me.

"You also let your vindictive intention transpire in the terrible threat that the Minister for Colonies would decide whether I would be sent to Cape Verde or some other colony.

"I can understand that as a representative of a colonial power Your Excellency should try to force me not to be against the power you represent, but I would never allow you to trample on my birthright of being for India in order that the most beautiful sentiment, which is second only to God's will, might not be defiled."

The plea of *habeas corpus* was not open to politicians detained or imprisoned without trial. Thus the legality or otherwise of any Government action could not be contested in a court of law.

Under Dr Salazar's dictatorship there was no freedom of any kind in Goa. Even the metropolitan Portuguese do not enjoy the fundamental freedoms; there is no freedom of expression or thought, no freedom of association and no freedom of the press.

In the Portuguese constitution is included an article extending to citizens the right of "freedom of expression and thought under any form" as well as the "freedom of association and meeting," but the same article[10] nullifies the earlier portions when it mentions later: "Special laws shall regulate the freedom of expression, thought, meeting, and association, and as regards the first named, perversion of public opinion must be forbidden preventively or repressively...."

The press in the "overseas provinces" is regulated equally rigidly. The political constitution provides for pre-censorship.

[10]Article 8, Political Constitution of 1933.

In respect of newspapers in the colonies a monetary guarantee acts as a deterrent against the misbehaviour of the editor or publisher or even a correspondent. In case an adverse comment escaped the notice of the Government censor, the newspaper was not exornerated from the criminal responsibility incurred. Thus, neither individual nor collective liberty existed in the settlements.

A former Portuguese Minister and one of the liberal intellectuals of Portugal, Antonio Sergio, felt strongly against these curbs on freedom. In 1954, in a letter to the Minister of Overseas Provinces, he said: "I make the following constructive suggestions. The launching of a civic intercourse campaign of real national unity by abolishing the system of cold war and by granting to the overseas Portuguese as well as those in Portugal fundamental civil liberties, namely, to express their thoughts, to meet in an orderly manner, and to form associations, by putting an end to prior censorship, seizure of books containing legitimate doctrines, and by the release of political and social prisoners.

"Divesting ourselves of the letter and spirit of the Colonial Act, and suppressing racial discrimination in Portuguese India...."

Fewer than 25,000 persons out of a population of 637,000 enjoyed voting rights in the elections to the legislative council. Apart from the usual qualifications, the civil authorities were required to certify that a person was "politically acceptable" before he became a voter. The effect of this was that those who belonged to the only political party in the settlement were eligible to vote. Public meetings even for social purposes could be convened only with the permission of the authorities. Speeches, if any, were required to be approved by the official censor and a breach of these restrictions entailed heavy penalties, including long terms of imprisonment and deportation. Under these circumstances, it was almost impossible for the people to agitate even peacefully for minor civic or social liberties. But the courage and love of liberty of the Goans were such that they could not be suppressed by highhandedness. Hundreds of Goan patriots, including doctors, lawyers, students and farmers, courted imprisonment in Goa, Daman and Diu.

Dictators sometimes resort to strange measures and Dr Salazar is no exception. In 1951 he decided to replace the term colonies by overseas provinces, and the decision was incorporated in the political constitution. This was intended to support the claim that the colonies were overseas provinces of Portugal and any talk or claim of independence for these areas was meaningless and unjustified.

This change in terminology helped Portugal to circumvent the United Nations Charter while becoming a member of that organization because the Charter had categorically rejected colonialism and had solemnly written in the right of subject peoples to independence. The Portuguese authorities thought that by playing on words, the burning desire of Goans for freedom and reunion with India could be thwarted. The change could neither alter the basic facts of history and geography nor disguise the fact that Goa was a colony maintained by force against the wishes of the people to serve the imperialistic interests of Portugal.

Compared with this picture of lack of freedom, bordering on slavery, and security of life and property, Goans in India were enjoying the benefits of one of the most enlightened constitutions in the world which enshrined all types of freedom. This disparity, across the political barrier created by Portugal, encouraged the Goans all the more in their freedom struggle and prepared them for greater sacrifices. Goans in India enjoyed all the freedoms and opportunities as Indian nationals. They were considered Indians in every respect.

CHAPTER V

ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON INDIA

THE Portuguese pockets have remained economically and culturally one with the rest of India in spite of all the barbarous methods the Portuguese adopted during their 451-year rule to obliterate the Indian character of the people. Viceroys and governors-general of Goa tried to root out Indian religions, language, dress and customs. With this aim laws were framed and enforced severely. But these proved futile. The only result was that they left behind a few black pages in the history of the world.

Portuguese religious intolerance reached its zenith during the first 100 years of their rule in Goa. People of different faiths were converted to Christianity on a mass scale. Muslims were special victims of Portuguese hatred and were butchered during and after the conquest of Goa. But later, with equal ruthlessness they killed Hindus and burnt their homes and towns. When it came to the question of spreading the faith, all Indians were treated alike and their places of worship were either destroyed or converted into chapels. Proselytization appeared to be the main aim of these people from a civilized region.

In the Old Conquests, the Portuguese succeeded in converting almost the entire population to Christianity by force. Those to whom their faith was as dear as Christianity was to the Portuguese fled. In the wake of the new conquests, the Portuguese found that it was not possible to continue the old methods. Had they persisted, they would not have stayed on for 451 years on the Indian subcontinent. Despite the conversions, the population of the colonies consisted of 61 per cent Hindus, 36 per cent Christians and three per cent others, including Muslims, according to the 1950 census of the Portuguese.

The Goans who bear Portuguese names are not the descendants of Portuguese settlers but Indians who took Christian names on conversion. Similar is the case of the Christian commu-

nity all over India where Christians are found in considerable numbers.

Equally firm conclusions may be drawn from the language of the people. In spite of the civilizing mission of the Portuguese, the vast majority of the Goans speak Konkani—an Indian dialect common to the entire coast of western India from Bombay to Mangalore. Konkani is spoken by Hindus, Christians and Muslims. In Daman and Diu the language is Gujarati, another Indian regional language spoken in the areas around these pockets.

Strangely enough, a strikingly small minority—about three per cent of the population—speak or understand Portuguese. English is more popular than Portuguese in the Portuguese province of India.

Konkani is spoken in an area of 7,000 square miles which extends far beyond Goa. Philologists call it Gomantaki, belonging to Gomantak, the ancient name of Goa and so the principal home of the language. In grammar and vocabulary it resembles Sanskrit more than Marathi and it is also akin to Northern Indian languages such as Bengali.[1]

Kudali, the Konkani spoken in Malwan and Devgad in the north, is influenced by Marathi, and in the south, as far as Mangalore, is influenced by Canarese. The main cause for the stunted growth of Konkani is the systematic suppression and persecution to which the Portuguese subjected it. There is not a single school where this language is taught nor does it possess an alphabet or orthography of its own. The newspapers published in Konkani, both in Goa and outside, are printed in the Latin script with various forms of spelling or in Devanagari or Canarese.

A faithful Portuguese historian, Cunha Rivara, testifies to the religious intolerance of the Portuguese and its effects on the Konkani language. He says: "In the first heat of conquest, temples were destroyed, all the emblems of the pagan cult were shattered into pieces and books written in the vernacular were burnt for being guilty or suspected of containing precepts and doctrines of idolatry." With the advent of their rule, the Portuguese closed down all Konkani schools to make room for

[1]Dr T. B. Cunha, *Goa's Freedom Struggle*, p. 25.

European languages such as Latin and Portuguese. This zeal did not end soon after the heat of conquest but persisted to the last day. In 1548 the Catholic bishop, Fr. D. Joao Albuquerque, was in search of books written in Konkani for destroying them.

Viceroy Antonio de Melo Castro informs us that the Jesuits in Salcete and the Franciscans in Bardez refused to learn Konkani even for administering the sacraments, disobeying all orders in this connection. Even in 1684 the Franciscan priests obtained a charter from the Count of Alvor where it is said: "I assign three years within which time every one in general will speak Portuguese language, and only of it make use in their dealings and contracts made on our lands and not by any means make use of the language of the country under pain of proceedings being instituted against them publicly with a severity of penalty which might seem befitting."

In 1732, again on the complaint of Franciscan priests, the King of Portugal, by a decree, determined that "the said charters be observed for the petitioners and they shall always be observed."

Antonio Amaral Coutinho, an inquisitor, complained to the king in 1731 about the lack of new conversions because of the Konkani language. He wrote: "The first and chief cause of such regrettable ruin is the non-observance of the law of his Serene Highness D. Sebastian of glorious memory and of the Goan councils who forbid the natives of the land to speak in their own language, obliging them only to speak in the Portuguese language."

Father D. Lourenzo de Santa Maria, archbishop, in his mandate of November 21, 1745, ordered the rigorous observance of the Charter of the Count of Alvor and decided that to be a priest it was necessary to prove "the knowledge of, and the ability to speak only the Portuguese language, not only for the 'pretendentes' but also for all their close relations, men as well as women, confirmed by a rigorous examination by reverend persons." The same archbishop ordained that the Brahmins and Cardoes of Salcete and Bardez should learn Portuguese within six months, extending the time for other castes to a year under pain of "not being able to contract matri-

mony with any man or woman who might not know or not make use of and speak the Portuguese language."

So extraordinary and inconceivable were these orders that they provoked protests from the rulers themselves who feared the adverse effects of these stupid measures. Keen on securing converts to their religion and seeing the necessity of teaching the Christian doctrine in a language which the people could understand, some priests tried to learn Konkani. But they faced serious difficulties because of the complete lack of books or documents in Konkani, since all had been destroyed. They tried to learn it orally and with the help of Sanskrit and Marathi.

The Marquis of Pombay tried to mend the wrong done for more than two centuries; but the truth remains that during the Portuguese rule no Konkani schools were established. The result was that most of the people remained illiterate and the rulers failed to impose Portuguese on the country.

"The lack of Konkani schools is undeniably the chief cause for the obscurantism to which the masses have been condemned. For the mother-tongue is the only proper medium for the spread of education among the people. And the artificial culture acquired by educated Goans through languages which are not their own is the reason of their complete lack of an intellectual personality so characteristic of them. But the extraordinary survival of Konkani in spite of the ostracism to which it has been subjected during centuries is the best proof that it is deeply rooted into the soil and the race, which makes it impossible to replace it by another idiom however much one might endeavour."[2]

Of the population of 637,000 about 138,000 can read and write. Most of them use the Roman script to read and write Konkani. The majority of the literates read and write Konkani, Marathi, Kannada and English.

As a rule, Goan children attend English and Indian language schools run by various institutions rather than the Portuguese Lyceum. There are about 40 schools affiliated to the Secondary School Board of the Maharashtra Government, and more than 100 Marathi primary schools. According to unofficial estimates, there were 21,000 students in English and Indian lan-

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

guage schools in Goa in 1959 as against a bare 1,600 in the Lyceum, the only Portuguese high school in Goa.

The facilities offered by the Lyceum which caters for the needs of children of European and other local officials are not fully availed of. There is hardly any scope for higher education in Goa in arts, science or the professions, the only exception being a medical school in Panjim. Students go to the universities of Bombay, Karnatak and Poona for higher studies.

A small section of the inhabitants mainly concentrated in the Old Conquests and in large towns such as Panjim, Marmagao and Mapuca boast of their Latin or Western way of life. This is also the case in the large cities of Africa, South-East Asia and even in India. These people are just sufficient in number to mislead a casual foreign visitor in search of a happy blending of two old cultures and civilizations, the Eastern and the Western, the Indian and the European. If only the visitor cares to meet people other than those thrust on him by interested parties even in these cities, what to talk of urban and rural areas, he would soon realize how deep rooted is Indian tradition and the Indian way of life in Goa. Dr Braganza Pereira, in his book entitled *Etnografia da India Portnguesa*, published under the patronage of the Portuguese Government at a time when the Government of Dr Salazar had not yet absorbed new revolutionary ideas, described amply the customs and usages of the people of Goa, emphasizing the close affinity between the Goans and the Indians across the political barrier.

The Goan Catholics are deeply religious and are as courteous, carefree, hospitable and peace-loving as their counterparts in India. Their homes are neat and they love music. "The Goan goes gay during church feasts and weddings. Imbibing the very strong local brew called 'feni' and 'caju,' and eating 'sorpotel' and 'sanams,' he lets himself go in song and dance on these occassions."[3]

In spite of all the hard facts about the historical, cultural, economical and political unity of the Portuguese colonies with India, some people in Goa fancy that a Goan way of life has

[3]K.N. Menon, *Portuguese Pockets in India*, p. 52.

been developed and has come to stay as a result of the Portuguese rule. A Goan author recently went to the extent of stating that "we are a separate people and a separate country."

There cannot be a statement more erroneous than this. If every minor variation in dress, customs and manners is to be termed a separate culture and a separate way of life, India will have as many, if not more, ways of life as the number of villages. The people of Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh are known for their *Lucknavi* culture, which stands for gentle manners, etiquette and good behaviour not only towards strangers but also among themselves and at home. This culture, introduced by the Muslim invaders of North India, is 1,000 years old. Nobody ever heard, even in the fanatical pre-independence days, of the people of Lucknow arrogating to themselves a culture and a way of life all their own and separate from the rest of India. They did not on that score claim a separate nationhood.

The inhabitants of the former Hyderabad State maintained that they had their own culture and way of life. This was nothing but the best in the culture of the Telugu, Kannada, Marathi and Urdu-speaking people. Any argument of a Hyderabad citizen that the former Hyderabad State should be a separate unit, even within the Indian Union, because it had a separate way of life, would not have been found reasonable without the backing of weightier arguments.

The different ways of life, having deep historical and cultural roots in the Indian subcontinent, are like streams flowing into a river. They not only swell the river but also enrich themselves in process. These ways of life are like the beads of a rosary. The thread that holds them together is the Indian culture. The beads stay together and have a value only as long as the thread keeps them bound to the others.

In economic development, Goa and the other enclaves under Portugal have suffered a worse fate than the rest of India under British rule. Though a predominantly agricultural area with a rich and fertile soil, Goa does not produce enough food for its small population and is obliged to import heavily from India rice, wheat, fruits, vegetables, meat, coke, cotton,

textiles, soap, tobacco and tea. The Portuguese totally neglected not only the agricultural and industrial economy of the settlements but also elementary aspects of administration such as public health and sanitation.

Because of the strained relations between India and Portugal during the fifties the settlements imported coal, cotton textiles, tea and tobacco at substantially higher costs from other countries. Food grains such as rice and wheat were imported from countries including Pakistan.

Goa has two excellent natural harbours but they have not not been improved or modernized.

The most important section of the economy of the colonies is the mining industry. Goa has large iron and manganese ore deposits. It also possesses aluminium, cobalt and nickel. The iron ore deposits are found practically throughout the settlement. Large deposits are found near Bicholim, Sanvordem, Collem and Sakurda. Manganese ore is found in the neighbourhood of Sanguem, Quepem and Bicholim. In spite of the existence of these minerals in such vast quantities, the Portuguese did not carry out a geological survey of the colonies to exploit the mineral resources for the benefit of the people. The extraction of iron and manganese ores in Goa is conducted not so much by the Portuguese as by Japanese, West German and Italian firms. A systematic survey of Goa is expected to reveal a high potential for the expansion of the mining—iron and manganese ores—industry and also help in the establishment of a metal industry.

The Portuguese were so little interested in this aspect of the economy of the settlement that the fee for granting a mining lease was as low as Rs 300 to Rs 1,500 with the result that any one could become a mineowner. Despite the low tax level, Goa did not export any ore until 1947. However, with the introduction of mechanized processes of production helped by foreign capital, the producion of iron ore rose from three million tons in 1957 to 4.7 million tons in 1960. During the same period, 56,000 tons of ferro-manganese ore was extracted and the bulk of it exported to Japan and West Germany. The iron content of the ore is rather low, but Japanese importers have been using a new technique for processing it into ferro-dioxide

red paint. Japan imports about 40 per cent of the iron ore produced in Goa and this forms roughly a tenth of the needs of Japanese steel mills. The United States is the most important buyer of Goan manganese ore. In terms of money, the total ore exports stood at Rs 16 crores in 1960 and was expected to rise to Rs 20 crores in 1961. West Germany, the next biggest importer of Goan iron ore, receives about 30 per cent of the production which is about 1.2 million tons.

At the time of the liberation, the capital investment in Goa's industry was roughly estimated at Rs seven crores, of which three-fourths was Indian and the rest foreign in the form of loans. Though the mining industry has developed of late, the relative prosperity enjoyed by Goa has been strictly limited because the ore is priced below the world and Indian quotations. With good inland water and road communications and excellent harbour facilities at Mormagao, Goa is expected to make rapid economic progress under the new administration.

Lisbon always determined Goa's trade policy. Goa hardly exported anything to Portugal. It imported Portuguese wine, sardines and olive oil. Goa's connection with Portugal imposed certain peculiar economic disabilities. Goa had to join a Customs union which obliged it to sacrifice almost 80 per cent of its share of Customs duty on articles imported from other members of the union. As she was not able to export much to these countries, its loss of Customs revenue was considerable. Another disadvantage of the membership was that Goa had to import sugar from a company at Mozambique, in which Portuguese officials were reported to hold large shares, rather than from Java and Mauritius where the prices were lower. The annual loss to Goa under this arrangement was about Rs 135,000.[4]

The economic dependence of Goa on India is fully brought out by the fact that Indian currency circulated freely in Goa and it constituted almost two-thirds of the total of all currencies in circulation. During 1942 and 1952, when Portuguese authorities banned the circulation of Indian currency, Goans were obliged to resort to barter for transactions.

The Banco Nacional Ultramarino, the only bank in Goa

[4] *Portuguese India Today.*

run by the Portuguese, which controlled the circulation of Goan currency, was mainly responsible for this state of affairs. The currency was highly inadequate to meet Goa's trade requirements. The Banco Nacional itself used its reserves of Indian currency to back the Goan currency. It was one of the worst exploiters in the colony. It accepted deposits from the people but paid no interest. It advanced loans too, but the rate of interest charged was about the highest charged by any Government bank in the world.

An extent of the economic dependence of Goa on India may also be assessed through an analysis of the monetary remittances to Goa. In 1951, remittances from India amounted to Rs. 680 lakhs, and those from Goa to India Rs. 460 lakhs. Remittances from Portugal totalled only Rs. 41 lakhs and it received from Goa Rs. 116 lakhs. These remittances, largely from Goans employed in India, went to wipe off Goa's adverse balance of trade with India.

The Portuguese not merely connived at but openly encouraged smuggling. Expensive luxury goods, far in excess of local requirements, were imported from abroad and systematically smuggled across the border into India. Italian silks, U.S. fountain pens, Swiss watches, foreign liquor, silver and gold and precious stones were smuggled. The total value of such contraband goods seized by Indian Customs and Excise authorities in three months in 1954 amounted to Rs. 25 lakhs. Morever, the Customs department believed that it detected only about 10 per cent of the total goods smuggled into India from Goa.

CHAPTER VI

FREEDOM STRUGGLE

THE Goan people who submitted to Portuguese rule during the first 50 years became restive and tried to drive the foreigners out from the second quarter of the 16th century up to the beginning of the 20th century. There were 40 revolts which were often put down by the Portuguese with ruthlessness and brutality.

Three factors were mainly responsible for the discontent and dissatisfaction against the Portuguese administration in those enclaves; these were economic, political and religious. The economic exploitation was ruthless and impoverished the people. Politically, Goans had no voice in the administration and this led to deep frustration. Religious animosities had been deeply stirred by the demolition of mosques and temples and by the proselytizing zeal of the Jesuits who derived support from the king and church of Portugal.[1]

In the very first year of Portuguese colonization, the people of five villages in southern Goa, Assolna, Velim, Cuncolim, Veroda and Ambelim, revolted. The leaders were rounded up and killed inside a nearby fort. Their lands were confiscated and donated to the Company of Jesus. Even to this day these lands remain in the possession of Portuguese families.[2]

The first rebellion of a series of 20 took place in 1555 following the Goans' refusal to pay the increased land revenue which was considered excessive.

In 1755 the people of Satari district declared themselves free and fought the Portuguese for decades until they were put down by superior armed force. The Goan garrison at Daman mutinied and defied authority for a long time in 1780. Seven years later in an uprising known as Pinto's rebellion, the Portuguese faced a more concerted and greater challenge. The rebellion was planned by a group of priests in Goa with

[1] *The Story of Goa*, Information Service of India, India House, London, p. 6.
[2] Evagrio George, *The Goa Case*, p. 21.

the ultimate object of overthrowing the Portuguese Government. The aim of this revolt, according to the verdict of a Portuguese court, was "to establish a new republic, in which the people of the country would have ruled themselves by exercising all the ruling powers through a House of the People." But two colleagues of Pinto, the leader of the rebellion, informed the Portuguese of the plot and the freedom fighters were foiled. The ringleaders, 47 in all, including 17 priests and seven army officers, were arrested and imprisoned. Three priests were released and the remaining were banished to Portugal. All the arrested laymen, except one, were sentenced to different terms. Those sentenced to death were tied to the tails of horses and dragged through the streets of the town and their hands were cut off before they were sent to the gallows. Even their bodies were cut to pieces and exhibited in the town to strike terror in the hearts of the people.[3]

A detailed account of this revolt and how it was crushed is given in a book entitled *A Conjuracao de 1787* by the Konkani author Cunha Rivara. This revolt continued to inspire generations of Goans and they kept on fighting the Portuguese. Mention may be made here of Custoba, a Goan rebel, who carried on the struggle and defied arrest for a long time until he was seized and deported to Africa where he died "under mysterious circumstances."[4]

The Ranes, a Goan warrior tribe of the New Conquests, especially the wild and undeveloped district of Satari, rose in revolt against the Portuguese no less than 20 times between 1755 and 1912. They used guerrilla tactics. They had successes and defeats, alternately. Many of their leaders were treacherously killed or deported to far-off colonies. But the tribe did not lose heart. In 1824, one of the biggest Rane revolts took place and it lasted for almost a year. The Portuguese arrested the rebels and imprisoned them for three years in the notorious Aguada fortress, now well known to Goan and Indian patriots.

A Goan nationalist, Bernardo Peres da Silva, was appointed prefect by the King of Portugal in 1833. The European resi-

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *The Story of Goa*, Information Service of India, India House, London, p. 6.

dents of Goa resented this and overthrew him within 18 days. Da Silva escaped to British India where the authorities gave him asylum. A few months later he formed a provisional government in Daman, which was recognized by the British in India, and administered the settlements of Daman, including Dadra, Nagar Aveli and Diu for two years. Goan exiles in Belgaum, Dharwar, Poona and Bombay organized an army of volunteers to fight the Portuguese. Da Silva was able to mobilize a small naval force of five warships with English, American and Dutch officers and manned by sailors from Daman, Diu, Sind, Ratnagiri and Bombay. This fleet was sent to Goa to re-establish his authority there but a violent cyclone destroyed the fleet while it was on its way and Da Silva's plans remained unrealized. Later, he was arrested by the Portuguese and deported to Lisbon and his followers were put down. This incident speaks of the whites' intolerance of Goans holding high offices in their own territory.

In 1852 the Ranes revolted again when the Visconde de Ourem was Governor-General of Goa and enhanced the agricultural tax in a bid to increase the revenue receipts. The Ranes resented the order which they considered an encroachment on their rights. The revolt, led by Dipaji Rane, has left a deep impression on the history of the Goan freedom movement. The Rane forces occupied the fort of Nanuz, filled with firearms and ammunition, in Satari district, and made it the centre of their activities. The governor-general sent a small company to fight the rebels, but his forces failed because the Ranes were elusive and disappeared into the nearby thick forests. Later, the governor-general himself led an army against the freedom fighters but with little success. The Ranes continued to harass the authorities by visiting villages and looting and burning them.

With Nanuz as headquarters Dipaji carried out sorties into Quepem, Canacona and Hemadbarshem, thus bringing almost half of the then Goa under his control. His achievements impressed the people and they rallied round him and the revolt assumed major proportions. The rebellion lasted three and a half years, and left with no choice the governor-general appealed for peace but had little success. He requested an old retired

military officer, Jose Paulo de Oliveira Pegade, who knew the Ranes well, to approach the rebels for a peaceful settlement.

The result was an agreement between the authorities and the rebels. The governor-general obtained pardon for the rebel leader and his followers in 1855. His successor, the Conde de Torres Novas, went a step further and not only restored the ancient rights to the rebels' leader but also made him an army captain and promoted his relatives.

The next Rane revolt, under the leadership of Custoba in 1869, is said to have followed an incident in which he was insulted by a Hindu priest or *Bhott*, who had dishonoured a widow of Custoba's family and denounced her father and brother as responsible for of a murder. He produced false witnesses to support his charge.[5] Custoba took to outlawry and waged a relentless war on society, which had so unjustly condemned him for another man's crime while the guilty person went about unpunished. Custoba and his followers pillaged villages and murdered men, but they never molested women, unlike the Portuguese. Custoba warned the parties concerned before robbing them. He did not forget the Hindu priest and cut off his head when he fell into his hands. The police had put a price on Custoba's head and on the night of June 13, 1871, as he was escaping from a house, he was shot dead. With the death of the leader the followers dispersed.

In 1895 Dada Rane fought the Portuguese in support of Goan Hindu sepoys who did not want to be sent to Africa. He also wanted the Portuguese to end the unjust distribution of the land of the Ranes among the Narcornis. The rebels captured 90 soldiers and invaded Bardez in a great gang of over 800 men on October 14, 1895. After depriving the Church of Tivim of its treasures, the gang made a sudden raid on Mapuca. The garrison, taken by surprise, surrendered. The Mayor was attacked and the municipal treasury was looted before the gang made its way to Colvale where also it broke open the community safe. The people were helpless and so were the authorities. Many fled either to the Ghats or to the neighbouring British territory. Thereafter the then governor-general distributed arms among the villagers for self-defence. This

[5]C.F. Saldanha, *A Short History of Goa*, p. 145.

acted as a check on the Ranes. One night in October that year, the Ranes clashed with the armed villagers of Aldona, suffered 35 casualties and retreated. At this time an expeditionary force came from Portugal under Prince Afonso Henriques and with its help the governor-general successfully fought the Ranes. All those not found guilty of murder or robbery were pardoned.

Meanwhile, an incident took place in which a relative of Dada Rane who was being led to prison in Mapuca under escort was shot dead by one of the escorts. This angered the Ranes who thought it was a deliberate act by a member of the Braganza family of Nadora (Pangues). They waited for an opportunity for revenge. When the whole family had gathered together on a festive occasion the Ranes surrounded it and took the male members captive but left the women free. This uprising came to an end in 1897 when Joaquim Machado was Governor. Two minor Rane revolts occurred in 1901 and 1912, both of which were put down by the Portuguese and their leaders were captured and deported.

Another great revolt took place in 1870. The Portuguese wanted to disband the army for economic reasons such as the poor state of finances. "Besides, one could not see why the army was necessary at all, since all the surrounding territory was subject to the British, who were age-old allies of the Portuguese."[6] The army resented Governor Pestana's order disbanding it and took up positions at Volvoi. The governor who was weak and old had to resign because he promised concessions to meet the army's wishes. His successor Visconde de S. Jaunuario refused to honour his predecessor's promises. The army revolted again at Marcella and refused to surrender. An expeditionary force under Prince Dom Augusto came out to India to crush the revolt. When he landed in Goa the Goan army thought it useless to resist any longer and submitted tamely.

The last Rane revolt of 1912 was led by Morio Savant and Gill Savant. A Christian toddy tapper named Quistulo was also one of the leaders. It was crushed after the arrival of Portuguese troops from Mozambique. Morio Savant was

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

beheaded while he was asleep and Gill Savant and some others were sent to prison in Portuguese West Africa. With this the 150-year old freedom struggle of the Ranes came to an end.

There have been further instances of Goans, including Christians brought up in the tradition of loyalty to Portugal, expressing their burning desire for freedom and liberty. Citing the independence of Brazil, Father Jeremias Mascarenhad proclaimed in the Portuguese Parliament in 1852 that none should wonder if Portuguese India also made a demand for independence. He said emancipation was a natural evolution common to individuals and colonies.

In 1862 another eminent Goan writer Francisco Luiz Gomes demanded in the Portuguese Parliament complete freedom for Portuguese India. In a novel written in Portuguese, *Os Brahmanes*, he says: "Impartial men, who are moved by justice and not by racialism, want India to be ruled by Indians."[7]

When Portugal became a democratic republic in 1910, Goans under the leadership of Menezes Braganza welcomed the new Government and expressed the hope that it would give autonomy to the Indian settlements and end the religious discriminations established by the former autocratic regime under which the Hindu population was subjected to all sorts of disabilities. But the democratic regime succumbed 14 years later to a military coup which brought Dr Antonio Oliveira Salazar into power. Dr Salazar's fascist regime continues to be in power in Portugal.

The Goan struggle for freedom from its beginning in the 16th century to the last revolt of the Ranes in 1912 was always violent and followed the conventional bloodshed pattern. During the last part of the 19th century and the first part of the 20th, Portuguese India was outside the orbit of the political movement started by the Indian National Congress. Individual Goans, whether in India or the Portuguese pockets, might have been thrilled by the developments taking place in what was then known as British India, but there was no concerted move in Goa to organize a liberation struggle on the lines the Congress had launched.

[7]Evagrio George, *The Goa Case*, p. 24.

The result of the Portuguese revolution of 1926 and the reorientation of terms of political expression shocked Goans in general and nationalists aspiring for freedom from Portuguese rule in particular. The nationalists started thinking seriously about a movement which would ultimately bring them deliverance. It was but natural that these nationalists should have paid greater attention to the philosophy and activities of the Congress because of the geographical nearness and also because the largest number of nationalist-minded Goans were in Bombay and areas outside Portuguese India.

The influence of Mahatma Gandhi, who was ushering in a silent and nonviolent revolution in India, was felt in the Portuguese pockets also. The nationalists, who had learnt a bitter lesson from the struggles of the past four centuries, began to revise their views on the means of achieving freedom. In the then existing circumstances any liberation movement could have been launched only from a place outside Portuguese India. In 1928, following the efforts of Dr Tristao Braganza Cunha, the nationalists in Bombay formed a Goa Congress Committee, which adopted nonviolence as its creed.

In June 1946, the first civil disobedience movement against the then 435-year old Portuguese rule was launched in Goa and for the first time Goan nationalists and Indian freedom fighters joined hands to wreck the political barrier erected by the Portuguese between Indians in Goa and Indians living in the then British India. Dr Rammanohar Lohia, the Indian socialist leader, took a leading part in this movement. At a public meeting in Panjim on June 18, Dr Lohia told the people that it was time they liberated themselves from the Portuguese shackles and moulded their destiny. He stressed the methods of economic exploitation the colonial powers adopted for enriching themselves. None in the audience, which included policemen, noticed anything seditious, revolutionary or anti-Portuguese in the speech. Everybody was moved by Dr Lohia's words. A local merchant wanted to honour Dr Lohia and invited him to an *at home* along with a number of friends—officials and non-officials. At this meeting also Dr Lohia repeated the sentiments of his earlier speech. A Portuguese official, though not well conversant with the English language, under-

stood the gist of the speech and reported the matter to the authorities. The Government was agitated. The administrative machinery was geared to meet the challenge. Dr Lohia was arrested and whisked away to the notorious Aguada fort. His host faced a horde of troubles.

The news of the arrest spread like wild fire in the city and led to demonstrations. Even the students of the Lyceum did not lag behind. The forces of law and order lathi-charged the demonstrators at a number of places. Students were warned not to participate in demonstrations and were told that indulgence in political activity would render them liable to rustication. After keeping Dr Lohia in a dark and solitary cell for three days, the Portuguese brought him to the border and pushed him into Indian territory.

The campaign did not end with a few days of demonstrations. The clashes between the demonstrators and the police brought home to the former that they did not enjoy even the freedom to express their views peacefully. This had a terrible impact on the Goan mind and a regular campaign for civil liberties followed. Men, women and students participated in a satyagraha, defying those laws which restricted the basic freedom of citizens such as holding meetings. Though the movement was peaceful, the Portuguese tried to suppress it by arresting its leaders, who were tried by special military tribunals. Some of the leaders were awarded savage sentences and others deported as prisoners to the island fortress of Peniche in Portugal.

The late Dr Braganza Cunha was the first to offer satyagraha and court arrest. He was followed by Dr R. Hedge, Mr Purushottam Kakodkar, Mr Jose Loyola and Mr Laxmikant Bhembre. In spite of the violence, repressive policies and terrorism of the authorities, the movement continued up to November 1946. About 1,500 people were arrested, held in detention for various terms and beaten up.

While the movement was on, various nationalist groups of Goans in Bombay formed the National Congress (Goa).

Dr Lohia made a second attempt to visit Goa to continue his mission. But this time as a true satyagrahi, he informed the authorities in advance of his intentions and the date and place

of entry into Goa. The Portuguese police waited for him at the border and prevented him from entering their territory.

Within days of the commencement of the satyagraha, Mahatma Gandhi wrote in *The Harijan* on June 30, 1946: "The little Portuguese settlement which merely exists on the sufferance of the British Government cannot be allowed to exist as a separate entity in opposition to the laws of the free State. Without a shot being fired, the people of Goa will be able to claim and receive the right of citizenship of the free State. The present Portuguese Government will no longer be able to rely upon the protection of British arms to isolate and keep under subjection the inhabitants of Goa against their will. I would venture to advise the Portuguese Government of Goa to recognize the signs of the times and come to honourable terms with its inhabitants rather than function on any treaty that might exist between them and the British Government.

"To the inhabitants of Goa I will say that they should shed fear of the Portuguese Government as the people of other parts of India have shed fear of the mighty British Government and assert their fundamental right of civil liberty and all it means. The difference of religion among the inhabitants of Goa should be no bar to common civil life. The religion is for each individual himself or herself, to live. It should never become a bone of contention or quarrel between religious sects."

In another context referring to Portugal, Mahatma Gandhi said: "A small power, because of its smallness, often acts with impunity where a great power cannot."

The Goan movement for freedom also derived its inspiration from Gandhiji's famous letter of August 2, 1946, in reply to Mr Jose Bossa, Governor-General of Portuguese India.

In this letter Mahatma Gandhi said: "I suppose you know that I have visited Mozambique, Delagoa and Inhambane. I did not notice there any Government for philanthropic purpose. Indeed I was astonished to see the distinction that the Government made between Indians and the Portuguese and between the Africans and themselves. Nor does the history of the Portuguese settlement in India prove the claim set forth by you. Indeed, what I see and know of the condition of things in Goa is hardly edifying. That the Indians in Goa have been

speechless is proof not of the innocence or the philanthropic nature of the Portuguese Government but of the rule of terror. You will forgive me for not subscribing to your statement that there is full liberty in Goa and that the agitation is confined only to a few malcontents.

"Every account received by me personally and seen in the papers here in this part of India confirms the contrary view. I suppose the report of the sentence by your court martial of eight years on Dr Braganza and his comtemplated exile to a far-off Portuguese settlement is by itself a striking corroboration of the fact that civil liberty is a rare article in Goa. Why should a law-abiding citizen like Dr Braganza be considered so dangerous as to be singled out for exile?...

"I, therefore, hope that you will revise your views on philanthropy, civil liberty and caste distinctions, withdraw all the African police, declare yourself whole-heartedly for civil liberty, and, if possible, even let the inhabitants of Goa frame their own government and invite from Greater India more experienced Indians to assist the inhabitants and even you in framing such government."

The Portuguese governor-general did not reply to this letter.

The Congress Working Committee, meeting on August 12, 1946, at Wardha, adopted a resolution strongly attacking the Portuguese administration in Goa. The resolution said: "The people of these (the Portuguese) possessions have been reduced to poverty and degradation; politically they have practically no rights, and even the most elementary civil liberties are denied them. The fascist administration of Portugal functions in a peculiarly oppressive way in this small colony, which once was rich and prosperous and is now deserted, with its people migrating elsewhere in search of a living.... Goa has always been, and must inevitably continue to be, part of India. It must share in the freedom of the Indian people.... The Working Committee notes the contrast between the attitude of the Portuguese in regard to their Indian possessions and the policy recently enunciated by the governor of French India, who stated that the people are free to decide their own future and may if they so choose join the Indian Union. The Committee

appreciates this statement's expression of policy on behalf of the French Government."

The resolution took note of the fact that Portugal had applied for membership of the United Nations, and after declaring that it would be improper and against the basic principles of the U.N. to admit to membership a country which denies democracy and civil rights in its colonies, expressed the hope that Portugal would not be admitted to the U.N. At the same time, the meeting extended its greetings to the people of Goa in their struggle for the establishment of civil liberties.

CHAPTER VII

SATYAGRAHA GAINS MOMENTUM

With the British withdrawal from India in August 1947, the movement for the liberation of the French and Portuguese pockets on the subcontinent gathered momentum.

The Portuguese turned a deaf ear to the freedom demand of Indians and Goans and seemed to defy the 20th century trend in favour of liquidation of colonies. In February 1950, the Government of India suggested that a referendum be held under the United Nations' control to determine the future of the Portuguese pockets. The Portuguese Government replied firmly that transfer of sovereignty was out of the question. The issue was thus clearly drawn and this became the starting point of a tense and bitter tug of war between Lisbon and New Delhi.

The 1946 satyagraha in Goa continued intermittently until India became free. During the lull that followed people watched anxiously the efforts made at Govermental level for a solution of the Goa problem. But the hopes of a peaceful settlement vanished when Goan nationalists came to know of the contents of the Portuguese reply to the Government of India's first *aide memoire*. However, they waited patiently until the first half of 1953 but with no results.

The desier for liberation was so ardent that the nationalists formed a number of parties. These small and scattered organizations could not produce the desired effect. They finally decided to unite and coordinate their efforts. A Goa action committee was set up in 1953 with Dr T.B. Cunha as chairman. The committee became the coordinating body for all Goa nationalist parties. It included representatives of the Goa People's Party, Goa United Front, Goa National Congress and several other organizations which had been outlawed in Goa.

In the latter half of 1953, there was some evidence of Goa becoming a live issue again. Mr Peter Alvares and his friends were moving about in Goa in order to organize a fresh campaign. People were being won over in large numbers from Kan-

kon to Dodamarg. It was expected that prominent people like Dr P.S. Gaitonde would assume the leadership of the movement. Young men and women from Goa visited India and brought information about the situation in the interior. Volunteers from India went to Goa to make a first-hand assessment. Thus began the preparation for the coming struggle.

At this stage, the plan was to attain freedom through a satyagraha. As the enrolment of volunteers gathered force the Portuguese struck a blow on February 18, 1954, by arresting Dr Gaitonde. He and his Portuguese wife were sent to Portugal. Dr Gaitonde belonged to a respectable family of Kankon and was known as a skilled surgeon. The Gaitondes represented two major sections of Goan society, Hindus and Christians. Mrs Gaitonde was a noted pianist and their home was a meeting place of lovers of art and science.

At a party where Dr Gaitonde was present, somebody proposed a toast of loyalty to the Portuguese Government. To this formal toast Dr Gaitonde's response was "I object." These words shocked the officials and society leaders present as if the image of loyalty built up during four hundred and fifty years had been shattered in a moment. It was no wonder that the Portuguese Government looked upon the event as an evil omen.

The Portuguese penal laws are inscrutable. In India, before a person is convicted, the prosecution has to prove that he is guilty. But according to Portuguese laws even the idea of opposing the Government is criminal. The Portuguese Government does not like to be described fascist.

In June 1954, when handbills were being printed and lists of volunteers drawn up, the Portuguese police swooped on the nationalists and arrested several of them. They took away a large quantity of propaganda literature and also seized a list of party sympathizers. Anticipating an uprising on a larger scale, the authorities had brought the international police, trained cadres in the steel frame of Dr Salazar's rule, and deployed them all over Goa, Daman and Diu. The seizure of the list of party sympathizers gave a great setback to the movement.

On June 18, 1954, the nationalists demonstrated and hoisted the Indian flag in Goa. This led to the arrest of a number of

demonstrators and suspected nationalist sympathizers. Dr Gaitonde, who had been arrested earlier, was sentenced by a Lisbon court on July 9 to three months' imprisonment, deprivation of political rights including that of practising his profession for 12 years and police surveillance for five years. After his arrest and deportation the Indian Government protested to Portugal against its repressive policy in the settlements.

The liberation of Dadra and Nagar Aveli in the second half of July roused the enthusiasm of the Indian and Goan population and some Goans volunteered to be satyagrahis and hundreds of Indians declared their intention of joining the liberation movement. Meanwhile, the action committee formed in Bombay announced that volunteers would march on Goa on August 15 to mark the beginning of a satyagraha campaign in the settlements.

The Portuguese strengthened their garrisons between the spring and summer of 1954. In a note presented on July 24, the Portuguese Government accused the Government of India of concentrating troops on the borders of the settlements, and demanded that Portuguese troops and police be allowed to pass through Indian territory into Dadra. A second note of July 26 repeated this demand, and requested permission for Portuguese representatives to visit Dadra and Nagar Aveli to examine the situation there.

The Government of India's reply of July 28 denied the presence of any Indian army personnel on the borders of the settlements and stated that it could not permit the movement of foreign troops and police over Indian soil and be a party to the suppression of a genuine nationalist movement for freedom from foreign rule. It also declared that the prevailing tension was bound to increase if Portuguese officials were permitted to go through Indian territory. Later in the month, the Portuguese demanded the withdrawal of the Indian consul-general in Goa and India retaliated by asking Portugal to recall its consul-general in Bombay.

In anticipation of the projected nationalist march on Goa, the Portuguese proclaimed a state of siege in the settlements on August 7, imposed a curfew, closed part of the Indian border, banned the entry of Indian and foreign newspapers

and expelled from Goa some 4,000 Indians who did not possess residence permits. The Portuguese frigate *Bartolomeu Dias* arrived off Diu on August 10 with orders to fire on any ship flying the Indian flag near the coast.

Mr Nehru declared on August 13 that he was opposed to non-Goans entering the settlements, but he would not stop Goans from doing so; at the same time he appealed to them to refrain from acts of violence. Rejecting as "fantastic nonsense" the Portuguese allegation Mr Nehru said that the Indian Army could easily have occupied the settlements but "we have not done it and shall not do it." An Indian official spokesman had previously pointed out that the Goan National Congress, which was sponsoring the march into Goa, was affiliated to the opposition Praja Socialist Party and had consulted neither the Government of India nor the Congress Party on its action.

On August 15, three small batches of Goan satyagrahis crossed the Goa border at Majali, Banda and Redi. The Indian police prevented Indian nationals from crossing the frontier and searched the volunteers for arms beforehand. The number of volunteers was small and the march peaceful. Two parties of 19 and 13 volunteers, carrying Indian flags, crossed the border at other points and were arrested after advancing a short distance into Portuguese territory. At Terekhol, 15 unarmed volunteers occupied a fort without any resistance from the Customs officers holding it. Portuguese troops reoccupied the fort the following day after killing one volunteer and wounding 12 others. Elsewhere in Goa the police dispersed groups of demonstrators which had hoisted the Indian flag and arrested several people. Twelve hundred Indian volunteers, organized by the Praja Socialist Party, were turned back by the Indian police from the Daman border. The Government of India protested on August 20 against the violent measures used by the Portuguese at Terekhol, and alleged in notes on September 3 and October 6 that members of two nationalist groups had been publicly beaten.

After these incidents many Goan and some Indian satyagrahis continued to enter Goa in batches at intervals of a month. Mrs Sudha Joshi offered satyagraha in April 1955, at the head of half a dozen women satyagrahis. Mrs Joshi was

President of the Goan National Congress. Mr N. G. Goray, member of the national executive of the Praja Socialist Party, who accompanied her to the border at Maneri, declared his intention of entering Goa the following month.

A number of the nationalists arrested during July-September 1954 were tried by a Portuguese military court, and Mr De Souza, leader of the march on Goa, was condemned to 28 years' deportation or 20 years' rigorous imprisonment. A Customs officer who had surrendered to the nationalists at Terekhol was sentenced to four years' imprisonment and 46 nationalists received terms of imprisonment ranging from one to eight years.

On January 5, 1955, the Portuguese Government informed the Government of India that a new legislation had been enacted by it under which (1) both Portuguese and foreign citizens who participated in "collective actions intended to stir up public opinion or engage in other activities (individual or collective) which coincide with the aims of foreigners seeking to separate part of the national territory from the mother country, or to hand all or part of it over to a foreign country," would be liable to long terms of imprisonment; (2) these terms of imprisonment might be served in "a different province from the one in which the transgression took place;" (3) in the case of foreigners the penalties would be slightly lower, except that foreigners who had illegally entered Portuguese territory would be liable to the same penalties as Portuguese citizens. The note also stated that Indians already under arrest for such activities would be returned to India and requested the Government of India to publicize the serious nature of these penalties so that more satyagrahis were dissuaded from crossing the frontier.

In a note on January 12, the Government of India warned the Portuguese Government that any attempt to deport Indian (including Goan) satyagrahis to serve prison sentences in Portugal or Portuguese Africa would have "serious and far-reaching repercussions" in India. The note declared that the Government of India refused to accept the view that Indians including Goans, who had the courage to resist "Portuguese colonialism" were criminals, and that the people of India

had every right, with their compatriots in Goa, to strive for the end of colonialism.

On January 20, the Portuguese Government rejected the Indian protest and expressed surprise that the Government of India should have passed judgment on a legislation enacted by another State concerning offences committed in its territory by its nationals.

The Government of India had several times warned the Portuguese that its treatment of not only the Indian satyagrahis but also of the Goan prisoners would not be tolerated by India. Perhaps, the only effect this warning was that no one belonging to this movement, which started in 1954, was banished to Portugal or Africa, the only exception being Dr Gaitonde. But the Portuguese paid no heed to the warning about treatment of prisoners and all of them, including the veteran leader Tatya Bapat, were mercilessly beaten up.

Dr Gaitonde and his wife, released by the Portuguese on May 25, arrived in India on June 14. He said he had not been treated badly in Portugal but had to report to the police every day.

The satyagraha entered a new phase on January 26, 1955, the anniversary of the Indian Republic. A group of satyagrahis successfully held up traffic between India and Goa by squatting on the railway track connecting Castle Rock with Goa. In a dozen villages in Goa Azad Gomantak volunteers distributed pamphlets calling on nationalists not to pay taxes. Twenty-seven satyagrahis entered the colony from various border points. Fifteen satyagrahis, six of whom had crossed into Goa on the night of January 25, were arrested at bayonet point at Loliem and Maschem. They were mercilessly beaten and two of them, Prabhu and Bhat, were seriously injured. Thirty-two more satyagrahis were arrested at Panjim and in and around Canacona, 24 of them on suspicion for interrogation.

Speaking in the Lok Sabha on March 31, Mr Nehru referred to the satyagrahis and said: "I want the Government of Portugal to remember and realize that they are there because we are patient and men of goodwill, because we think ahead and we see the world situation as it is and we do not wish to do something even in a small way, indulging in violence, etc.

which may have bigger repercussions." Mr Nehru also referred to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, of which Portugal was a member, and said: "It came in order to defend a colonial territory in India. That did not do much good to the prestige of NATO. It showed that behind its laudable objective NATO had some which were not so laudable and which could be used for other wrong purposes."

The arrests in Goa and the reports of ill-treatment of satyagrahis by the Portuguese, led to increased tension during May 1955, when Indian volunteers began crossing the border without interference from the Government. All sections of Indian opinion started demanding stronger action in support of the nationalist movement in the settlements.

On May 18, the first batch of 54 non-Goan satyagrahis entered Goa and was fired on by the police. Four of the party were wounded. Twenty-eight of the volunteers were subsequently taken to the Indian border and released, and the remaining were held prisoners. Between April 30 and May 20, the Praja Socialist, Kisan Mazdoor, Hindu Mahasabha and Communist parties announced their intention of organizing parties of volunteers to enter Goa.

Parties of 50 to 100 volunteers entered Goa on May 18 and 27 and June 4, 12 and 18. The Portuguese authorities arrested the satyagrahis but sent back most of them to India. Leaders of the groups including Mr Goray, Mr Madhu Limaye, a P.S.P. leader from Maharashtra, Mr Rajaram Patil, a Communist leader, and Mr V. G. Deshpande, general secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha and a member of Parliament, were taken into custody.

An all-party Parliament committee for Goa was formed in Delhi on May 5, 1955. It met in Bombay on May 21. Mr Frank Anthony, Anglo-Indian leader, presided. The meeting adopted a resolution urging the Government of India to make "one last attempt" for a peaceful solution of the problem. Dr N. B. Khare, vice-president of the Hindu Mahasabha, appealed to the Congress Party to launch a satyagraha. The P.S.P. executive in a resolution condemned the Government's "appeasement" policy and demanded immediate "police action" to merge the settlements in India.

Addressing a public meeting in Poona on June 4, Mr Nehru said: "If you are under the impression that the Government of India will take police action or use force to liberate Goa from Portuguese domination, you are entirely mistaken." He declared that he would adhere to a policy of peace in settling the Goa issue even if it meant a delay of months or even a year.

While conceding the right of Indians to go to the assistance of their brethren in Goa, Mr Nehru said that he did not want any mass satyagraha by Indians. He did not want the world to get the impression that it was a satyagraha of Indians. "I know Goans are tremendously agitated and want to snap the Portuguese bondage. It should not appear to the world that Indians are going there and forcing the Goans to join the satyagraha."

He stated: "It is not a hard job for India to throw out the Portuguese from Goa. But the question is, should we take to such means? Then more problems will arise. Wars and armed action have never solved any problems anywhere in the world."

The Portuguese Embassy in London on June 9 issued a statement criticizing Mr Nehru for his speech of May 31 in which he had stated that he did not approve of "a large number of Indian nationals crossing into Goa, but then Indians had a right to enter the territory."

The national executive of the Praja Socialist Party on June 5 instructed all party branches to take the initiative in forming all-party committees to aid the Goa struggle and not to treat it as a party issue. The party as such was not to organize any separate satyagraha but was to continue to help the All-Party Goa Liberation Committee in its efforts.

Speaking at a civic reception held in his honour by the citizens of New Delhi on June 16, Mr Nehru told the 300,000-strong gathering that if there was any example in the world today of peaceful intentions and of patience and tolerance, it was India's Goa policy.

On July 19, Mr Nehru told journalists: "Here is a great country like India, with dignity and self-respect, with power to deal with the situation swiftly if it chooses, but restraining its

strength and restraining its power and holding on to peaceful methods, in fact checking its own people. It is an unheard of a thing, other countries acting like this. It shows how we love the method of peace, and we are going to continue it. But, to imagine that by sneers and jeers and threats and these romantic stories about the past we are going to be diverted from our path is nonsense."

Fifty-two volunteers drawn from different political parties in India led by Mr Tridib Chowdhury, M.P., crossed into Goa on July 9. Mr Chowdhury, a leader of the Revolutionary Socialist Party, was suffering from fever. Two days later, all the satyagrahis except Mr Chowdhury were sent back to India. Mr Chowdhury was the second Indian M.P. to take part in the Goa liberation movement, the first being Mr V.G. Deshpande, a Hindu Mahasabha leader.

The same day, Mr R.S. Fernandes, a Goan nationalist, was seriously injured. He was in a car near the Chandor border when the Portuguese police ordered him to stop. The driver ignored the order and the police opened fire at a close range, killing the driver and hitting Mr Fernandes in the abdomen. Mr Fernandes had been jailed twice, once in 1953 and again in 1954, for taking part in the freedom struggle.

Mr S.M. Nandekar, a Communist leader, accompanied by 59 volunteers entered Goa from Banda on July 16. They were taken to a police station and severely beaten. Fifty-seven of the volunteers were later left in a nearby jungle at midnight. Earlier that day, 11 volunteers led by Mr Damodar Rao of the Praja Socialist Party entered Goa from Karwar. The party was pushed back into Indian territory two days later. Mr Rao said that they had been taken to a Margao jail where they were beaten and denied food. His request for an interview with the Indian consul in Goa was refused.

Two batches of 18 and 20 volunteers entered Goa on July 17 and 18.

Lisbon Radio described the situation in Goa on July 7 as "grave" with every possibility of its becoming "critical" by August 15, the day fixed for the mass satyagraha by the Goa National Congress and the All-Party Goa Liberation Committee.

According to figures released by the National Congress of Goa, the Portuguese authorities arrested 2,567 people in Goa between February 1954, and April 1955, for taking part in the freedom movement. Of these, 510 were still in prison. About 70 of the total number arrested were Goans.

The All-Party Goa Liberation Committee meeting in Poona on July 20 decided to launch a mass satyagraha on August 15, India's Independence Day, for the liberation of Goa. A resolution said that the struggle for the liberation of the Portuguese pockets had now assumed national dimensions. It demanded the support of all political parties in India.

A meeting of the Congress Working Committee on July 23 in New Delhi passed a resolution calling for a peaceful settlement of the Goa problem and opposing attempts at the mass entry of Indians and others into Goa as it was likely to "change the nature of the peaceful struggle." However, the resolution conceded that it was the right and duty of the people as well as the Government of India "to strive for the liberation of Goa and its integration with the Union of India." The 2,500-word resolution said that while everyone in India was naturally interested in the freedom of Goa, it was "principally for the Goans themselves to carry on the struggle through peaceful means." India's liberation would not be complete until the remaining foreign pockets were also liberated and joined to the rest of India, "for a foreign power to hold on to any territory, however small, in India will always be a source of danger to India as well as a denial of freedom to the people of the area."

What the resolution stated was that it was principally, and not exclusively, for Goans to carry on the struggle through peaceful means. This was interpreted to mean that individual Congressmen may join the satyagraha.

The same day a convention of members of Parliament and of State legislatures adopted a resolution unanimously urging the Government of India to make a final effort to settle the Goa issue through peaceful negotiations. Should the negotiations fail, the convention said the Government should "enforce suitable sanctions to eliminate once and for all the remnants of colonialism in India." It condemned the reign of terror and repression in the Portuguese settlements.

With the satyagraha continuing unabated and with the possibility of its gathering greater momentum, and the deterioration of the diplomatic situation between Portugal and India as a result of India's demand for the closure of the Portuguese legation in New Delhi, the tension between the two countries further increased.

Railway traffic between India and Goa was suspended on July 25. An official announcement by the Southern Railway at Madras stated that the traffic had been suspended between Castle Rock and Sanvordem "until further advice." As a result of this, trains from Londa terminated at Castle Rock, the Indian Customs point, about six miles from Karanzol, the first railway station inside Goa. The reason for suspension was given by an official spokesman in New Delhi on July 25. He said the railway track on either side of Collem station in Goa, on the Castle Rock-Mormagao line, had been mined by the Portuguese. Officials in New Delhi pointed out on July 27 that normal railway traffic between Goa and India could be resumed only if the Portuguese authorities either removed the interference with the railway track or gave an assurance that there would be no damage to traffic passing over that section of the railway.

On July 28, a rally of dock workers of Bombay under the auspices of the Transport and Dock Workers Union decided to boycott all foreign ships carrying cargo to and from Goa. The decision affected eight foreign cargo vessels, mostly British-owned, which passed through Bombay every month to and from Goa. A resolution extended the Bombay dock workers' "full support and sympathy" to the liberation movement and expressed the workers' determination to prevent effectively the movement of cargo to and from the Portuguese possessions. A decision to boycott all Indian vessels trading with the Portuguese possessions in India had been taken by the union eight months ago.

Yet another batch of 52 Indian volunteers entered Goa on the afternoon of August 9 from Majali. On August 11, the Portuguese imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew in Daman and asked the military to "shoot at sight" any "prowlers." This announcement came three days before the day fixed for the

mass satyagraha when about 3,000 unarmed volunteers were scheduled to cross into Daman from Surat district.

The Chief of the Portuguese Army Staff, General Barros Rodrigues, arrived in Panjim on August 12 aboard a Portuguese frigate to inspect the army units stationed on the Indo-Goa border.

Referring to the reports of the mounting of heavy guns on the border and orders to "shoot to kill" by the Portuguese, a spokesman in charge of the preparations for the satyagraha in Surat said: "These reports do not alter our determination to free this tiny hold of the imperialists. Our volunteers shall and will brave Portuguese brutalities as true satyagrahis."

A dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed in Diu on August 10, following a demonstration of local people which was dispersed with a lathi charge by white and coloured police. About 2,000 people had collected at the Gogala *pinjrapole* to see Mr Chandra Shanker Yagnik who led a batch of six satyagrahis on August 9.

The Portuguese Foreign Minister, Senor Cunha, called on the Indian Government on August 12 to ban the planned march of satyagrahis on August 15 "so that the provocation being prepared in the Indian Union may be avoided." At a news conference in Lisbon, he said that Portugal, in facing Indian demands for the cession of its colony, "yielding neither to threats nor to provocation, takes note of offences but does not commit them."

The Portuguese legation in New Delhi was closed on August 8, and the Brazilian Embassy in New Delhi started looking after Portuguese interests in India.

A spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry of the Government of India revealed that the Portuguese authorities had refused visas to nine Indian journalists to go to Goa to report on the mass satyagraha. They, however, had granted visas to nine British and American correspondents stationed in New Delhi and accredited to the Government of India.

The Indian journalists who had applied for visas were Mr A.D. Mani, President of the All-India Newspaper Editors Conference and Editor of *The Hitavada*, the representatives of *The Statesman*, *The Indian Express*, *The Hindusthan Standard*, *The*

Free Press Journal, *Press Trust of India*, *The Times of India* and two Marathi newspapers, *Lok Manya* and *Nava Shakti*. The foreign correspondents granted facilities were those of *The Times* (London), *Associated Press of America*, *Daily Mail* (London), *New York Times*, *British Broadcasting Corporation*, *Columbia Broadcasting Service*, *The Observer* (London), *Reuter* and *News Chronicle* (London).

The Governor-General of the Portuguese settlements in India, General Guedes, stated on August 12 that (*a*) 454 Goans and 176 Indian satyagrahis had been arrested since July 20, 1954, of whom 132 had been arrested since July 20; 127 had been expelled to India and 371 had been held for trial; (*b*) 193 had been tried, 27 of whom had been acquitted; and (*c*) 1,120 Indians who had entered Goa since May 18 had been expelled.

CHAPTER VIII

PATIENCE UNREWARDED

WITH the departure of the British from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, Indians expected that the French and the Portuguese would follow suit. The French were realistic and agreed in principle that the people in their Indian colonies could decide on their future in a democratic way.

But the lessons of history made little impression on the Portuguese. Instead of adjusting themselves to the new situation, they adhered to their no-change policy in a world in which colonial countries were becoming free one after another in rapid succession.

The Government of India, under the leadership of Prime Minister Nehru, approached the Portuguese Government for a peaceful transfer of its enclaves as the British had done. In 1949, the Government of India opened a legation in Lisbon in the hope that this would facilitate an early negotiated settlement of the future of Portuguese possessions. In its first *aide memoire* to the Portuguese Foreign Minister, presented on February 27, 1950, the Government of India suggested that negotiations be opened and that once the principle of reunion of these possessions with India was accepted, "ways and means could be devised by friendly consultations between the Governments of Portugal and India." To this the Portuguese Government replied that it was "unable to discuss, and much less accept, the solution proposed by the Indian Government."

On June 29, a decree promulgated by the governor-general of Portuguese India authorized the detention of persons engaged in "subversive activities or open revolt against the State," without trial for a period of one to three years and required former political prisoners to notify the authorities of their movements after their release and to secure official permission for any change of residence.

At a meeting in Bombay on July 18, the Goan National Congress adopted a resolution affirming the determination of

the people of Goa "to cast off the foreign yoke and to merge our homeland with the Indian Republic." It appealed to the Indian Government to "stand by the people of Goa at this hour and support actively their struggle for democracy."

Dr B.V. Keskar, Deputy Minister for External Affairs, told Parliament on August 14, that the Government of India had informed the Portuguese Government in February of its view that "foreign possessions in India must eventually become part of the Indian Union for historical, political and economic reasons and had proposed the opening of negotiations on the future of the Portuguese settlements in India, but this had been rejected by the Portuguese Government on the ground that these possessions constituted an integral part of Portugal." The Indian Government, he said, had expressed its"deep disappointment" at this reply of the Portuguese Government and had pointed out that it could not accept it as final or acquiesce in "the continuation of the present unsatisfactory position."

The Portuguese Government progressively curtailed civil liberties to put down the merger movement. After patiently waiting for three years, the Government of India, in January 1953, sent another *aide memoire* to the Portuguese Foreign Office pointing out that "political barriers artificially created by an accident of history for which no justification existed at the present time can no longer stem the rising tide of the national urge for unity." At the same time, the Government of India gave the firm assurance that it would "maintain cultural and other rights, including language, laws and customs of the inhabitants of these territories and make no changes in such and like matters except with their consent."

The Portuguese Government did not reply to this *aide memoire*. Consequently, the Government of India sent a note to the Portuguese Foreign Office on May 1, 1953, stating that since the Government of Portugal had not expressed any desire to enter into negotiations, the Government of India proposed to withdraw the Indian mission from Lisbon as it saw no advantage in keeping such a mission there because "it had ceased to be of practical utility." The Portuguese reply, dated May 15, reiterated their earlier view that they could not discuss the

question, much less accept the solution suggested by the Indian Government. The Indian mission in Lisbon was withdrawn on June 11. The Government of India sent a number of notes to the Portuguese Government through its legation in New Delhi urging it to desist from its policy of repression in Goa and maltreatment of satyagrahis.

Mr Nehru told Parliament on July 25, 1955: "As will be evident, the Government of India have exercised the utmost patience and restraint in dealing with the situation in Goa, in spite of the strong and natural feelings of the people of India and Goa. In accordance with their general policy, they will continue to seek a peaceful settlement and will welcome negotiations with the Portuguese Government."

Following the liberation of Dadra and Nagar Aveli, the Portuguese demanded the withdrawal of Mr Coelho, Indian Consul-General in Goa, and of the Indian vice-consul at the Port of Mormagao, whose activities were said to constitute a "serious threat to the internal security of Portuguese India." This allegation was repudiated as unfounded by the Government of India which retaliated by demanding that the Portuguese consul-general in Bombay be recalled. Consular relations were not re-established until January 18, 1955, when the Government of India announced that Mr P.R.S. Mani had been appointed Consul-General in Goa and that Dr Albano Nogueira had been provisionally recognised as Portuguese Consul-General in Bombay.

On August 6, 1954, the British Foreign Office announced that Mr Selwyn Lloyd, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, had informed the Portuguese Ambassador in London, Dr Pereira, that the British Government greatly regretted "the state of tension existing between a member of the Commonwealth and an ally of such long standing as Portugal." The statement said that recent events appeared likely to intensify this tension and result in bloodshed and the acting British High Commissioner in New Delhi, Mr Middleton, had therefore expressed to the Government of India "the earnest hope that there will be no resort to violence or to methods bound to lead to the use of force."

In a reply to this statement delivered on August 9, India

repudiated the "unwarranted implications" contained in the Foreign Office statement which, it said, was based on "one-sided information." It said that the present situation in the settlements had not been created by India, which had "persistently sought a peaceful solution of this problem by negotiation, but had arisen from the Portuguese Government's resistance to" the desire of the subject people for freedom from foreign rule.

Hoping to put India in the wrong Portugal demanded, in a note to New Delhi on August 9, 1954, a study of the situation in the Portuguese settlements by impartial observers. The Portuguese observed that there were two contradictory versions of the situation. Bands formed from "elements foreign to the Portuguese national community" were being used to "obtain the usurpation of Portuguese territories or to provoke incidents," with the protection and assistance of the Indian authorities and armed forces. India, on the other hand, the note stated, maintained that the nationalist agitation was peaceful in character and it could not be blamed in any way. In order to "permit light to be thrown on the situation," the Portuguese Government proposed that neutral observers chosen from countries with which both Portugal and India maintained diplomatic relations, should be allowed free access to the settlements and to adjacent Indian territories and submit reports on (*a*) the nature, nationality and activities of any group entering or proposing to enter the other country's territories against the will of its authorities; (*b*) whether or not these groups were armed; (*c*) whether they received protection or help from the authorities and armed forces of the country in which they originated; and (*d*) any frontier incidents.

The Government of India replied to this note the following day. India accepted the proposal that there should be an impartial study of the situation in the settlements. The reply, however, protested against the "grotesque and totally uncalled for allegations." India did not consider the Portuguese proposals entirely practical or suitable, and therefore suggested that representatives of the two Governments should meet immediately to consider what steps should be taken to implement the principle of impartial observation.

On August 13, the Portuguese Government stated that the Indian note had referred only to Portuguese territories and invited India to state the questions of detail on which it disagreed with its proposals. India reaffirmed its acceptance in principle of the Portuguese proposals and suggested that representatives of both countries should meet to discuss "the terms of reference, composition of observation teams, methods of operation of the principle of impartial observation and all other relevant questions."

The Portuguese Government accepted this suggestion on August 17 and nominated Dr Garion and Dr Laborinho, Portuguese Minister and Counsellor respectively in New Delhi, to lead its delegation. India, on its part, nominated Mr N.R. Pillai and Mr R.K. Nehru, Secretary-General and head of the political department in the Ministry of External Affairs respectively, as its principal representatives and proposed that negotiations should begin on August 24.

On August 22, the Portuguese rejected this proposal and insisted that India should either agree that the purpose of the observers was solely to report on the matters specified in its note of August 8 or indicate what other matters should be laid down as the object of international observation. It added that the Government was prepared to enter into separate negotiations on "certain problems arising from the co-existence and vicinity of the Portuguese State of India and the Indian Union," provided India accepted certain conditions in advance, and the negotiations took place in London or in the territory of a third country.

On August 24 India pointed out that it was being asked to agree in advance to certain conditions which should themselves be the subject of discussions. It suggested that the proposed conference should discuss the implementation of the principle of impartial observation and any other subjects which it considered relevant in accordance with the normal procedure whereby a conference agreed on its own agenda, and observed that the proposal for a second conference was a different one, which should be considered separately.

The Portuguese reply of August 30 suggested that negotiation should begin on September 7, that India sub it a draft

agenda, and that separate negotiations be held on problems arising out of the co-existence of India and the settlements. A separate note the same day requested that Portuguese officials be allowed access to Dadra and Nagar Aveli. India rejected the request on September 2. It agreed that the talks should open on September 7 but refused to accept pre-conditions about the agenda.

Dr Garin informed the Government of India on September 6 that in the Portuguese Government's view the Indian reply did not amount to acceptance of the proposal for appointment of observers and that the meeting fixed for the following day could not therefore take place. Another Portuguese note the same day stated that as Portuguese officials had been refused transit facilities, the Government of Portugal proposed to appoint observers from a third country to examine the situation in the enclaves.

On September 11, the Government of India expressed regret that negotiations had been delayed because Portugal had "continued to insist that matters which in accordance with normal practice should form the subject of negotiations should be agreed to in advance." Portugal's proposals to appoint foreign observers represented a departure from the principle of impartial observation and India could not accept the Portuguese claim that it had "the right to demand transit and passport facilities for nationals of other countries." India emphasized that it still accepted the principle of impartial observation and invited Portugal to send representatives to New Delhi for negotiations.

"If the Portuguese Government are, however, disinclined for any reason to proceed with the proposed negotiations, it would be appropriate for them to make a clear statement to that effect to avoid further misunderstanding, instead of making new demands which deviated from the agreed principle while professing to keep the door open for genuine negotiations," the Indian note said.

During a debate in the Lok Sabha on July 25, 1955, Mr Nehru announced that the Government of India had decided to ask for the closure of the Portuguese legation in New Delhi with effect from August 8, 1955. This step had been taken in

view of the developments in Goa, as exemplified by the mounting repression and the persistent refusal of the Portuguese Government to enter into negotiations for the peaceful transfer of Goa to India. Mr Nehru said that the Government of India had come to the conclusion that the continued functioning of the legation in Delhi in the existing circumstances would serve no useful purpose. At the same time, Mr Nehru expressed the hope that the Portuguese Government would make a friendly response to India's continued desire for a negotiated settlement.

A note to this effect was personally handed over by the Foreign Secretary, Mr R.K. Nehru, to the Portuguese Charge d'Affaires in New Delhi on July 25. Interpreting the notice served by the Government of India on the Portuguese Government, an External Affairs Ministry spokesman stated that India would no longer have any direct diplomatic relations with Portugal.

The Indian legation in Lisbon had been closed down in July 1953. India did not maintain even a consulate in Portugal. Portugal had only a consulate in Bombay and India a consulate-general in Goa.

The Portuguese Foreign Ministry, in a communique on India's decision to close down the Portuguese legation in New Delhi, said on July 26 that the Portuguese representative in New Delhi was "informed verbally that, with these measures the Indian Government do not seek to cut off diplomatic relations with Portugal but only that Portuguese diplomatic representation in New Delhi should cease to exist. Once again, we emphasize that it is Portugal which wants and practises peaceful co-existence, and that it is only from the Indian Union that offences and disturbances come."

The same day, the Portuguese Overseas Minister issued a communique complaining about the suspension of railway traffic between Goa and the rest of India since July 25. The Government of India, it said, had decided to "add to the sacrifices imposed on the people of Goa by their imperialistic policy of the lack of news among members of numerous families of emigrants. Measures have been taken to assure normal traffic in our railway services."

On August 19, 1955, four days after the mass killing of satyagrahis by the Portuguese, the Government of India announced its decision to break off diplomatic relations with Portugal.

A note communicating this decision was handed over to the Portuguese governor-general in Goa early on August 19 by the Indian consul-general. The following is the text of the note:

"The Consul-General of India presents his compliments to His Excellency the Governor-General of Goa and has the honour to convey the following note under instructions of his Government for transmission to the Government of Portugal.

"The Government of India, in their note of July 25, conveyed to the Portuguese Government their earnest and considered view that the Portuguese Government should desist from their policy of violence including firing on unarmed and nonviolent satyagrahis. The Government of India regret that the Portuguese Government have continued and intensified this policy of repression by terror of arms.

"On August 15, nonviolent and unarmed men and women were fired at in very close proximity to the Indian frontier. This resulted, according to information at present in the possession of the Government of India, in the death of at least 15 and injuries to at least 225 persons. Ten others are still reported missing and the majority of these are presumed dead. The Government of India wish to point out to the Government of Portugal in the strongest terms that the conduct of the Portuguese authorities in this respect is totally contrary to the practice of civilized Government and was wanton and brutal exercise of force against unarmed people.

"The Portuguese Government in their press communique allege that they had to defend 'themselves from violence by violence,' and further state that India has massed troops on the Goan border. The Government of India wish to state categorically that these statements are completely untrue and none of the allegations have any foundation in fact. The Portuguese Government must be fully aware that there are no armed forces of the Indian Union anywhere along the borders of the Portuguese enclaves in India. They must be aware that

on August 15 the Portuguese armed forces and the police fired at point-blank range with the deliberate intent to kill unarmed and nonviolent satyagrahis. They did not even hesitate to shoot at women satyagrahis.

"The Government of India have decided to withdraw their consulate-general from the Portuguese enclaves in India. In pursuance of this decision, the consulate-general of India will cease to function as from the first day of September 1955. The Government of India, at the same time request that the consulate-general of Portugal in Bombay and the honorary consulates in Calcutta and Madras be closed on or before September 1, 1955.

"The Government of India trust that the Portuguese Government will extend the necessary facilities and a reasonable time to their Consul-General and his staff to wind up their affairs and for their departure from Goa. Reciprocal facilities will be granted to the Portuguese Consul-General and his staff in Bombay and the consulates in Calcutta and Madras.

"The Consul-General of India avails himself of this opportunity to renew to His Excellency the Governor-General the assurances of his highest consideration."

On August 20, 1955, the Portuguese Government announced that the Indian note had been returned as it had been couched in "unacceptable terms," but that Portuguese consulates would be withdrawn from India. The statement complained about "deliberate misrepresentation" of the conduct of the Portuguese authorities towards "Indian invaders," and put the sole responsibility upon the Indian Government for the severance of direct relations between the two countries.

CHAPTER IX

MASSACRE OF 1955

DURING the small hours of August 15, 1955, the eighth anniversary of India's Independence Day, numerous groups of satyagrahis moved into Goa, Daman and Diu through jungle and swamps in support of the liberation movement in the colonies. The 3,000 satyagrahis, including women, represented all political parties in India and were drawn from different walks of life. Within minutes of their entry, the Portuguese police and military lathi-charged the nonviolent satyagrahis and opened fire on them at a number of places. The final casualty figures, according to Indian officials, were 22 shot dead and 225 injured, 38 of them seriously.

In a number of instances, the police opened fire on the excuse that the satyagrahis had disregarded orders to stop and had continued to march forward. But Indian journalists and foreign newspaper correspondents who watched the satyagraha have testified that the Portuguese police opened fire without any warning.

Reports had reached India earlier that the Portuguese had concentrated troops and police, European and African, fully armed with rifles, sub-machine guns and Sten-guns, all along the border of the settlements. The satyargrahis' march, despite this information, only showed their high calibre and earnestness for the liberation of the settlement.

The 160-mile long Indo-Goan border, lush with rain-fed vegetation, was tense with excitement on the night of August 14. Hundreds of satyagraha camps had been set up between Savantwadi and Majali. For want of transport, a few hundred satyagrahis trekked long distances to reach the border.

According to figures given by Prime Minister Nehru to Parliament, 1,711 volunteers entered Goa, and 1,691 of these were turned back. Some were detained or sent to hospital and some were probably dead. One thousand two hundred

and forty-nine satyagrahis entered Daman, and all but five, one of whom was known to be dead, were pushed back into India. Nothing was known of the fate of the 81 passive resisters who entered Diu, although there was no police firing there.

Three groups of 20, 39 and 16 satyagrahis entered Goa from the southern border at Majali in torrential rain at midnight. Another 49 volunteers crossed the northern Aronda border at midnight and were followed in the next two hours by six more groups at regular intervals. Powerful Portuguese searchlights scanning the Tirakul river did not deter 300 others bent on crossing the river on the northern border.

At Patradevi on the Banda border, 35 out of 600 satyagrahis had hardly moved 20 yards into Goan territory when the police fired several rounds. The volunteers, who had earlier been briefed by their leaders to lie flat on the ground if they were fired on, halted. Mrs Subhadra Bai Sagar of West Bengal took the national flag from Mr V.D. Chitale, leader of the group, and marched forward. She fell when hit by a shot fired at from point-blank range.

Mr Kamal Singh of Punjab, who tried to save Mrs Sagar, was shot at from a short range and fell dead. Yet another volunteer, Mr Madhukar Chaudhuri of Madhya Pradesh, tried to carry the flag forward but fell a victim to a bullet.

Mr John Hlavacek, of United Press of America, and Mr Arthur Bonnear, of Columbia Broadcasting Corporation, brought two of the dead satyagrahis and the wounded Mrs Sagar to Indian territory.

At Palva, near Aronda, satyagrahis hoisted the Indian flag on a temple at daybreak. The Portuguese police asked them to haul it down and on their refusal to do so opened fire. A satyagrahi fell dead and two others received bullet wounds.

Some volunteers waded across the Tirakul river and hoisted the national flag over the Tirakul fort at 11 a.m. The people on the Indian side of the border heard the report of a gun. Another followed five minutes later. Then there was Bren-gun firing, about 60 rounds. Hirane Guruji, secretary of the All-India Primary Teachers' Federation, was killed in the firing.

Two groups consisting of 185 volunteers entered Portuguese territory at Castle Rock. The first was lathi-charged and 17 volunteers were injured. The police opened fire on the second group, killing six persons.

One hundred and one satyagrahis crossed the border at Sasoli. A lathi-charge failed to turn them back. Three of the volunteers wounded in the police firing that followed died after they were brought to Indian territory.

About 1,200 satyagrahis who entered Daman were belabour-ed by the police. The governor himself took a hand in the belabouring. When one group refused to return the police opened fire, killing an old *sadhu* (ascetic) and injuring three other persons, one of them seriously.

Many people in Goa repeatedly offered satyagraha on August 15. They hoisted the Indian flag at a number of places. Twenty Goans were taken into custody in Mormagao and a similar number at Bicholim. They were rounded up and severely beaten both before and after arrest. The citizens of Mormagao hung out a large number of Indian flags, and handbills with the slogan Jai Hind and Viva Goa were distributed.

Seven of the foreign press correspondents who saw the satyagraha returned to Belgaum on August 18. One of them said that the shooting of the peaceful and unarmed satyagrahis was unnecessary. Two others who had spoken to a large number of people in Goa said that the majority of Goans favoured Goa's merger in India.

Prime Minister Nehru told the Lok Sabha on August 16 that the Portuguese firing on the satyagrahis was "brutal and uncivilized in the extreme." There was not even a hint that the satyagrahis had any weapons with them. He paid special tribute to Mrs Sagar and her "extraordinary" courage. In several instances, Mr Nehru said, the satyagrahis were sitting on the ground when they were fired at. It might be that according to the Portuguese the volunteers were committing an offence. But the question arose as to how far under international law a Government was justified in shooting and killing unarmed people behaving peacefully and not attacking.

What had happened in Goa on August 15, and earlier was, perhaps, done deliberately to provoke the Government of

India into some action which might serve to cover the Portuguese misdeeds. But the Government of India was not diverted by such provocations from its fundamental policy of achieving a peaceful settlement of the Goa problem.

Earlier, Mr H.V. Kamath (P.S.P.) had tabled an adjournment motion on what he described as "the unhelpful attitude of the Government of India towards the Indian struggle for Goan freedom, which had contributed to the massacre of peaceful satyagrahis by Portuguese imperialists in Goa." Mr G.V. Mavalankar, Speaker, ruled out the motion and advised those dissatisfied with the Government's policy to table a censure motion. He, however, requested the leader of the House to make a statement.

President Rajendra Prasad, who was then visiting Kurnool, the Andhra capital, said on August 17 that if the Portuguse Government understood modern trends it should not be in any doubt about the future of its territories in India. He said: "We claim to have experience of these matters. We had to challenge the British along these very lines. I have no doubt in my mind that very soon the Portuguese Government will have to review the situation and meet the demand of the people of Goa and hand over its Indian possessions to India."

The Government of Portugal protested to the Government of India on August 17 on the entry of satyagrahis. The note said: "Unfortunately, the Indian Union has not paid attention to the warning and appeal made by the Portuguese Government a few days ago to avoid violations of the frontiers of Portuguese territories in India by means of invaders in an aggressive attitude and with a seditious purpose.

"Details are not yet known, but it is learnt that considerable number of individuals of Indian nationality—several thousands—entered our territories at several points disobeying the authorities, who as they had been strictly ordered, used all possible means to make themselves respected without resorting to force.

"However, in some cases the behaviour of the invaders—who went to the point of attempting to entrench themselves—made inevitable the use of fire arms first into the air, and then to the ground, and only as a last resort against the people.

"The Portuguese authorities were thus compelled to defend themselves from violence by violence—and as a result, in accordance with what the Indian Union wanted, judging by the forecasts contained in an interview recently published in *The Times* (London) with the Indian Prime Minister there are deaths and wounded to be deplored.

"The responsibility for the bloodshed belongs entirely to those who have excited, consented to and favoured the invasion which the Portuguese State of India has just suffered.

"The bands of invaders have already been expelled from our territory, though it may be that there are still some individuals ambushed in regions of more difficult access.

"Armed forces from the Indian Union, namely, Gorkhas and Sikhs, appeared at several points of the neighbouring Indian territories. Their presence was not visibly intended to impede the invasion of Portuguese territory as it was the international duty of the Indian Government to do.

"The case with which large masses of invaders violated our frontier hardly fits in with such a function.

"Inside the Portuguese territory, there is complete tranquillity and the population comments indignantly on the attitude of the invaders.

"The Portuguese Government presents a formal protest to the Indian Government for the serious acts of violation of sovereignty committed on Monday (August 15) and denounces to international public opinion the illegitimate purposes of provocation which they involve."

On August 19 India announced its decision to break off diplomatic relations with Portugal. The previous day, the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs, Government of India, announced in New Delhi that money orders between India and the Portuguese enclaves had been temporarily suspended with immediate effect.

Throughout India the mass killing of satyagrahis caused deep resentment and led to angry demonstrations. Schools and colleges and industrial and commercial establishments were closed everywhere. State legislatures which were in session adjourned for brief periods to pay tributes to the martyrs. The suspension of business in Delhi on August 16 and in

Calcutta and Madras on August 18 was total. The most impressive demonstration, however, took place in Bombay on August 16 when demonstrators attempting to enforce a hartal clashed with the police who opened fire at some places. Fourteen persons were injured. A group of demonstrators demanded the British Deputy High Commission office in the Fort to fly the Union Jack half-mast. A High Commission spokesman stated that it took some time to explain to the crowd why this could not be done.

Another group in front of the Bombay secretariat called for immediate police action against Goa to save the lives of satyagrahis. The Chief Minister, Mr Morarji Desai, tried to persuade the crowd to disperse, but they would not listen. In the afternoon, a section of the demonstrators managed to break into the secretariat. At the same time, other demonstrators began throwing stones. Some employees at their desks were hit and several window panes were broken.

More than 300,000 workers stayed away from textile mills, factories and other business concerns. Roving masses of demonstrators interfered with the city's public transport with the result that bus and tram services were suspended in the afternoon. Life in the city was paralysed. Earlier in the day, thousands of demonstrators broke the police cordon round the Portuguese consulate to hoist the Indian flag on the building.

Addressing a meeting in Delhi on Independence Day, Prime Minister Nehru said that some people were asking why India wanted Goa. The answer was that it was a part of India. The charge of foreigners that India was massing tanks and troops on the Goa border was completely untrue. India was determined not to use force. He referred to the Portuguese firing on the satyagrahis and said that in a war between two armies resort to firing was an obvious thing. But the context was entirely changed when unarmed peaceful people were fired at.

"Let us take note and let the world take note as to how far it is proper for any Government or country to open fire on peaceful people who carry no arms. If anybody breaks the law, the Government concerned has a right to arrest him and send him to jail. These rights are there, but does not inter-

national law sanction that unarmed people, who are not attacking any country, should not be fired on? This is utterly wrong. I say with all respect that it is for the world and the Portuguese Government to understand that nothing would be achieved by these methods and this kind of thing should not be done."

Mr Nehru asked the people to remember that big questions could not be settled by magic or in haste. "We have to wait. But ultimately what is done in a calm and considered way is always more stable and lasting," he added.

Many countries, particularly Asian, condemned the Portuguese and expressed sympathy for India. The Ceylon Government turned down a Portuguese request for opening a legation in Colombo.

More satyagrahis entered Goa on August 19 in two groups of 82 and 150. The following day, all but 11 satyagrahis were pushed back into Indian territory. The fate of the 11 was not known. Many of the satyagrahis bore marks of severe beating. Reports from the Portuguese settlements stated that Mr Ishwarlal Desai, leader of one of the groups of satyagrahis who entered Daman on August 15, had been arrested and taken to Goa by sea along with three others.

At Panjim the Portuguese announced on August 25 that two groups of 147 satyagrahis who had entered Goa in the past few days had been expelled.

Underground freedom fighters burnt down the new agricultural research institute at Pilerne, Bardez Mahal. Some hutments of Portuguese soldiers on the Goa-Karwar border were also burnt down. The Goa National Congress announced that 120 Goans were arrested for offering satyagraha in Goa between August 15 and 19. Two Goan nationalists were shot at in an incident in north Goa on August 15, in which one died on the spot and another later. The nationalists were taking part in a demonstration organized to welcome the satyagrahis.

On August 21, addressing the Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee at Sitapur, Mr Nehru said that he had no doubt that India would solve the question of Goa peacefully and free the people there from colonial oppression. He said: "It

is not that we covet Goa. That little bit of territory makes no difference to this great country. But even a small enclave under foreign rule does make a difference and it is a constant irritation both to India's selfrespect and national interests.

"It may be a source of danger, more especially if a hostile and reactionary country like Portugal holds on to it. Who are the people of Goa? They are the same as our people. Less than two per cent of them, according to Portuguese census figures, have Portuguese as their mother-tongue. The rest are Indians by descent, by race, by language and in other ways. About two-thirds of them are Hindus. About one-third are Catholic Christians. There are many millions of Roman Catholics in the rest of India who are as much Indians as any other. The economic life of Goa is inevitably connected with India's. Thus, it is natural for us to have a sense of unity with the people of Goa and to feel for their oppression under foreign colonial rule.

"Ever since independence, we have tried our utmost according to our declared policy to come to a peaceful settlement with the Portuguese Government. They have spurned us and refused even to discuss this question. We established a legation for this purpose but had to withdraw it because it served no purpose. In spite of insults offered to us by the Portuguese Government and the callousness and cruelty of their rule in Goa, we adhere to our peaceful approach.

"We are convinced that a peaceful approach is the right one, not only from the point of view of Goa and India but also because of larger issues in the world and the foreign policy that we have pursued with so much success. It was this peaceful approach that yielded results in Pondicherry, and today we are friends with the Republic of France. It is easy enough for us to take possession of Goa by using military force, but that would not only be betrayal of all that we have stood for but would also not be fair to the people of Goa. We have set our face against the solution of problems by warlike methods and we intend to adhere to that decision."

On August 21, Indian Christians at a meeting in New Delhi passed a resolution characterizing Portugal's attitude towards Goa "unchristian." The resolution denied Portugal's claim

that its hold on Goa was in the interests of Christianity. This claim ignored the cardinal fact that India had the largest Christian population on the Asian continent and enjoyed freedom of conscience from the earliest days. The satyagraha council of the National Congress of Goa, at a meeting in Bombay on August 23, adopted a resolution paying homage to the martyrs and condemning Portuguese brutality.

The Pakistan High Commissioner in India, Mr Ghazanfar Ali Khan, told newsmen in Delhi on August 24 that Pakistani nationals were not employed in the Portuguese police and armed forces in Goa. Earlier in the week, some satyagrahis had reported on their return that they had seen some Pakistanis in the Portuguese police force. Foreign correspondents told the High Commissioner that they had seen some Pakistani merchants in Goa. The High Commissioner said he had no information and added there might be one or two "in such walks of life." Another correspondent asked if the report that an air service had been started between Karachi and Goa was true. Mr Ghazanfar Ali Khan parried the question. On August 25, it was stated in Karachi that Goa had established new trade links with Pakistan and Ceylon. Following the severance of all diplomatic relations with India, the Portuguese had been seeking trade and shipping facilities from Pakistan and Ceylon.

It was stated in New Delhi on August 24 that three Indian shipping companies, the British India Steam Navigation Company, British-owned but operating in Indian waters, the Scindia Steam Navigation Company and the Konkan Coastal Vessel Shipping Company, had been asked to suspend their services to Goa. It was stated that the Government did not propose to disallow foreign ships, other than the Portuguese, from passing through Bombay.

A Portuguese military tribunal in Panjim published on August 29 the sentences passed on nine Goan Hindus arrested on January 26 in Chapora for staging anti-Portuguese demonstrations. Mr K.N. Palencar and Mr A. Dabolkar were tried in *absentia*. The former was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment and a fine, three years' security detention and loss of political rights for 20 years, and the latter to 10 years'

imprisonment, loss of political rights for 15 years and a fine. Mr R.N. Sirodkar was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment, loss of political rights for 13 years and a fine. Mr N. Dabolkar and Mr A.T. Pallencar and Mr T.C. Pernentca were awarded eight years' imprisonment each, and two others were given one year's imprisonment each.

The tribunal later sentenced four other Goans and two Indians to prison terms ranging from one to nine years on charges of subversive activities. They had been arrested in Portuguese territory on January 26.

The All-Party Goa Vimochan Sahayak Samiti (Organization for Liberation of Goa) decided in Poona on August 28 to continue mass and individual satyagraha.

Within hours of the decision, 100 satyagrahis left Poona for Belgaum to march into Goa. Twenty-five of them, who crossed the border at Majali in the morning on August 31, were arrested by the Portuguese police and severely beaten. They were thrown back across the border later at night. On September 1, more than 70 unarmed satyagrahis entered Goa from Majali. They were rounded up about seven miles from the border, beaten and pushed back into Indian territory.

Lisbon Radio said on September 11 that Portugal would impose a tax on Indian merchants in Angola, Mozambique and other Portuguese possessions for payment to Goan families who used to receive remittances from relatives in India.

Mr Anil Chanda, Deputy Minister for External Affairs, told the Rajya Sabha on September 2 that from the beginning of August 1955, the Portuguese had made several non-scheduled flights between Karachi and the Portuguese enclaves in India. These planes did not fly over Indian territory but did fly over Indian territorial waters.

Prime Minister Nehru told the Rajya Sabha during a foreign affairs debate on September 6 that Goa had become an interesting test of the feelings of people and countries towards colonial territories. Nearly all countries in Asia took up an anti-colonial attitude and were in favour of freedom for Goa. "I regret, however, that as far as I know, no such clear indication has been given by Pakistan of following the Bandung

line in regard to Goa. In fact, there have been some tendencies in the other direction, which we have noted with regret."

Mr Nehru said: "Inside Goa, something or other has been happening. The people of Goa were themselves demanding a change, demanding freedom and civil liberties, and quite a large number of people had to be punished with the most extraordinary sentences. Normal sentence in Goa varies from 10 to 20 years. There was complete absence of civil liberties, and there was no press. Last year, something new appeared. There was satyagraha....So far as the Government of India were concerned, obviously one Government could not offer satyagraha against another. The utmost that it could do was not to prevent it if there was no violation of law."

After paying tributes to those who went to Goa on August 15, Mr Nehru declared that the country was emotionally roused and powerfully moved by those acts of heroism and courage.

Mr Nehru disclosed that they had consulted many eminent lawyers as to what was the position in international law if a party entered the territory of another State in violation of the law. Obviously, it had a right to arrest and push it out, but no right to ill-treat it, much less to behave in the manner the Portuguese had done.

He added: "I am not for the moment engaged in pushing Goa into the Indian Union. What I am engaged in, and I think that is much more important, is the removal of Portuguese sovereignty from Goa. I am not making any fine distinction between the two. What I mean is that I want to remove the idea from any person's mind that we are out to coerce or compel the Goan people to come into the Indian Union. I have no doubt that the Goans want to come in and they will come in. But the main point for us as well as for the people of Goa is, first of all, the general proposition that colonialism should not continue, and secondly, that colonial rule should not continue right on our door-steps."

A Government, he said, could not offer satyagraha. It was absurd. Whether private parties could do so or not was a very difficult question. But a Government could take economic action in various ways and his Government had done

so in the last six or eight months. It took a little time to have any effect.

Mr Nehru stated: "I am not prepared to give a final reply to the philosophical or theoretical aspects of the question of individual satyagraha. I have no answer in my mind as to what a Government should do in these circumstances. But I am quite clear, that, in the existing circumstances, satyagraha, certainly of the mass variety as well as of the individual variety, is undesirable.

"Surely, Goa is not such a problem on which we should go to war or take any warlike measures. I am not prepared to prophesy or give any guarantee to this House or to the country as to how and when this problem will be solved. I am no prophet. But I think I can say with some confidence that forces are at work, national and international, economic and others, which are bringing that solution nearer and which ultimately will undoubtedly solve this problem."

Replying to the discussion, Mr Nehru again said: "Our approach in regard to Goa is not that it will not be merged in the Indian Union. I think that is inevitable. But stress has to be laid on the factor of Portugal leaving Goa. The merger of Goa in India is a second step."

Another group of 31 volunteers tried to cross the border at Banda on the northern border of Goa on September 6. The Indian police prevented them from doing so and brought them back to Savantwadi. The police requested the satyagrahis not to go towards the Goa border. Three days later another 33 satyagrahis from Belgaum were prevented from going to the Goa border.

The Bombay Government instructed the district authorities to dissuade Indian satyagrahis from crossing into Goa and Daman in support of the liberation movement. The Saurashtra Government was also reported to have taken similar steps in regard to Diu.

The All-India Congress Committee, at a meeting in New Delhi on September 4, passed a resolution expressing its opinion that in the present context it would be inappropriate for Indian nationals to enter Goa. It, therefore, asked the people to desist even from individual satyagraha. The resolution

was moved by the West Bengal Chief Minister, Dr B.C. Roy, and was seconded by the Bombay Chief Minister, Mr Morarji Desai.

After the resolution was adopted, Mr Nehru told the meeting that what the committee had taken was the "only correct course." The Congress had experience of satyagraha inside the country but not in the international field. The AICC resolution was "an act of boldness" in view of the prevailing excitement in the country, he added.

Until this time the Congress and its ruling wing had opposed police or military action but allowed individual satyagraha.

The resolution said: "The AICC is strongly of the opinion that any mass entry into Goa in the name of satyagraha or otherwise is undesirable. The Government of India, after the withdrawal of cooperation from the Portuguese Government, have closed and sealed the borders of the Portuguese possessions in India and, in the circumstances, any entry into Goan territory by Indian nationals will be inappropriate.

"The AICC is, therefore, of the opinion, that in the present context even individual satyagraha by Indian nationals should be avoided."

The adoption of this resolution by the AICC brought forth strong criticism of the Congress and the Government by leaders of different parties, particularly those participating in, or sympathizing with the Goa freedom movement.

Nine political leaders including members of Parliament said in a statement that they could not accept the unilateral declaration of policy by the Congress Party as national policy. Some of the signatories were Acharya J.B. Kripalani, Mr Asoka Mehta, Mrs Sucheta Kripalani (all P.S.P.), Mr N. C. Chatterjee and Mr V. G. Deshpande (both Hindu Mahasabha), Mr A. K. Gopalan, Mr Bhupesh Gupta, Prof. Hiren Mukerjee (all Communists), and Dr Lanka Sundaram (Independent).

These leaders expressed surprise at the adoption of such a resolution by the Congress. They regretted that when all parties were united and were conducting the liberation movement on a national level, the united front was sought to be "sabotaged" by the ruling party acting in isolation without

any reference to or consultation with other political parties. "The most disquieting feature of the resolution is that the brave people of Goa, who have been fighting against fascist dictatorship, will feel suddenly let down by the ruling party," they said.

The chairman of the satyagraha council of the Goa National Congress, Mr Peter Alvares, said on September 6, that it would be a gross understatement to state that the AICC resolution of Goa was merely a "shock to the freedom movement. In the absence of an alternative positive plan for freedom it has thrown the safety and lives of Goans to the wolves of Portuguese imperialism." On the other hand, Mr Janardan Shinkere, general secretary of the Goan National Conference, welcomed the AICC resolution and described it "unambiguous." He wanted the Goan freedom struggle to be fought mainly by Goans themselves.

The Portuguese Government issued a communique on September 8, denying that the U.S. was showing sympathy towards India's stand on Goa. It said: "The position of the U.S. as regards Goa continues to be the same as described by Mr Dulles in August. Any press reports seeking to create an impression to the contrary is inaccurate."

At a news conference in Calcutta on September 9, the U.S. Ambassador to India, Mr John Sherman Cooper, was asked if the "liquidation of Portuguese control over Goa will contribute to world peace." He replied that he stood by the U.S. policy statement on Goa made by the Secretary of State, Mr J. F. Dulles, a few months earlier.

Two groups of satyagrahis were prevented from reaching Goa by the Indian border police on September 11. Fourteen satyagrahis marched towards Majali from Karwar but were stopped at a river ferry-crossing. Another 31 volunteers were stopped from marching towards the borders from Savantwadi. Forty satyagrahis were brought back from Ambodi in Belgaum on September 12 following a decision of the Belgaum branch of the Goa Vimochan Sahayak Samiti to call back volunteers from the Goa border.

Forty-six Communist volunteers on their way to Daman were stopped on the border by the police on September 16.

In a spirited speech in the Lok Sabha on September 17, during a foreign affairs debate, Mr Nehru defended the Government policy of preventing satyagrahis from entering Goa. He maintained that this was no new policy. He conceded that at times the emphasis varied and at some periods there was a certain laxity in enforcing the policy. He also denied that there was any pressure from any foreign countries in the slightest degree to affect the decisions brought about by the Government. The opposition was equally spirited in criticizing the Government for imposing a "ban" on the Goa movement and for taking such a vital decision at party level and for not treating it as a national issue.

Mr A.K. Gopalan, the Communist leader, criticized the Government's "vacillating policy." Mr N.C. Chatterjee maintained that the Government had "torpedoed the united front" built up on the Goan issue. The AICC or the Government had no right to deprive Indians of their inalienable right to fight injustice in Goa. Mr Purushottamdas Tandon (Congress) said that by banning satyagraha, the Government had taken upon itself the entire responsibility of solving the Goa problem. People should give the Government time to do it.

Following this change in the Government policy (banning the satyagraha), opposition parties strongly condemned the Congress and the Government. They issued a number of statements ventilating their grievances. In a joint statement on September 20 the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, the Jan Sangh and the Ram Rajya Parishad said that a crisis had been created in the movement for the liberation of Goa , so successfully conducted by the Goa Vimochan Sahayak Samiti. "This action of the Government of India will demoralize people inside Goa and will be responsible for any setback in the movement," it said. The central committee of the Communist Party of India said on September 19 that the Government should make it clear to the Portuguese that unless it was prepared to open negotiations immediately, the Government of India would be free to take any action in respect of Goa including police action.

Goa gripped the attention of foreign governments and newspapers. Sober newspapers supported the Indian stand in

principle, though many of them did not agree with the methods and manner or time for a solution. The Portuguese colonial rule in Goa was considered a fantastic anachronism, a relic of an age of Western domination which had ended almost everywhere else in Asia. World opinion had no doubt about Goa's future.

The influential *Baltimore Sun* said on September 17: "Even without the violence of the past few days, time and history were running against Portugal in Goa. The pace may now be accelerated."

The *Chicago Sun Times* stated on September 22: "There can be little doubt that the Portuguese will eventually relinquish their territorial toeholds in India. The British went out of India in 1947 and the French gave up their small coastal settlements a few years later, in 1954.... We are sure that many people can understand the part which Portugal's pride has played in her reluctance to quit Goa and her other two Indian possessions...."

The *Washington Post* said on September 22: "It must be recognized that continued Portuguese hold on Goa and two other tiny enclaves in India is running against the tide of history." A week later it added: "The fact that Goa has been held by the Portuguese for 400 years is no more reason to an Indian that it should continue to be so held than that India should have continued under the British...."

The *Malaya Mail* on September 17 said: "There can be no justification for Portugal retaining its hold on this territory.... To a nation which is becoming more and more powerful and whose presence among the councils of the world is invariably sought, the existence of foreign pockets on its territory must be a standing affront ...."

The *Pakistan Times*, Lahore, stated on September 29: "Portugal still sticks leech-like to its possessions. Its pockets in Goa, Daman and Diu are proving a harder nut to crack and continue to disfigure the fabric of India's freedom. Happily, they are but a few and more annoying than dangerous. They are nevertheless an unwelcome anachronism whose existence in its midst no proud or selfrespecting nation can tolerate."

In its issue on August 5, 1955, the *Ceylon Daily News*, Colombo, stated: "It cannot be expected that the Indian people who have seen more powerful imperialism vacating every other part of their country should reconcile themselves to the survival of this final outpost of colonial rule."

The *Die Welt*, Hamburg, said on September 20: "The Portuguese may put out many legal arguments but even the cautious Vatican diplomacy has declined to defend the relic of a colonial age."

CHAPTER X

DADRA WINS FREEDOM

JULY 21, 1954, has become a red letter day in the history of Goa. On that day, Dadra, a Portuguese enclave in India, was liberated by the United Front of Goans with the assistance of the local people after a minor clash with the Portuguese police.

The fall of Dadra led to panic among the police of Nagar Aveli and the Portuguese administrator, a retired captain, and the police, including several Europeans, sought refuge in Indian territory.

On August 2, 1954, the members of the Independent United Party and the Goa People's Party helped the local people of Nagar Aveli, another Portuguese enclave in India, to overthrow the Portuguese rule.

The liberation of Dadra and Nagar Aveli and the end of the 175-year Portuguese rule in these pockets marked the beginning of the end of Portuguese colonial rule in India.

The Portuguese Foreign Office said that "the Portuguese territory of Dadra has been the object of armed aggression originating in the neighbouring Indian Union." It alleged that in numerous villages and border communities not only in the enclaves but elsewhere armed Indians had penetrated Portuguese territory. Portugal demanded passage for its armed forces across Indian territory to Dadra and Nagar Aveli to re-establish its rule.

The Government of India denied the Portuguese allegations and at the same time announced its firm decision not to allow Portuguese troops to go through Indian territory to the enclaves. Mr A.K. Chanda, Deputy Foreign Minister, assured the Rajya Sabha that the Government of India would take every step to see that Indian territory was not violated in any manner by Portuguese troops bound for the enclaves.

In a note to Lisbon, India categorically denied the allegation of complicity in the merger movement and maintained at the same time that "Indians in the Portuguese possessions are as

much entitled to their freedom as those in the Indian Union and are determined to win it but the Government and the people of India have always been anxious to find a solution by conference and negotiation."

On December 22, 1955, within days of its admission to the United Nations, Portugal filed an application with the International Court. The dispute has come to be known as the Right of Passage over Indian Territory Case (Dadra Nagar Aveli Case).

Portugal requested the Court:

"(*a*) To recognize and declare that Portugal is the holder or beneficiary of a right of passage between its territory of Damao (littoral Damao) and its enclaved territories of Dadra and Nagar Aveli, and between each of the latter, and that this right comprises the faculty of transit for persons and goods, including armed forces or other upholders of law and order, without restrictions or difficulties and in the manner and to the extent required by the effective exercise of Portuguese sovereignty in the said territories.

(*b*) To recognize and declare that India has prevented and continues to prevent the exercise of the right in question thus committing an offence to the detriment of Portuguese sovereignty over the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar Aveli and violating its international obligations deriving from the above-mentioned sources and from any other, particularly treaties, which may be applicable.

(*c*) To adjudge that India should put an immediate end to this *de facto* situation by allowing Portugal to exercise the above-mentioned right of passage in the conditions herein set out."

(India raised six preliminary objections to the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the application. Of these, four were rejected by the Court in its judgment on November 26, 1957. The remaining two objections were joined to the merits of the case. The Indian Judge of the Court, Mr M.C. Chagla, dissented from this ruling. The fifth and sixth objections were that the dispute fell exclusively within Indian jurisdiction and that it had its roots before 1930 when India accepted the Court's jurisdiction. However, in its final judgment, the Court rejected these objections also.

Hearing of the application began before the Court on September 21, 1959. Prof. Inocencio Calvao Telles, Director of the Faculty of Law in Lisbon University, said that the Portuguese flag had flown over Daman since the 16th century and Dadra and Nagar Aveli became Portuguese in the 18th century. He said: "In 1954, bands of men coming from the territory of the Indian Union penetrated the Portuguese enclaves. Force was used and blood was shed. The local Portuguese authorities, having only feeble means of defence, could not effectively resist.

"Communications between Daman and the enclaves were completely cut and the Indian Government adamantly refused to allow the legal order to be re-established.

"But the illegal situation thus created in no way affects the Portuguese right of sovereignty on these territories."

On the third day of the hearing on September 23, Mr Maurice Bourquin, a Swiss professor of law, appearing for Portugal, said: "The Portuguese application made it clear that for two centuries the right of passage had never been menaced until it was radically changed in 1954 in pursuance of an open campaign, begun by India in 1950, for the annexation of Portuguese territory."

Prof. Telles submitted on September 30 that India was responsible for the loss to Portugal of *de facto* authority over the enclaves, because India facilitated their invasion and capture and prevented Portugal from sending reinforcements to defend them.

Indian's case was presented by its Attorney-General, Mr M.C. Setalvad, on October 9. He told the Court: "Portugal claims in particular that she has the right under international law to take her forces across the territory of India in order to establish Portuguese sovereignty over a people who declared themselves independent more than five years ago. India denies that it is obliged under international law to grant such passage.

"The dispute raised the issue of Portuguese colonialism in India as against the freedom of the people of those colonies.

"Portugal has come to this court not merely to seek endorsement of its colonial rule in India. She asks that under the

auspices of international law she should be allowed to take her armed forces over the territory of India to achieve that object.

"Is Portugal entitled to this under international law? That is one of the important questions which faces the Court in the present proceedings.

"Portugal has been at some pains to spread the idea of the beneficent nature of Portuguese colonialism in India and the non-existence of the Goa freedom movement, but the statements of Dr A. Salazar testifies to the existence of that movement. Dr Salazar had declared that the crisis in the enclaves was part of the gale that had swept through India and was part of the aspirations that had led to Indian independence in 1947."

The people in the Portuguese enclaves, he said, were not Portuguese but were the "kith and kin" of the Indian people outside those territories and spoke the same language. The inhabitants of the enclaves were "converted to Christianity by force," but a caste system prevailed. Portugal had tried to crush the Goan freedom movement by sending into the settlements African and Portuguese troops. "The nationalists were beaten and tortured."

The history of the independence movement in the colonies was very different from the history of the independence movement in British India, he stated. "The British understood and in a measure respected the urge for freedom. Portuguese colonialism, on the other hand, was marked by the authoritarian features of a police State, by stern and cruel oppression."

On October 10, Prof. Henri Rolin, of Brussels University, counsel for India, declared: "The central point of the Portuguese argument has been that the right of passage flowed naturally and necessarily from Portuguese sovereignty over the enclaves. Portugal had said that there was an absolute need for this right of passage for the exercise of Portuguese sovereignty and had asked whether it was possible to exercise sovereignty without the right of passage.

"What obligations has India? We are willing to concede that it is impossible for Portugal to exercise sovereignty without passage, but we are not willing to concede that this creates a right of passage by spontaneous combustion.

"In the 175 years that the Portuguese enclaves have existed, it has been the United Kingdom for the greater part that has in fact exercised sovereignty over the surrounding territory."

Prof. Rolin said that they were all "too familiar" with the "extreme reluctance" of the Anglo-Saxons "to settle a matter in abstracto."

"Here, I think we have the explanation of what has been going on. There has been passage of Portuguese authorities, troops and persons across Indian territory which was controlled by the United Kingdom. This took place on a permissive basis. Portugal now, after 175 years, finds herself in a position where the newly-constituted Indian Union refuses this passage, which is not a right of passage. This is a new State which controls the surrounding territory."

This, he argued, was a plausible and common situation, where the sovereign now controlling the surrounding territory had changed its mind, or where the situation was changed because the sovereignty had changed.

There had always been agreements for passage. In this case it was by permission, and this permission did not give rise to a right. "The permission having been withdrawn, the passage ends, because there has never been the right of passage." India had full jurisdiction over the intervening territory in the absence of a special title in the sense of the right of passage.

On October 14, Mr Setalvad charged Portugal with making a deliberate attempt to keep back documents unfavourable to it.

He referred to the 1779 treaty between Portugal and the Maratha rulers which, Portugal claimed, had given it sovereignty over the enclaves and said that no evidence that the Marathas had ever granted the Portuguese sovereignty had been produced.

He told the Court how two Indian officers had found in the personal belongings of a Jesuit priest in Bombay, the late Rev. Father Heras, of St. Xavier's College, a photo copy from the Portuguese archives in Goa which was the Portuguese official text of the 1779 treaty. From this treaty it appeared that the Maratha rulers had made only a grant of revenue to the Portuguese and had not ceded any territory.

Portugal, he said, had to this day not submitted to the Court this document, which had now been proved to be present in the Portuguese archives, although it had declared that it did not exist. Portugal had not produced a single document relating to the transit of goods from Daman to Nagar Aveli during the Maratha period. There was no evidence of the right of passage for goods under the Marathas as claimed by Portugal.

Mr Setalvad pointed out that Article 17 of the treaty only referred to "villages yielding a revenue of Rs. 12,000" and wanted to know where Article 17 mentioned cession of territory in sovereignty.

He also quoted the Portuguese official text of Article 17 of the treaty which spoke of a contribution in Daman of Rs 12,000. This too, he said, would not be interpreted as meaning a cession of territory in sovereignty.

He revealed that there was another text of the alleged treaty which had been found by India in unusual circumstances. Portugal had contended that she had no knowledge of this version and that it did not exist. "However, India discovered that not only did this document exist but it existed as an official Portuguese document, undersigned by two Portuguese governors of Goa, and that, in fact, it was part of the official Portuguese treaty of the text of March 4, 1779, and January 11, 1780."

Appearing for India, Sir Frank Soskice, a former British Attorney-General, told the Court on October 16 that the British recognized no obligations arising from the arrangements made by the Portuguese with the Marathas. In 1819, therefore, the field was clear. If any right to passage existed previously it had ceased to have effect and the position between the British and the Portuguese remained to be worked out. Therefore, the British regarded every kind of traffic over their territory between Daman and the enclaves "as something they could prohibit or allow, tax or exempt, regulate and control, just as they wished. They never acknowldged any right limiting their freedom of action. They did not hesitate to use their position even to compel the Portguese to order their domestic affairs according to British desires. The Portuguese accepted

this attitude of the British and never made any complaint about it however serious the effect on them of British measures and never complained of infringement of any right.

"When they had troops or armed police or military stores to send between Daman and the enclaves, they asked the British for permission. If they wanted exemption from duty or even the relaxation of complete embargoes, they asked for it as a favour and never mentioned any right. They never based their request on the needs of their administration or the maintenance of their sovereignty. Both sides entered into agreements quite inconsistent with any right of passage."

He quoted from the partition proceedings published by the Government of India and the effect of partition and the relations of the successor governments of India and Pakistan between each other and with other countries, besides existing treaties and engagements.

A list of treaties entered into by the British Government of India or by the British Government in which India was interested, contained 627 treaties from 1654 to 1947. It was clear that the list was meant to be comprehensive, as showing the treaties binding upon the Government of British India at the time of partition. "It is interesting to note in passing that more than one treaty with Portugal is included in the list. However, for our purpose, what is significant is what the list does not include. It contains no mention of the so-called treaty of 1779, or of any treaty having anything to do with the enclaves. The list of treaties is of great significance. It was prepared expressly for the purpose of the grant of independence and it shows that the so-called treaty of 1779 was not regarded as an effective obligation which would devolve upon the new Government of India."

Mr Setalvad said on October 19 that the Portuguese allegations that India had a plan to isolate the enclaves as part of a programme of annexation was not correct. There was an independence movement in the Portuguese possessions even before India became free. A person no less than Dr Salazar had acknowledged the existence of such a movement as long ago as 1930. With the withdrawal of the British from India, the Portuguese became afraid of what might happen in their

own territories. In Goa they embarked on a policy of repression. There had always been the question of the independence of Goans from Portuguese colonial rule. The insurrection in Dadra and Nagar Aveli was brought about by Goans and the people of the enclaves. It should be seen against the background of the existence of a movement of the people of the Portuguese possessions for emancipation from colonial rule.

Summing up the position taken by India, Mr Setalvad denied on October 20 that India had in any way assisted the uprising in Dadra and Nagar Aveli.

Portugal began replying to India's arguments on October 24. Prof. Telles told the Court that India had "completely misunderstood" the Portuguese claim and had attributed to Portugal intentions it never had. It was quite clear that from the beginning the Government of India had "systematically inflated" Portugal's claim and "distorted it completely" in order to find some means of combating it. Portugal had always admitted that persons and goods in transit remain subject to that competence and that India had the right to regulate their passage and subject them to conditions and restrictions. "All that we claim is that the competence of India is not discretionary, that it is limited and that India is not free to prevent the exercise of Portuguese sovereignty in the enclaves. What Portugal was claiming today was nothing other than continuation of an ancient practice. It was sufficient to read the Portuguese application to the Court and its memorial to be convinced that the right of passage claimed by Portugal continued to be subject to the exercise of the territorial competence of India. But India had tried to show that, contrary to Portuguese statements, Portugal wished to remove Portuguese transit from the competence of India to make regulations from its administrative and judicial control."

He went on to give evidence of what he called the recognition of Portuguese sovereignty over Dadra and Nagar Aveli and quoted examples of certain privileges in the field of Customs duties, taxes and transport and said that the right of passage claimed by Portugal was necessary and indispensable to the exercise of its sovereignty.

On October 27, Prof. Telles denied that the undertakings given to Portugal by the Maratha rulers had been swept away by the British authorities, as Mr Setalvad had asserted. It was evident that the treaty, in making a territorial concession to the Portuguese, necessarily conferred on them at the same time the means indispensable to the exercise of the rights implicit in that concession. This implied the ability to pass through the intervening Maratha territory. He added: "The right of passage is implicitly contained in the treaty itself, which constitutes the legal basis of the concession."

On October 31, Portugal concluded its pleadings.

During India's second series of pleading which ended on November 6, Mr Setalvad said that if one studied the text of the Portuguese application, its memorials and its pleadings, one would see a change in the claim. According to its pleadings, the right should be considered as being restricted to the smallest proportion. What Portugal required was that it should be able to exercise its sovereignty over the enclaves. He had two objections to the Portuguese definition of the right. In the first place, it was very limited, and secondly, it lacked precision.

In its final judgment, announced on April 12, 1960, the Court declared that in 1954 Portugal had a right of passage between Daman and the Dadra and Nagar Aveli enclaves to the extent necessary for the exercise of Portuguese sovereignty, and subject to regulation and control by India in respect of private persons only. Four of the 15 Judges dissented from this declaration.

The Court (eight to seven) found that there was no right of passage for Portuguese armed forces. It decided that Portugal had received a title to collect taxes from these villages to the extent of Rs. 12,000 yearly by a treaty concluded with the Maratha ruler in 1779; Portuguese sovereignty over the villages had been subsequently recognized by the British in fact and by implication, and had later been tacitly recognized by India. In consequence, the villages had acquired the character of Portuguese enclaves within Indian territory, and there had developed between the Portuguese and the territorial sovereign a practice with regard to passage to the enclaves upon which Portugal had relied for the purpose of establishing its claim to

right of passage. Nevertheless, this right only applied to the passage of private persons.

As regards armed forces, armed police and arms and ammunition, the Court maintained that the position was different. It said: "It appears that during the British period up to 1878 passage of armed forces and armed police between British and Portuguese possessions was regulated on a basis of reciprocity. No distinction appears to have been made in this respect with regard to passage between Daman and the enclaves. There is nothing to show that passage of armed forces and armed police between Daman and the enclaves or between the enclaves was permitted or exercised as of right.

"Paragraph 3 of Article XVIII of the Treaty of Commerce and Extradition of 26 December, 1878, between Great Britain and Portugal laid down that the armed forces of the two Governments should not enter the Indian dominions of the other except for the purposes specified in former treaties, or for the rendering of mutual assistance as provided for in the treaty itself, or in consequence of a formal request made by the party desiring such entry. Subsequent correspondence between the British and Portuguese authorities in India shows that this provision was applicable to passage between Daman and the enclaves....

"The requirement of a formal request before passage of armed forces could take place was repeated in an agreement of 1913.

"With regard to armed police, the position was similar to that of armed forces. The Treaty of 1878 regulated the passage of armed police on the basis of reciprocity. Paragraph 2 of Article XVIII of the Treaty made provision for the entry of the police authorities of the parties into the territories of the other party for certain specific purposes, e.g. the pursuit of criminals and persons engaged in smuggling and contraband practices, on a reciprocal basis. An agreement of 1913 established an arrangement providing for a reciprocal concession permitting parties of armed police to cross intervening territory, provided previous intimation was given. An agreement of 1920 provided that armed police below a certain rank should not enter the territory of the other party without consent previously obtained.

"An agreement of 1940 concerning passage of Portuguese armed police over the Daman-Silvassa (Nagar Aveli) road provided that if the party did not exceed ten in number, intimation of its passage should be given to the British authorities within twenty-four hours after the passage had taken place, but that if any number exceeding ten at a time are required so to travel at any time the existing practice should be followed and concurrence of the British authorities should be obtained by prior notice as heretofore.

"Both with regard to armed forces and armed police, no change took place during the post-British period after India became independent.

"It would thus appear that, during the British and post-British periods, Portuguese armed forces and armed police did not pass between Daman and the enclaves as of right and that, after 1878, such passage could only take place with previous authorization by the British and later by India, accorded either under a reciprocal arrangement already agreed to, or in individual cases. Having regard to the special circumstances of the case, this necessity for authorization before passage could take place constitutes, in the view of the Court, a negation of passage as of right. The practice predicates that the territorial sovereign had the discretionary power to withdraw or to refuse permission. It is argued that permission was always granted, but this does not, in the opinion of the Court, affect the legal position. There is nothing in the record to show that grant of permission was incumbent on the British or on India as an obligation....

"Having found that Portugal had in 1954 a right of passage over intervening Indian territory between Daman and the enclaves in respect of private persons, civil officials and goods in general, the Court will proceed to consider whether India had acted contrary to its obligation resulting from Portugal's right of passage in respect of any of these categories.

"Portugal complains of the progressive restriction of its right of passage between October 1953, and July 1954. It does not, however, contend that India had, during that period, acted contrary to its obligation resulting from Portugal's right of passage. But Portugal complains that passage was

thereafter denied to Portuguese nationals of European origin, whether civil officials or private persons, to native Indian Portuguese in the employ of the Portuguese Government, and to a delegation that the governor of Daman proposed to send to Nagar Aveli and Dadra."[1]

The Court noted that the governor of Daman was granted the necessary visas for a journey to and back from Dadra as late as July 21, 1954.

The judgment said: "The events that took place in Dadra on 21-22 July 1954, resulted in the overthrow of Portuguese authority in that enclave. This created tension in the surrounding Indian territory. Thereafter all passage was suspended by India. India contends that this became necessary in view of the abnormal situation which had arisen in Dadra and tension created in the surrounding Indian territory.

"On 26 July the Portuguese Government requested that delegates of the governor of Daman (if necessary limited to three) should be enabled to go to Nagar Aveli in order to enter into contact with the population, examine the situation and take the necessary administrative measures on the spot. The request stated that if possible this delegation would also visit Dadra and examine the situation there. It mentioned that the delegation could be routed directly to Nagar Aveli from Daman and need not necessarily pass through Dadra. The Government of India in its reply dated 28 July refused this request. The reply stressed *inter alia* the tension that prevailed in the intervening Indian territory, and went on to state:

'This tension is bound to increase if Portuguese officials are permitted to go across Indian territory for the purposes mentioned in the note. The passage of these officials across Indian territory might also lead to other undesirable consequences in view of the strong feelings which have been aroused by the repressive actions of the Portuguese authorities. In these circumstances, therefore, the Government of India regret that they cannot entertain the demand of the Portuguese authorities for facilities to enable them to send a delegation from Daman to Dadra and Nagar Aveli across Indian territory.' "

[1]India: Ministry of External Affairs, Judgement of the International Court of Justice on the right of passage over Indian territory case, pp. 38-41.

By nine votes to six, the Court held: "In view of the tension then prevailing in intervening Indian territory, the Court is unable to hold that India's refusal of passage to the proposed delegation and its refusal of visas to Portuguese nationals of European origin and to native Indian Portuguese in the employ of the Portuguese Government was action contrary to its obligation resulting from Portugal's right of passage. Portugal's claim of a right of passage is subject to full recognition and exercise of Indian sovereignty over the intervening territory and without any immunity in favour of Portugal. The Court is of the view that India's refusal of passage in those cases was, in the circumstances, covered by its power of regulation and control of the right of passage of Portugal....

"Portugal had in 1954 a right of passage over intervening Indian territory between the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar Aveli and the coastal district of Daman and between these enclaves, to the extent necessary for the exercise of Portuguese sovereignty over the enclaves and subject to the regulation and control of India, in respect of private persons, civil officials and goods in general....

"Portugal did not have in 1954 such a right of passage in respect of armed forces, armed police and arms and ammunition....

"India has not acted contrary to its obligations resulting from Portugal's right of passage in respect of private persons, civil officials and goods in general."[2]

The Court refused to consider whether this limited right of passage survived after the overthrow of Portuguese authority in the enclaves. About the present and future of such a right, the Court referred to India's stand that it had been extinguished by the liberation of the enclaves. The judgment said: "The Court must adjudicate upon the claim as thus presented, stating whether the right invoked by Portugal is or is not a right possessed by that State. But with reference to what date must the Court ascertain whether the right invoked by Portugal exists or does not exist?

"If the date selected is the eve of the events of 1954 which brought about a new situation which has since prevent-

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 42-3.

ed the exercise by Portugal of its authority in the enclaves without, however, having substituted there for that of India, the factors relevant for the guidance of the Court in its decision will be those existing on the eve of those events. If, on the other hand, the issue is viewed as it stands at the date of the present judgment, it will be necessary to take into account—whatever may be their weight—the arguments of India designed to establish that the right of passage, assuming it to have existed previously, came to an end as a result of the events of 1954 and has lapsed in the present circumstances....

"That question was put to the Court in respect of the dispute which has arisen between India and Portugal with regard to obstacles placed by India in the way of passage. Portugal—and this was the immediate purpose of the Application—sought a finding as to the character, in its opinion unlawful, of these obstacles. It was in support of this contention that it invoked its right of passage and asked the Court to declare the existence of that right. This being so, it is the eve of the creation of these obstacles that must be selected as the standpoint from which to ascertain whether or not Portugual possessed such a right.

"This will leave open the argument of India regarding the subsequent lapse of the right of passage and of the correlative obligation. It is in connection with what may have to be decided, not as to the past but as to the present and the future, that these arguments may, if such questions arise, be taken into consideration...."[3]

From this passage it is clear that in the circumstances, India was not obliged to permit the passage of any kind for the Portuguese.

The Soviet Judge, Mr F.I. Kojevnikov, stated that he "can concur neither in the reasoning nor in the operative part of the judgment on the first and second points" for he was of the opinion that in this case the Court had no jurisdiction to examine and adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute.

He added: "Portugal did not possess and does not possess any sovereign rights over Dadra and Nagar Aveli, and since

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

it never had and has not now any right of passage over Indian territory to these regions and between each of them."[4]

Mr J. Spiropoulos, the Greek Judge, said: "It is a fact that, after the departure of the Portuguese authorities, the population of the enclaves set up a new autonomous authority based upon the will of the population. Since the right of passage assumes the continuance of the administration of the enclaves of the Portuguese, the establishment of a new power in the enclaves must be regarded as having *ipso facto* put an end to the rights of passage."[5]

Sir Percy Spender (Australia), another Judge, said that he agreed that Portugal had "acquired by local custom a right of passage to the extent necessary for the exercise of Portuguese sovereignty over the enclaves, subject, however, to the regulation and control of India, which right extended at least to the passage of private persons, Portuguese civil officials and goods in general."[6] He did not agree, however, that no right of passage had been acquired in respect of armed forces, arms and ammunition. He found that India did act contrary to its obligations resulting from the right of passage which according to the Court had been acquired by Portugal.

Mr M.C. Chagla, the Indian *ad hoc* Judge, said in his dissenting opinion that India's fifth and sixth objections to the jurisdiction of the Court should have prevailed and that the Court should have held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain Portugal's application.

He said: "On the merits, in my opinion, India has substantially won. Although I take the view that Portugal has no right of passage whatever inasmuch as the Court has found in favour of Portugal a very limited right confined to private persons, goods and civil officials and inasmuch as India herself has stated that she has no objection to the passage of private persons and goods, and the right regarding civil officials is of little consequence and is also subject to the regulatory power of the Government of India, I think that the judgment of the Court in the main vindicates the attitude taken up by India in the controversy between herself and Portugal over the question of the right of passage."[7]

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 49. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 50. [6] *Ibid.*, p. 92. [7] *Ibid.*, p. 112.

Mr Chagla said that Portugal had failed to establish its claim. If the Court were to award Portugal the right of passage, it should be in a position clearly to define it. But the right claimed by Portugal was "vague, shadowy and unsubstantial."

He added: "We have now a grim prospect of unending litigation in this Court....One thing is clear—if Portugal gets from this Court what she is asking, the dispute between India and Portugal will not be determined by its own decision. The Court will only be sowing seeds for future disputes and discords....

"At best and at the highest, Portugal has only established a series of revocable acts of courtesy and accommodation on the part of the British authorities. The basis of the passage, as stated by Portugal herself, was the rule of good neighbourhood and international cooperation—moral principles which lack a legal content....In my opinion, therefore, Portugal has failed to establish any local custom even with regard to a limited right of passage. In the result she is not entitled to any relief and her application should be dismissed."[8]

The Portuguese *ad hoc* Judge on the Court, Dr Manuel Fernandes, former Director-General of the Portuguese Ministry of Justice, said in his dissenting opinion: "The Court in part gives satisfaction to the claim of Portugal. It recognizes that when India decided to oppose the communications between the Portuguese territories of Daman, Dadra and Nagar Aveli, Portugal had a right of passage over Indian territory to ensure these communications to the extent necessary for the exercise of Portuguese sovereignty over the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar Aveli. But the Court takes the view that this right relates only to the transit of private persons, civil officials and goods in general and not to that of armed forces, armed police and arms and ammunitions." He added: "I cannot agree with that differentiation, which appears to be artificial and unfounded, in fact and in law. I am consequently in disagreement also with the conclusion reached in the judgment that India had not acted contrary to her obligations resulting from Portugal's right."[9]

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 115. [9] *Ibid.*, p. 116.

It may seem strange that both the parties to the dispute welcomed the judgment and claimed that they had won the case. Of the three issues Portugal had raised it won only a part of the first, whereas India won not only the other part of the first issue but also the remaining two. Portugal's victory was over a legal aspect, but India's success was of practical value. The Court maintained that while Portugal had sovereignty over the enclaves and subject to the regulation and control by India, it did not have in 1954 such a right of passage in respect of armed forces, armed police and arms and ammunition. Further, "India had not acted contrary to its obligations."

On April 13, 1960, the President of Portugal, Admiral Americo Tomas, with Dr Salazar by his side, told a crowd outside the National Assembly in Lisbon that the judgment "consecrated the just cause of Portugal." The people had gathered in response to a call by the municipal authorities to celebrate what they called "the victory of The Hague." The gathering had earlier marched in procession from the City Hall carrying banners with slogans such as "Goa is Portugal," "They are not colonies but the nation," "We are right" and "A single people, a single country." The same day, the Lisbon Municipal Council passed a resolution expressing its satisfaction at the Court ruling and its gratitude to Dr Salazar.

The Director-General of Political Affairs in the Portugese Foreign Office, Senator Alberto Franco Nogueira, said in Lisbon on April 12 in an official statement: "We greet the decision of the International Court of Justice with joy and receive it with emotion. The decision recognizes our legal right, the validity of our titles and our full sovereignty over Dadra and Nagar Aveli and our unquestioned right of passage for private persons, civil officials and goods. It is a good thing that the highest court of the community of nations recognizes, consecrates and proclaims it. India cannot see in this Court decision anything humiliating or impolite. We can legitimately hope that Prime Minister Nehru, a statesman of international renown, will not let the opportunity go by to observe towards the Portuguese State of India the attitude of good neighbourliness and mutual respect which should govern the conduct of members of the community of nations.

"The presence of the Portuguese nation in the Hindustan subcontinent does not represent any offence to India. Her security is not endangered. India's complete sovereignty over her own territories is not under discussion, and we do not intend to limit or violate them. Her legitimate interests are not involved for we respect them and we are not forgetting," he added.

Prime Minister Nehru told the Lok Sabha (Lower House) on April 19 that it was obvious from the judgment that Portugal's main claim of rights in respect of Dadra and Nagar Aveli had been rejected by a majority of the Court. Certain other things decided by the Court by a majority, he said, were not, however, clear and they would be examined fully.

Mrs Lakshmi Menon, Deputy Minister for External Affairs, in reply to a series of questions, said that the judgment was being studied by the Government of India. She said the independence of Dadra and Nagar Aveli had already been acknowledged by the very fact that the enclaves had liberated themselves and, in consequence, Portugal had been denied the right of passage for its armed forces.

The people of the enclaves received the news of the judgment with joy on April 13. It meant that even under a legal pretext, Portugal could not send its army or police to the enclaves to put them down and enslave them again. Jubilant crowds marched through the streets, hoisted flags at several places and held meetings where the Court's decision was welcomed and "the next steps for complete freedom were taken."

Nationalist Goans welcomed the judgment with great joy. The president of the United Front of Goans, Mr Francis Mascarenhas, asked the Government of India to integrate these areas with India or allow their residents to form a Government of their own. He said that the Goans now expected positive action by the Government of India to satisfy the political aspirations of the Goan people of the liberated enclaves and other territories still under the Portuguese heel. They had waited too long and even if the Government presisted in its policy of silence over the Goan issue they were now determined to liberate all Portuguese territories on Indian soil. An all-out movement to achieve this aim would be launched shortly.

He appealed to the Indian Government to enforce complete economic sanctions against Goa, even if it meant hardship to Goans. "If we want freedom we must not be afraid of hardship. All money remittances to Goa and all smuggling of goods into the territory should be banned. All avenues by which Indian rice and other goods reached Goa should be blocked," he added.

Mr V.N. Lawande, president of the Azad Gomantak Dal and joint secretary of the Goan Political Convention, welcomed the judgment as a "momentous decision and a victory for the downtrodden colonial people."

In a statement he said on April 13: "The verdict, which recognizes the basic right of the colonial people to overthrow foreign rule, has dealt a blow to Portugal's ingenious theory of turning colonies into overseas provinces overnight. It is an indication of the growing influence of the Afro-Asian nationalist force in the international sphere and an eye-opener to Dr Salazar and his co-travellers that their days are numbered. The freedom struggle of Goa, Angola, Mozambique and other Portuguese colonies is now entering a new phase and before long, I am confident, the world will witness a scene more inspiring and momentous than seen during the liberation of Nagar Aveli."

Mr Peter Alvares of the Goa National Congress, said that the judgment was a triumph for the forces of anti-colonialism. He said: "This international judicial verdict of mankind has set its seal of approval upon the action of the Goan liberation forces. It has upheld India's right to protect the liberated areas. The verdict will encourage the speedy solution of the Goa problem."

The liberated enclaves did not become a part of India. They became autonomous administrative territories. Later, panchayats were formed in villages and a Varishta Panchayat or people's assembly was set up for Dadra and Nagar Aveli. Executive powers were vested in an administrator.

The first important acts of the new Government were the abolition of forced labour and reduction of taxes and annulment of part of the peasants' debts to landowners. The new administrator undertook a programme of reconstruction

of the countryside and road building. Fallow land was distributed among landless peasants and rules were framed to limit rents. As the wealth of the enclaves lay in their forest produce, the new authorities gave greater attention to forestry. The progress the enclaves have made during the past seven years is striking. At present there are 44 primary and two high schools; there were only five primary schools on the even of the liberation. The total number of boys and girls attending schools in 1960 was 3,080 compared to 429 in 1953. The forest revenue rose from Rs. 1.4 lakhs in 1953 to Rs. 16 lakhs in 1960.

Two Bills to enable Dadra and Nagar Aveli to become an integral part of the Indian Union were passed by the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha in August 1961. The Government of India took this step following repeated requests for integration by the Varishta Panchayat which had been administering the two enclaves since 1955. The Bills made Dadra and Nagar Aveli the seventh Union Territory, which will be entitled to one seat in the Lok Sabha to be nominated by the Union President.

Replying to the debate on the Bills, Mr Nehru told the Rajya Sabha on August 16 that the steps to be taken for the liberation of Goa could not be considered "a closed chapter but would have to be reviewed from time to time." He did not rule out the use of the Indian Army for this purpose at the appropriate time.

A communique issued in Lisbon on August 16 by the Portuguese Foreign Minister said that the Portuguese Government considered India's attitude in submitting to the Indian Parliament a Bill for the integration of "the Portuguese territories of Dadra and Nagar Aveli" as being of no validity and sent a note to the Indian Government communicating its intention of exerting the right of passage of Dadra and Nagar Aveli in the terms defined by The Hague verdict.

The communique said: "...The decision of the Indian Parliament disrespects the rights of sovereignty of a third State, expressly recognized by India and contrary to the rules of international law which governs the life of the community of nations. The act is also against the principles of co-existence

and mutual respect constantly proclaimed by the Indian Prime Minister.

"In addition, it constitutes a clear attempt against the judgment passed on April 12, 1960, by The Hague tribunal, the highest international court, which recognized Portugal's sovereignty over Dadra and Nagar Aveli and the right of passage for the same territories for Portuguese officials, civilians and merchandise. Finally, as the usurpation of Dadra and Nagar Aveli was made through a violent act started from Indian territory in which many people were killed and injured, the measure taken anew by the Indian Government supports a well defined international aggression."

CHAPTER XI

ECONOMIC BLOCKADE

WITH the Government of India preventing satyagrahis from crossing the border into the Portuguese settlements, the liberation movement ceased to be one merely confined to the people. Consciously or unconsciously, the Government thus assumed responsibility of freeing these areas. The people's role thereafter was merely to egg the Government on to a decision. For six years, from 1956 to 1961, meetings were held, resolutions passed and seminars organized to publicize the atrocities to which the Goans were exposed. Compared to the satyagraha days of 1954 and 1955, this period was one of frustration. If there was a change, it was for the worse from the point of view of Goan nationalist and Indian patriots.

When the movement became dull on the Indian front, the underground movement and other activities of the nationalists received a terrible setback. In spite of all these handicaps, the nationalists carried on the struggle till the day of liberation. This period was also one of disturbances on the Indo-Goan border, with India accusing the Portuguese authorities of border, sea and air violations from time to time.

On February 5 and 8, 1956, Portuguese armed personnel violated the Indian border. Portuguese personnel opened fire at 8.20 a.m. on February 5 across the border near Netarda. The Indian border police posted at Netarda observed that a man was shot down about 100 yards inside Goa. A second fell 100 yards inside Indian territory. About 10 to 15 Portuguese armed personnel trespassed into Indian territory under cover of rifle and machine-gun fire to seize the fallen men. Indian border police, who numbered only four, opened fire in reply but the man was seized and dragged into Goa. The two Goans killed were Bapu Vishnu Gawas, formerly a *patel* of Chandel, Goa, and Bala Gopal Desai, a hotel-keeper of Mapuca.

On February 8, at 12.40 a.m., 16 rounds were fired by Portuguese armed personnel after advancing about 100 yards

into Indian territory at the same spot of the February 5 incident. Indian border police returned the fire.

On February 12, a spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry of the Government of India disclosed details of these border violations, which were further amplified in the Lok Sabha by Prime Minister Nehru on February 17.

News about the shocking conditions and bad treatment meted out to political prisoners, particularly women, in Portuguese jails began to pour across the border. These accounts produced a wave of anger throughout India. The Government of India sent a communication to the Portuguese Government through the Egyptian Government early in March 1956, drawing the attention of the Lisbon authorities to the exceedingly bad living conditions in the jails and the harsh and brutal treatment meted out to prisoners.

Lisbon was requested to take steps to end such treatment and provide the detenus with "reasonable living conditions." The Portuguese Government did not care to reply. However, the Government of India continued its efforts to bring about "some amelioration" of the prisoners' condition through the good offices of the Egyptian Government and the Indian Red Cross.

Giving details about the terrible conditions of the prisoners, Mr Nehru told the Lok Sabha on May 22 that Mrs Sudha Joshi and five other women who were undergoing sentences or were under detention had gone on hunger-strike on May 9 as a protest against their continued detention. Replying to a question, Mr Nehru said: "We are very concerned in this matter, and we will take advantage of every opportunity to draw the attention of other countries to this matter both on the larger political question and for humanitarian reasons." Mrs Joshi and others ended their fast later after receiving assurances from Lisbon.

The same day, Mr Anil Chanda told a P.S.P. member, Mr H.V. Kamath, in the Lok Sabha that three Portuguese soldiers who were "seriously dissatisfied with the present political regime in Portugal and her possessions in India" had been granted political asylum by the Government of India.

The All-India Congress Committee, at a meeting in the

first week of June, adopted a resolution warning smugglers and others circumventing Government measures. It also said: "The AICC looks to the civilized nations and peoples of the world to express their disapproval of the policy and conduct of the Portuguese authorities against the people in their possessions in India, especially against political prisoners, and more particularly, women prisoners. The Committee also appeals to them to proclaim their sympathy with the people in the Portuguese possessions in their aspirations and endeavours for freedom from alien rule."

Meanwhile, the Government of India started receiving reports from various sources that there was a strong national movement in Goa for its liberation and it was gathering strength. The Portuguese authorities, unnerved by the rising tide of nationalist and anti-Portuguese feeling, had been adopting ruthless methods for suppressing the movement. Since June 1956, the Portuguese had arrested a large number of persons estimated between 80 and 100, including a prominent citizen of Goa.

On July 17, 1956, four more Portuguese soldiers trespassed into Indian territory to a distance of three or four miles near Netarda village on the Savantwadi border and forcibly took away one Arun Sitaram, who was grazing cattle near the village of Kholba. Sitaram was later released and he returned to his village. Following this incident, the Government of India "strongly protested to the Portuguese Government against this latest violation of Indian territory" through the Egyptian Embassy in New Delhi.

The Portuguese violated Indian air space 40 times between April 7 and December 17, 1956. Portuguese aircraft were operating on the Karachi-Diu-Daman-Goa route. The Government of India sent strong protests to Portugal about these violations. A country-craft violated Indian territorial waters on November 23 and it was taken into custody by the Indian Customs preventive branch.

On December 21, Mr Chanda informed the Lok Sabha that India had told Portugal that it would take preventive action against future violations of its air space by Portuguese aircraft without any "further warning." He added that India had protested several times to Portugal about these violations. The

Portuguese had persistently denied them. The Government had now told Portugal that it was satisfied that violations had taken place and were still continuing. A list of the violations had been sent to Portugal. India, he said, had also told Portugal that the responsibility for any consequences arising out of India's action for stopping further violations would rest entirely with the Portuguese Government.

The Goa National Congress held its 10th session in Bombay on November 2, 1957. About 10,000 people attended. The last session of the Congress was held in April 1955, at Mapuca in Goa when the Portuguese authorities arrested Mrs Sudha Joshi while she was delivering her presidential speech. The session reviewed the Goa movement and adopted a number of resolutions including one which appealed to the Government of India to permit the Goan freedom movement to set up a popularly elected "provisional Government" in the liberated areas of Dadra and Nagar Aveli in order to carry on the struggle to liberate the rest of the Portuguese possessions. It asked the Indian Government to permit the free movement of Goans to and from India, thereby suggesting the abolition of the permit system for travel between India and the Portuguese possessions. It also appealed to the Government to review the question of participation of the people of India in the freedom movement.

On November 1, Dr Salazar criticized India's policy on Goa in an election broadcast from Lisbon. He said that internally the Government of India had concentrated on trying through its agents to spread propaganda and terrorism on the Goa frontier, and internationally it had for many months tried to demonstrate that it were the Goans who revolted against alleged Portuguese domination, seeking thereby to put the world on India's side. He said that persistent attacks against Portugal in the Indian Parliament, U.N. and elsewhere could not mask the hostility towards it and were contrary to the principles of peaceful co-existence.

The Goa National Congress, which spearheaded the satyagraha movement of August 15, 1955, announced the end of "the state of satyagraha" on April 19, 1958, and urged the Portuguese Government to start negotiations with India for a

peaceful solution. The following day, the External Affairs Ministry announced the abolition of the permit system for travel between India and the Portuguese Indian possessions. Three routes to Goa, Daman and Diu were opened for travel to all Indians and persons of Indian origin. The routes were from and to Goa through Majali, from and to Daman via Challa and from and to Diu via Ahmadpur-Manwi. A statement issued in this connection said that police would, however, have full authority to prevent the passage of any person who may carry arms and/or wear uniforms, who may belong or are believed to belong to the Portuguese armed forces, military and para-military formations, police or security services and who may be suspected of being Portuguese agents.

The economic blockade of the Portuguese possessions by the Government of India was generally speaking a success. With the imposition of these restrictions, the Portuguese looked to other countries for exports and imports. Pakistan was one of the countries which tried its best to help the Portuguese beat the blockade. As time went on, the trade between Portuguese India and Pakistan grew in volume and trade talks between the two commenced on July 26, 1960, at Karachi. The Portuguese delegation was headed by Mr Pamplona Moniz Corte Rael, secretary-general of the Portuguese department of imports and exports, and the Pakistan delegation was led by Mr I. A. Khan, joint secretary in the Ministry of Commerce. Pakistan also gave facilities to Portuguese commercial and military planes and ships moving between Portugal and Goa. Its exports to and imports from Goa in 1956 totalled Rs. 53 lakhs and Rs. 320,000. In 1958 the figures of Pakistan's exports to and imports from Goa stood at Rs. 52 lakhs and Rs. 117,000 respectively. Pakistan's main item of export was rice. Other items included cotton yarn, hosiery, tobacco and fruits. Pakistan's imports included coal tar, dyes, bottles and iron and steel.

At the trade talks, the Portuguese Ambassador, Dr Jose De Deus Ramos, offered Pakistan a full supply of iron ore for its projected steel mill from what he called Portuguese India. Pakistan had at that time plans to establish a steel mill with a capacity of 200,000 tons during its second five-year plan.

Reciprocating the gesture, Mr Khan pledged his country's friendship to the "neighbourly Portuguese province of Goa." On August 5, Karachi announced that as a result of the trade talks, the Portuguese colony of Goa had offered 20 items for export to Pakistan which included oilseeds, iron ore and machinery and Pakistan had offered to export to Goa 30 items including cotton, jute and rice.

The Bombay branch of the working council of the Azad Gomantak Dal adopted a resolution on August 1 stating that the Pakistan Government had grossly violated the Bandung principles and had committed its people to collaborate with and support colonialism by signing a trade agreement with the Portuguese Government of Goa. The resolution strongly protested against this reactionary stand of Field Marshal Ayub Khan's Government and appealed to the people of Pakistan to render this trade agreement ineffective and help the liberation struggle of Goa.

On September 26, 1960, the Government of India announced the liberalization of travel facilities between Goa and India and the loan of an Indian Administrative Service officer to the local administration of Dadra and Nagar Aveli. It was explained that the restrictive measures taken by the authorities in 1954 and 1955 were no longer valid. At the same time, the authorities tightened their anti-smuggling measures all along the India-Goa border. Border check-posts were handed over to the State reserve police. A Government spokesman stated that the object was to remove the "administrative isolation" of the two enclaves in view of the local administration's request for their merger. The status of the enclaves had been decided by the World Court verdict that Portuguese sovereignty there had ceased. Even so, the Government did not propose to adopt measures for the merger in the immediate future.

The Portuguese refused to reciprocate India's gesture in easing the travel restrictions. They decided not to grant travel facilities on their side of the border. They closed the six or seven originally authorized *nakas* (routes) between Goa and the rest of India.

On April 1, 1961, the Government of India went a step further and announced the lifting of the ban on trade with Goa

and other Portuguese colonies in India. Mr Nehru said that if the Portuguese declined to extend reciprocal facilities on their side of the border, the "responsibility is surely theirs." He said that while India had announced the opening of two new routes to Goa in 1960, the Portuguese had not so far extended corresponding facilities on their side of the border. Referring to the new decision, Mr Nehru said that it was a variation and not abandonment of the policy of economic sanctions against the Portuguese colonies. He justified the decision by stating that the limited trade now permitted with Goa involved the export from India of such items as were required by the people of Goa, particularly the poorer classes. As an example, he mentioned textiles, books, drugs, equipment for educational institutions, tea and leather goods.

The four-day Seminar on Portuguese Colonialism held in New Delhi from October 20, 1961, will be remembered as a great landmark in the progress towards the emancipation of these colonies. From the Indian standpoint, it was much more than an epoch-making occasion because to the listeners of the inaugural speech of Prime Minister Nehru it was crystal clear that the Government of India had already started thinking of "other means" of liberating the Portuguese possessions. The very timing of the seminar was significant. Here was an opportunity to assess world opinion about the colonies of Portugal and probably to strengthen the hands of the Government of India for the liquidation of the last remnants of foreign rule on the Indian subcontinent. Viewed from this point, the seminar was a great success. The speeches and resolutions clearly showed that if at all India was to blame, it was for inaction and for choosing the weapon of nonviolence to fight the Portuguese. The seminar also brought out forcibly that nonviolence was not the correct weapon to fight the Portuguese because it was useful only against a civilized people.

Once this decision was arrived at, it was clear that "other means" had to be adopted to expel the Portuguese from their pockets, whether in Asia or Africa.

In a highly reflective and memorable speech Mr Nehru told his audience that India's policy towards Goa had been conditioned not by its theoretical attachment to nonviolence

but by practical considerations. At the same time he acknowledged how the country's nonviolent approach had influenced its efforts in seeking a peaceful end to the Portuguese rule.

Among the overseas delegates who attended the seminar were the Tanganyikan Commerce and Industry Minister, Mr Nsilo Swai, the Moroccan African Affairs Minister, Mr Abdel Karim-el-Khatib, Mr Kenneth Kaunda of Northern Rhodesia, Mr Wedgwood Benn, British M.P., and two delegates from the Congo. The near unanimous view of the seminar was best summed up by Mr Kaunda, who said that the discarding of nonviolence to fight the Portuguese did not signify that the ideology was wrong but rather that the Portuguese would not understand anything but force and that there were inherent weaknesses in human character which made adherence to the ideology difficult. "You've got to shoot a bull, otherwise it will finish you," Mr Kaunda declared. This feeling was repeated by one speaker after another who also described the peculiar horrors of Portuguese colonialism and how nonviolence had been met with repression and massacres.

Goan leaders attending the seminar said that India's peaceful approach had been misunderstood by Portugal as a sign of weakness and it was time the former took more tangible steps to free Goa. The African and other delegates made it plain that they looked to India for help in their freedom struggles and it was apparent that they would not be satisfied with purely diplomatic support. Mr Marceline des Santos of Mozambique said that one of the greatest contributions India could make to free Portuguese Africa was to free Goa immediately.

The seminar concluded its proceedings at a mammoth public meeting in Bombay. By now the mind of the seminar was clear and this was reflected in Mr Nehru's speech at the meeting. He confessed that the Government of India's policy on Goa had been a failure. He said: "We have to think afresh now because of the happenings in Goa, particularly in the last few months, the cases of torture that have come to our notice and the terror that is being spread there by the Portuguese. When I say think afresh, I mean that we have been forced into thinking afresh by the Portuguese to adopt other methods

to solve this problem. When and how we will do it cannot be forecast now. But I have no doubt that Goa will soon be free." (Thunderous cheers)

The outcome of the seminar was that the delegates were agreed that they would: (*a*) extend support to the people fighting Portuguese colonialism in every way open to them, including material support; (*b*) warn the nations now supporting Portugal that they were being misunderstood as backing everything that Portugal did and that that support should end; and (*c*) mobilize sufficient power by every means, including collective action through the U.N., to end Portuguese colonialism.

CHAPTER XII

U.S., U.N. AND GOA

When the entry of volunteers into Goa individually or in groups was banned the Government of India came under heavy pressure for action to free the colonies. In spite of its full sympathy for the demand for action the Government was unable to take any concrete steps, largely because of the conflict in its mind about the means to achieve the goal. As years rolled on, it became clear that it was impossible to persuade the Portuguese to leave the enclaves and that force was the only means. India was confident that the Portuguese could be pushed out in a few hours, but its faith in peaceful settlement of disputes stood in the way of any military move.

While dealing with the Portuguese, the Government of India had to consider one of the anachronistic treaties between Great Britain and Portugal signed in the 14th century. This treaty spoke of obligations of providing a number of bowmen for a particular purpose and so on. Referring to this treaty, Mr Nehru said in Delhi: "It was signed in an age long gone by, and it had the most fantastic and curious provisions which had no relations to the modern world. I say there is nothing more scandalous on God's earth today than the Portuguese occupation of Goa, historically, factually, religiously if you like, or from any point of view. It is fantastic nonsense for me to be told that there was an agreement or alliance with the British in the 14th or 15th century about the exchange of bows and arrows and what not, and so the Portuguese can hold on to Goa. They cannot, and they will not, hold on to Goa. Let the world take notice, let the Atlantic Powers take notice, that we will tolerate no nonsense about Goa from wherever it comes, big or small Power."

The continued stay of Portugal in the subcontinent amounted to interference with the political system established in India. The U.S. showed about 140 years ago how such interference could be overcome. The Monroe doctrine laid down that the

U.S. would regard the interference of any European Power with the political system on the American continent an unfriendly act. What was good for the U.S. was good for India also. It was unimaginable to think of a free India with foreign pockets in it. In addition to this strong emotional feeling, there were problems such as national security and national unity. A foothold for foreigners was a source of danger in the future, and more so when a country committed to military block was involved.

The Goa problem became more complicated in the closing months of 1955. In November, Marshal Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev, during their visit to India, supported India's stand with regard to Goa and other Portuguese settlements. They denounced the colonial exploitation in Goa. Replying to a civic address in Madras on November 28, 1955, Marshal Bulganin said: "For many decades and even centuries the people of Asia were living under the yoke of foreigners and were fighting for liberty, freedom and national independence. Now the colonial regimes are collapsing and are slipping into the unreturnable past. But certain European States cannot understand that the time is past and that there can be no return to the old colonial order. There is no justification for the continued existence of the Portuguese colony of Goa on the territory of India. This is a shame to civilized people. The sympathies of the Soviet people are always on the side of those fighting colonialism."

The Western nations reacted to these remarks strongly and quickly. A joint statement was issued in Washington on December 2 by Mr John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State, and Dr Paulo Cunha, Portuguese Foreign Minister, who was then on an official visit to the U.S. It said that they had discussed various statements attributed to the Soviet rulers now visiting Asia including "allegations concerning the Portuguese provinces in the Far East." Although the statement did not make any specific reference to the support expressed by Marshal Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev for Indian sovereignty over Goa, it accused the Soviet leaders of attempting to "foment hatred between the East and West."

On December 6, Mr Dulles was asked if the U.S. considered Goa to be a province of Portugal. He replied: "As far as I know, all the world regards it as a Portuguese province. It has been Portuguese for about 400 years."

Question: Was there any question that the North Atlantic Treaty commitment could possibly cover Goa as any other Portuguese possession in Asia?

Answer: That part of the world is definitely outside the North Atlantic Treaty area.

Dr Cunha, during his visit to Ottawa, stated on December 12 that Portugal would fight India, if necessary, to retain Goa. He said: "I hope we are not going to have war, but if my hope is unfounded—Portugal is going to defend Goa by force with all her power."

Dr Cunha said in Paris on December 16 that the NATO framework applied only to defence measures in the North Atlantic zone and was unlikely to be extended.

With these comments from the leaders of the East and West the Goa problem threatened to become a cold war issue. But thanks to India's dynamic foreign policy it was never allowed to become one.

The Dulles-Cunha statement generated terrific heat in India and the entire nation condemned it. Following the joint communique, Indo-U.S. relations, then not very happy, became worse. India sent a note to the U.S. seeking a clarification of the statement. Mr Dulles, who visited India after attending a two-day meeting of the SEATO council in Karachi, said in Delhi on March 10, 1956, that the U.S. had taken no stand on the merits of the Goa issue. He could not disclose the details of his talks with Mr Nehru, but it was a comprehensive review of the world situation with particular emphasis on problems of mutual concern to India and the U.S.

Question: How do you explain your recent statement that Goa is a province of Portugal?

Answer: I recall referring to the fact that under the terms of the present constitutional laws of Portugal, Goa and certain other areas are called "provinces." That is a fact which few people would deny, but that does not carry any necessary implications.

Mr Nehru told Parliament: "Mr Dulles assured me that in subscribing to the joint statement, the U.S. was not supporting Portugal as against India. We do not, of course, doubt this statement but the position nevertheless is that the joint communique is being interpreted, especially by the Portuguese authorities, as if it supported their claims. India had made its position clear to the U.S. that this country would under no circumstances tolerate the continuance of Portuguese rule over a part of India. We have been patient, and we shall continue to be so, but there will be no compromise on this issue. I still hope that friendly countries will impress on Portugal the unwisdom of following a policy of 16th century colonialism in the second half of the 20th century."

Goa became one of the issues at the U.N. also. On July 26, 1960, a number of countries belonging to the Afro-Asian group, the Soviet Union and East European nations demanded that Portugal should be asked to submit information to the U.N. on Goa and its other colonies as was obligatory under the U.N. Charter. This subject had come up for discussions at a previous session of the U.N., but Portugal took the stand that these colonies were not non-self-governing territories about which the U.N. had to be supplied information, and insisted that they were parts of metropolitan Portugal. The demand of these countries was in accordaace with a U.N. Assembly resolution inviting member nations to submit their opinions on the principles involved in judging such territories. The views expressed were taken into account by a committee of six countries consisting of the U.K., the U.S. and the Netherlands, members transmitting information, and Mexico, Morocco and India, non-administering members. Portugal contended that if the Afro-Asian position was accepted, the way would be open for U.N. intervention in the domestic affairs of member States.

The U.N. Trusteeship Committee on November 11, 1960, recommended that the General Assembly request the Government of Portugal to transmit to the U.N. information on the territories under its administration in accordance with its obligations under the U.N. Charter. The committee had already adopted a resolution setting forth the principles con-

cerning the obligation of member States to transmit information on non-self-governing territories in conformity with Article 73 (*e*) of the Charter in which this obligation and certain limitations to it were defined. Bolivia, Iraq, Ireland, Nigeria and Venezuela sponsored the draft. The voting was 38 in favour, 24 against and 26 abstentions.

In the committee debate, the Portuguese representative, Mr Alberto Franco Nogueira, held that the principles enunciated by the committee of six about non-self-governing territories did not apply to Portugal. He maintained that the question before the Assembly concerned the strict interpretation of Article 73 of the Charter. Divergent interpretations had been placed on Article 73, he said. The committee of six had tried to establish a set of principles which sought to implement the article without interpreting it. He rejected the findings of the committee of six, which he described as one-sided, for they appeared to apply only to Spain and Portugal. He wondered whether the committee's report would also apply to countries which used to be independent but had been integrated without U.N. supervision, for instance, the Baltic States.

Several speakers after Mr Nogueira pointed to the wind of change then sweeping Africa and the movement for freedom. Such a movement, said Mr Joseph A. Braimah of Ghana, could not be stopped by legal and juridical formulae. He added that the so-called overseas possessions of Portugal could not be indefinitely isolated from the changes sweeping Africa and Asia.

The leader of the Indian delegation, Mr V.K. Krishna Menon, said that Portugal's claim for exemption from the provisions of Articles 73 and 74 was based on playing on the word "territory." He suggested that the word was intended to mean areas. Articles 73 and 74 placed on the U.N. the responsibility for demanding that such places were administered according to the Charter provisions. He also referred to Goa and said: "We have not as a Government taken any steps to spread the liberation movement into Goa, largely out of consideration for the repercussions it would have on national peace and security." Goa was a remnant of colonial rule and India reserved its right of liberation.

Other speakers felt that the time had passed for legal arguments and a discussion of general principles. Mr M.I. Kuchava of the USSR held that the committee should not waste time but immediately take note of the fact that Portugal had since 1955 been under an unconditional obligation to transmit information about its colonies. He said that the General Assembly should deal with this vital question of granting independence to all non-self-governing territories, including those of Portugal, where so many millions of people were victims of cruel oppression and deprived of all rights.

The reaction of Portugal and its leaders to this decision of the world body was in keeping with their traditions. The Overseas Minister, Vice-Admiral Vasco Lopes Alves, said in a television speech in Lisbon on November 15, 1960, that Portugal would not consent to any international control of its overseas territories. Outlining his Government's attitude to the motion approved by the Trusteeship Committee asking Portugal to supply information about its overseas territories, he said: "We still keep our door open in Europe, in Africa and in Asia for all who may wish to visit us and see in good faith how we work and live, but we refuse to accept misinterpretations of the principles by which we are guided. We do not allow anyone to inspect us nor do we permit any interference in the solution of internal problems. No one with any knowledge of the facts could expect from us a different attitude in any circumstances. Our position corresponds not only to the rights we have but, beyond them, to the responsibilities we have assumed, which, today as always, we shall know how to fulfil. The persistent conspiracy that has been in progress against Portugal aims at continuing the surrender of Western lands and peoples to the oppression and domination of international Communist forces."

On December 1, 1960, Dr Salazar, also in a television speech in Lisbon, told his people that it was "shocking" that India's leaders would not recognize Portugal's historical rights in Goa. He said: "We noted that the Indian Union sought to restore its shaken prestige by eagerly assuming in the U.N. the leading role in the Afro-Asian opposition to Portugal." It was India's hope that by multiplying the difficulties faced

by the various Portuguese territories it would be able to create greater facilities for its claims on Goa.

Almost after a year, on November 13, 1961, the U.N. General Assembly's Trusteeship Committee overwhelmingly endorsed a 33-nation move to condemn Portugal's refusal to transmit information about its overseas territories and requested all member States to deny to Portugal any help which could be used for the subjugation of the peoples of the non-autonomous territories under Portuguese administration. In a roll-call vote, only Portugal, South Africa and Spain voted against it and Bolivia and France abstained. The final vote was 83 to three with two abstentions. The vote was taken after the committee turned down requests from the U.S. and Britain for separate votes on the paragraph calling for denial of aid and other sections of the resolution. The committee decided on this unusual step by 52 votes to 26 with five absentions.

The draft resolution, initially introduced by India after consultations among the Afro-Asian delegations, wanted the General Assembly to note with deep regret that the Portuguese Government had continued to refuse to submit information about its overseas territories as called for by the Charter and General Assembly resolutions. It also noted the continuing deterioration in the situation in the territories under Portuguese administration. It then condemned the continuing non-compliance by the Portuguese Government with its obligations under the Charter and the terms of Assembly resolutions. It also set up a special seven-man committee to gather and examine as a matter of urgency all the information available about these territories and to receive petitions and hear petitioners to get information as authentic as possible.

Speaking during the debate in the Trusteeship Committee, Mr Krishna Menon warned Portugal against expecting India not to use retaliatory force over Goa if provoked. He also claimed that the Portuguese were shooting Goans in cold blood. Mr Menon noted the Portuguese contention during the debate that Mr Nehru had renounced the use of force to end Portuguese rule in Goa. He said: "My country has at no time abjured the use of force in international relations." Portugal

was not forced into the United Nations, he added. Its admission was the result of a voluntary act and it knew the code of the international family. Membership meant acceptance of the Charter and its principles, and one of these articles obliged member States to transmit information about their dependent territories as evidence of the realization of the sacred trust they held over such territories.

CHAPTER XIII

36-HOUR ACTION FREES GOA

INDIA woke up on December 18, 1961, to learn with joy that Indian troops had entered Goa, Daman and Diu to liberate them. Newspapers announced the news with banner headings. People listened in to radios in houses, cafes and shops to hear the latest on Goa. The police action did not come as a complete surprise to the nation. The people knew that it was in the offing and they were impatient, for pressure was being exercised by some nations on India to go slow at the eleventh hour. The Government of India appeared to have weighed the pros and cons carefully before arriving at a decision. India welcomed the efforts of friendly nations, for a peaceful solution was all that it desired. At the same time it knew Portugal's mind and had no doubts that the efforts of friends would fail. India withheld armed action for a few days and then gave the signal to its troops to march.

Prime Minister Nehru had prepared the nation for the coming events. His speeches in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha during the debate on the Bill relating to the merger of Dadra and Nagar Aveli and in his inaugural and concluding speeches at the seminar on the problems of Portuguese colonies had made it clear that "other methods" of liberating Goa, Daman and Diu were being considered. India knew what these "other methods" were.

On November 17, the Portuguese opened fire on the Indian merchant coastal steamer *Sabarmati* while she was on the normal course off Anjadiv, an island near Karwar. The vessel suffered damage and Mr Anthony S. D'Penha, second engineer, was seriously injured. On November 25, the Portuguese again opened fire from Anjadiv and killed Rajaram Atmaram Kochrekar, a fisherman in a country-craft returning after fishing along with 15 other boats. These measures were provocative enough, but India waited patiently to allow more chances to the Portuguese to see reason.

The Portuguese Defence Ministry in Lisbon, in a communique issued on November 25, indirectly confirmed the firing on the Indian vessel. The communique said that on November 17 a ship of unknown nationality had passed by Anjadiv and that no incident had taken place. Within minutes the communique was withdrawn and another one stating that on November 25 "numerous crafts" tried to reach Anjadiv from the south and west and they were repelled by the forces defending the island after previous warning was issued. It said it was not known whether anyone in the "ships" was injured.

The strait between Anjadiv island and the Goa coast had always been used by Indian coastal shipping.

The communique that was withdrawn denied the *Sabarmati* incident, but the subsequent one referred to Mr Nehru's statement and said that the passage through "our territorial waters" of merchant ships without identifying themselves when asked to do so, as in the case referred to by the Indian Prime Minister, "must be regarded as provocative acts preparatory to Friday (November 24) night's attempt."

These incidents were not isolated ones. News about the Portuguese build-up in the enclaves started pouring into India day after day. On November 27, it was officially stated in Bangalore that a Portuguese frigate had been seen near the Karwar coast on the morning of November 25. Later, the frigate reached Anjadiv. The Mysore Government informed the Centre of these developments.

The All-India Port and Dock Workers Federation decided on November 29 to organize a world-wide boycott of transport unions of ships trading with Portugal. According to a federation spokesman the boycott was to protest against Portugal's aggressive colonial policies. He said that the federation had sounded African and Asian countries on the boycott at the international conference of transport unions, held at Saigon, and had received an encouraging response. Indian dock workers have been boycotting all ships carrying goods between Portugal and Goa since 1953 except for a short while in 1959.

The Goa Council of Action, set up by the Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee, called for the observance of Goa Week

from December 10 to 17 throughout India to protest against Portuguese imperialism and to take a pledge to work ceaselessly for Goa's freedom.

On November 30, 1961, news reached Bombay that a Portuguese frigate with 300 soldiers abroad had left Goa for Diu. The reports stated that the vessel had been sent because the Portuguese authorities feared trouble in that settlement. The governor-general of Goa issued a secret circular to all Government departments declaring that a state of emergency existed in Goa and ordered them to tighten security measures.

Meanwhile, the Mysore Government received information that two more Portuguese naval ships had joined the two frigates already identified in the vicinity of Anjadiv. Two of them had dropped anchor near the island and the other two were cruising around. The inspector-general of police, Mysore, and other senior officials went to Karwar to inspect the border security arrangements. The police kept a round-the-clock watch on the movement of Portuguese troops along the border.

On December 1, addressing a public meeting at Allahabad, Mr Nehru declared that India could no longer tolerate the Portuguese actions in Goa and that it would have to take adequate steps to give them an effective reply. India had waited patiently for 12 years to settle the Goa question peacefully. The recent incidents were most inhuman and undesirable. "We cannot tolerate such acts. We will take the necessary steps at the right time," he added.

On December 2, a Portuguese flag was noticed flying over Anjadiv for the first time, thereby indicating a heavy military build-up on it . The normal population of the island consisted of only three families of fishermen living in three huts. There is also a dilapidated church. There are very few trees on the island which is about three-quarter square-mile in area.

At a Goan political convention held in Bombay on December 3, it was disclosed that all roads leading to the Goa border had been heavily mined by the Portuguese and that a military jeep had been blown up in the area. The Portuguese stopped troop movements by night. Reports reaching Karwar

stated that a dusk-to-dawn curfew had been imposed in Panjim, Ponda, Margoa and Mapuca. The authorities were organizing rallies of the *mosigas* (cadet corps).

A delegation of the convention which met Mr V. K. Krishna Menon, Union Defence Minister, was told that the Government had not abjured the use of force for liberating Goa. Force would be used at the appropriate time if necessary. The convention claimed that it had received reports from across the border that political workers released from detention were being called to police stations, interrogated and imprisoned. Soldiers were searching for hidden arms.

Cancellation of several trains, without advance information or reasons being given, from December 4 onwards was another indication of further Government steps. It was obvious that large-scale troop movements had been ordered by the Government. Civilian traffic from North India to Bombay and Madras came to a stop. Military specials and goods carrying military vehicles and equipment were seen moving from Delhi to Bombay.

The all-round military build-up, both within the settlements and around them in India, made the people of Goa, especially those near the border, panicky and they started migrating to India for safety in large numbers. Reports from Surat and other places stated that the poorer classes in Daman had started moving into India in strength. One of the reasons for this mass movement was the report that two frigates with more than 1,000 Portuguese soldiers aboard had anchored off Daman.

The tension between Portugal and India mounted rapidly. Both appeared ready for a showdown. Hardly a day passed without some incidents on the border.

On December 5, a spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry confirmed the troop movements but said the Government was moving soldiers to the border as a precautionary measure "in view of the aggressive action already taken by the Portuguese against Indian shipping and fishing boats."

According to a report received by nationalists in Belgaum, nearly 4,000 soldiers, three-fourths of them African, had arrived in Goa from Mozambique. The armed strength of the

Portuguese in the settlements was estimated at more than 10,000. A frigate was reported to have landed further supplies of arms and ammunition at Daman. Two frigates had earlier brought a similar cargo to Daman.

On the night of December 7, Portuguese soldiers fired on two Indian villages on the Goa border, Lakkarkot in the north and Tilmati in the south, without any provocation. They ceased firing as soon as Indian special reserve police parties arrived and returned the fire. There were no casualties.

The Portuguese tightened military precautions at strategic places such as the airport and wireless station at Diu. The garrison was reinforced and a night curfew imposed. Orders were issued to shoot at sight those violating the curfew. Mines were laid at key points.

Underground nationalists and Portuguese troops clashed at several places in Goa. Mr Nehru said in the Lok Sabha on December 7 that Portugal's insults would be ended, the waters mined would be cleared and raids by their soldiers stopped. The Indian armed forces round the border of Goa would be strengthened. He told the House: "What exactly will happen I cannot say at the present moment because that depends upon circumstances and developments.... But what I can say is that we are prepared for any contingency that might arise." He assured the House that the present situation would not be tolerated and the Government was quite prepared.

Between December 4 and 11, the Indian authorities reported five separate incidents in which, it was alleged, Portuguese patrols had crossed the Goa border into Indian territory, opened fire on villages and searched a house. Two strong protest notes were sent to Portugal against these incidents.

Dr Alberto Franco Nogueira, Portuguese Foreign Minister, said in Lisbon the same day that it was difficult to state whether Portugal would take up the matter with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization if Goa was attacked. He said: "I will, however, recall that Article 4 of NATO provides for exchange of information and consultations on matters affecting any of its members." If India menaced Goa, Portugal "would inform the Security Council in the hope that it would take necessary action." Dr Nogueira, who was addressing newsmen, was ask-

ed whether he would raise the question of Goa at the NATO meeting of December 13. He said there was a tacit agreement not to disclose what was discussed at these meetings and he would not break the agreement. He said: "Information from various sources had been reaching us in the last few days to the effect that the Indian Union may be preparing some kind of aggressive actions against Goa. Indian warships have been moved and Indian military forces have been gathering in areas contiguous to Goa. Indian newspapers certainly inspired by the Government are urging in ever stronger terms that military action should be taken against Goa.... Above all, the Indian Government claims that the wishes of the people should be respected. Now, the inhabitants of Goa have indicated for centuries their will to be and remain Portuguese—but the Indian Prime Minister is the one who said on September 6, 1955, that he would not tolerate the Portuguese in Goa even if the Goans wanted them there. I leave it to you to reach your own conclusions."

The External Affairs Ministry reacted sharply to Dr Nogueira's remarks. A spokesman of the Ministry said in Delhi that recognition of Portuguese sovereignty over Goa and other Portuguese colonial possessions in India was "completely unacceptable to us." He said: "We consider Goa and other Portuguese colonial pockets in India an integral part of India. The Portuguese offer to give information about conditions in Goa makes very strange reading indeed in the light of their consistent defiance of the U.N. in giving information about non-self-governing territories forcibly occupied by them, specially Goa and other Portuguese colonies in India." The spokesman pointed out that the last such resolution against Portugal was passed by the U.N. General Assembly in 1960.

Portugal made similar allegations of border and air space violations by India and of machine-gunning of a Goan village. It was stated in Lisbon on December 10 that the Portuguese forces had not retaliated against these "provocative acts," and that the Portuguese Government had invited international observers to visit Goa and observe the situation on the spot. Meanwhile, a strong build-up of Indian forces near the Goan border was reported in Portugal and in Goa itself.

The Governor-General of Portuguese India, General Manuel Antonio Vassalo de Silva, announced in Goa on December 12 that it had been decided to evacuate European and locally-born women and children from Goa, Daman and Diu in view of the possibility of an Indian attack. Hundreds of families left for Portugal by air and sea during the next few days, the majority of the evacuees being the wives and children of Portuguese officials and military personnel.

With quick and rapid developments on both sides of the border, Britain expressed its willingness to assist India and Portugal "to bring the two parties together," if there was clear evidence that British good offices would be welcomed by both Governments.

The Portuguese Government had earlier asked the British Government to use its good offices with India. Portugal had also drawn the attention of certain NATO members to what it considered an Indian threat to Portugal's sovereignty over its possessions in India. Britain did not consider that it had the right to intervene in the Goa dispute but was willing to facilitate contacts between India and Portugal.

Reports reached India across the border that the Portuguese had mined the Tirakul creek and the Portuguese army had started vigorous patrolling of the entire border, along which checkposts had been established every six miles. Police and military units were guarding important officials. The Government of India declared that the Indian Navy would take immediate action if the Portuguese tried to mine Indian waters, an act that would endanger Indian coastal shipping or fishing boats.

The Government appointed Major-General K.P. Candeth incharge of the security of the India-Goa border.

Mr Nehru said in the Lok Sabha on December 8 that while making preparations India did not believe that the door to negotiations had been closed.

India's basic approach appeared to have remained unaltered. It would welcome a Portuguese move for negotiations, but the talks had to be on the withdrawal of the Portuguese from Goa. They could not remain on Indian soil any longer.

The Portuguese Government proposed on December 9 that

international independent observers should visit the Goa border "to examine the attitude of the forces present and to determine the nature and responsibilities of any incidents that may take place." A Lisbon communique stated that if the Government of India accepted the proposal "agreement could be reached immediately on the details of sending the observers to the frontier."

At the same time, the Portuguese Government addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council stating that Portugal was being made "a victim of unprovoked aggression by India." The Portuguese delegate did not ask for an urgent meeting of the Council but merely requested that his letter be circulated among Council members.

The same day Mr Nehru told the Congress Parliamentary Party in New Delhi that international factors complicated the Goa problem. He did not mean that Western countries would come and interfere. He also spoke of the "close relations" between Portugal and Pakistan.

India was not expecting any trouble from Western nations. Its fears were confined to international repercussions if serious developments took place. A matter of greater anxiety was that Pakistan might create mischief.

When the situation appeared to be going out of control, the U.S. acted to bring about an amicable settlement. On December 9, referring to Goa, the U.S. Ambassador, Mr J.K. Galbraith, told journalists at Jaipur that nobody wanted to see force used if things could be worked out in any other way. The position regarding colonialism had been made sufficiently clear when the U.S. supported a resolution in the U.N. to set up a commission to investigate the progress in bringing about the end of colonialism. He had heard it suggested that Goa was not a colony, but in his opinion it was, he said.

Meanwhile more and serious clashes were reported from Goa. According to one report, 15 Portuguese soldiers armed with light machine-guns attacked Talwadi village, close to the border near Tirakul fort, about 3 a.m. on the morning of December 10. The Portuguese personnel penetrated about a mile into Indian territory before returning. Senior Indian

police officials guarding the border asked the Government of India for guidance in meeting similar situations.

Radio Goa, which is completely controlled by the Government, announced on December 10 that 500 acts of sabotage had occurred since the emergency had been declared in the settlement.

On December 11, Mr Nehru told the Rajya Sabha of the various border incidents and added: "Deliberately or for some other reason, the Portuguese are functioning in a provocative way, as though they wanted us to attack them." He disclosed that the Portuguese Minister for Overseas Territories had arrived in Goa the previous day and since then "perhaps under pressure of events has been going about Goa promising autonomy....The time for this kind of talk has gone." Later, a spokesman of the Portuguese Overseas Ministry in Lisbon denied that the Minister had visited Goa on December 10.

Portugal's delegate to the U.N., Dr Vasco Garin, told journalists in New York on December 11 that India was "ready to attack" Goa and Portugal was convinced that the attack would be launched even if India "fails to find a genuine pretext for it." He said that he had already informed the members of the Security Council of the situation and that he might possibly request a Council meeting to denounce the "aggression" which, he said, India was preparing to carry out against Goa. Portugal had alerted the Council of an alleged Indian threat against Goa on December 9.

The Portuguese Ambassador in London, Senhor Manuel Ferrajota Rocheta, called at the Foreign Office on December 13 at his own request and saw Mr Edward Heath, Lord Privy Seal. The following statement was subsequently issued by a Foreign Office spokesman: "The Lord Privy Seal informed (the Ambassador) that H.M. Government deplored the tension existing between a member of the Commonwealth and one of their allies. Recent reports suggesting that hostilities might be imminent have caused the gravest concern. H. M. Government have expressed to the Government of India their earnest hope that there will be no resort to force over this issue.

"H.M. Government have similarly expressed to the Portu-

guese Government their hope that they will exercise restraint and avoid gestures that might be interpreted as provocative. The Portuguese Government have proposed the dispatch of international observers to Goa. H.M. Government are naturally in favour of any such machinery which is acceptable to both sides."

In reply to questions, the Foreign Office spokesman indicated that no request for mediation has been received from either party and that Britain, therefore, had no *locus standi* in the Indo-Portuguese dispute; while prepared to give any assistance in its power, the British Government would not take any initiative unless there was clear evidence that the Governments concerned would welcome it.

Asked what effect an Indian attack on Goa would have on the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of alliance of 1899 and earlier treaties between the two countries dating back to 1373, the spokesman said that there would "naturally be no question" of Britain engaging in hostilities with India.

(In 1373 Edward III of England signed a treaty of mutual military support with Portugal, and it was this treaty which Britain invoked in 1943 when seeking bases in the Azores during World War II. In 1386 the two countries entered into a perpetual military alliance—the Treaty of Windsor—against all Powers except the Pope, the Holy Roman Emperor, and John of Gaunt, "King of Castile." Under the Treaty of Windsor the alliance was to be confirmed by sovereigns of England and Portugal within a year of their coronation, and this was generally observed throughout the 15th century.

(The alliance lapsed during the 60 years in which Portugal was part of the Spanish Empire, 1578-1640, but when Portugal regained its independence it was revived in the form of a Treaty of Peace and Commerce signed by Charles I of England and John IV of Portugal in 1642 just before the outbreak of the Civil War in England. After the Restoration, a Portuguese princess, the Infanta Catherine of Braganza, was married in 1661 to Charles II. Tangier and Bombay formed part of her dowry. In that year a Treaty of Alliance was signed. This has remained the basis of Anglo-Portuguese relations to the present day.

(The Anglo-Portuguese alliance was defined in a secret article to the 1661 treaty which stated that, over and above everything contained in the marriage settlement between Charles II and the Infanta, "... His Majesty of Great Britain, in regard of the great advantages and increase of dominion he hath purchased by the treaty of marriage, shall promise and oblige himself... to defend and protect all conquests or colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal against all his enemies, as well future as present.... It is concluded and accorded, that there is and shall be for ever, a good, true and firm peace and amity between the most renowned Kings, Charles, King of Great Britain, and John IV, King of Portugal, their heirs and successors, and their kingdoms, countries, dominations, lands, people, liegemen, vassals, and subjects whomsoever, present and to come...."

(In conformity with the 1661 treaty and the earlier treaties, Britain and Portugal fought side by side against France in the Napoleonic wars and against Germany in World War I, when Portuguese troops served on the Western front. The original treaty of 1373 was invoked by Britain in World War II. The 1661 treaty was confirmed in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna; again in 1873, when Portugal received a British guarantee against external aggression and once more in 1899 when this guarantee was extended to the Portuguese colonies under a secret agreement.)

Seventy-two hours before the Indian forces marched into Goa, there was intense diplomatic activity at the highest level in Washington, Delhi, Lisbon and London. Mr Galbraith, and U Thant, Acting U. N. Secretary-General, were the key personalities. In Delhi, Mr Galbraith called on Mr M. J. Desai, Foreign Secretary, Government of India, on December 14 and was with him for nearly two hours. Goa was the principal topic discussed and its various implications were examined in some detail. The U.S. view was that force should not be used. Among the reasons advanced was one that India's international prestige would suffer. The U.S. admitted, however, that while advocating a peaceful way it did not hope that its suggestion would solve the problem. During the talks, the Ambassador made it clear that the U.S. was against colonialism and that

it regarded Goa as a colony. He had no answer to what should be done if Portugal refused to negotiate and declined to quit, beyond the cryptic statement that "we are pressing Portugal." The U.S. fully appreciated the dilemma in which India was placed.

The previous day, the British High Commissioner, Sir Paul Gore-Booth, called on Mr Nehru and the Foreign Secretary, Mr Desai, and later issued a statement stating the British position. The statement said that India should not resort to force, that the Portuguese Government should exercise restraint and avoid provocation and finally that the British Government was in favour of the Portuguese proposal to send international observers to Goa.

India did not take kindly to the suggestion about observers because it regarded the proposal not only unacceptable but one which can be interpreted as endorsing Portuguese sovereignty over Goa, which it wished to end forthwith.

In Washington, Mr C.S. Jha, India's permanent representative at the U.N., denounced Portugal for the "grossest kind of provocations" and said Goa was a "cancer in the body politic of India that must be removed." He criticized Portugal's NATO allies for giving moral, political and indirect aid to Portugal. NATO's moral support, particularly in regard to Goa, had damaged the prestige of the Western alliance in India's eyes. Mr Jha said that he was not thinking of any specific countries. In this respect NATO was a "complex." Mr Jha did not imply that NATO arms had been supplied to Goa. "But these arms are available to Portugal as a NATO country." He added that he would be surprised if the aircraft being flown by Portuguese from Goa were not NATO planes.

At the same time, India made public two letters it had sent to the President of the Security Council, Mr Omar Loutfi of the United Arab Republic, rejecting Portuguese charges against India and detailing Portuguese provocations.

In Washington, U.S. officials got in touch with the Portuguese Ambassador on December 16, and in Lisbon the U.S. Ambassador was in communication with the Salazar Government.

Mr Galbraith called on Mr Nehru in Delhi and was with him for about half an hour. U.S. officials were reticent about the outcome of the diplomatic activities in Washington, Delhi and Lisbon. They, however, stated that while they were pressing the Portuguese very hard to negotiate, and presumably to withdraw from Goa, they had no illusions about the time factor. At the same time, they continued to express the hope that India would not use force and set a bad example to others who might become more forward in taking recourse to arms for attaining their objectives.

India was as earnest as the U.S. to avoid a showdown, but there was little hope in Delhi about the Portuguese seeing the logic of the times and of negotiating terms and conditions for a withdrawal. The Portuguese had expressed no regret for firing on Indian vessels and other acts of aggression and they had paid no heed to India's protests.

On the evening of December 16, news reached Belgaum that the chief of police in Diu had offered to surrender. The Portuguese official went to meet the Indian official at the Ahmednapur checkpost and said that he would not resist if the Indian Army moved into Diu. He asked for an assurance that he and the people of Diu would receive "civilized and gentlemanly treatment" from the Indian Army. This report was received in India with much satisfaction because it indicated the growing panic among the Portuguese authorities and the collapse of their morale.

Reports from Goa stated that the Portuguese had started moving troops to the border. They appeared to be withdrawing troops from checkposts and grouping them at other points. The Portuguese troops at these posts were being replaced by Goan soldiers.

Meanwhile U Thant, Acting U.N. Secretary-General, sent messages on December 16 to Dr Salazar and Mr Nehru urging them to "ensure that the situation does not deteriorate to the extent that it might constitute a threat to peace, and to enter into immediate negotiations with a view to an early solution of the problem—in accordance with the principles embodied in the Charter and formulated by the United Nations."

The Portuguese Prime Minister, in his reply to the Secretary-General, stated that he was "deeply sensible" of the Secretary-General's appeal and assured him that Portugal, "except in the case of an armed aggression, will do nothing which may constitute a threat to peace and security." To this end, the Portuguese forces in India had received "rigorous instructions" not to undertake or even reply to acts of provocation. Dr Salazar added: "The (Portuguese) Government regrets that the Indian Union, which repeated the alleged provocation from the Portuguese side, has not thought it possible to accept the proposal... that international observers may follow events on the frontiers. These observers would witness if and how violations of frontiers and provocative acts take place.

"As regards negotiations, the Portuguese Government has always expressed, and confirms, its readiness to negotiate with the Indian Union solutions for all the problems arising from the vicinity between the territories of the Portuguese State of India and those of the Indian Union, including an international guarantee to the latter that Portuguese territories will not be utilized against the security of the Indian Union. Such negotiations can take place where and how the Government in New Delhi may wish."

Prime Minister Nehru's reply to U Thant referred to "the serious situation that has developed in and along the borders of India. We have recently given the Security Council some details regarding the sequence of events which have led to this serious situation, and shown how it has been entirely created by Portuguese aggressiveness along the Indian frontiers and an oppressive police regime inside these colonial areas. Portuguese forces continue to shoot indiscriminately at Indian citizens and are committing daily depredations into Indian territory.

"We have consistently abided by the U.N. Charter. The only solution conforming to the principles and purposes of the Charter, U.N. resolutions, and the irreversible course of history is for Portugal to leave her colonies in India and allow the people in these territories to join their countrymen in freedom and democracy. We have during the last 14 years been appeal-

ing to Portugal to settle this question of ending Portuguese colonial rule on the Indian continent. Portugal, however, has brusquely rejected all our appeals and also summarily rejected the advice and suggestions in this connection given by other friendly countries.

"As you know, Portugal has consistently ignored U.N. resolutions on ending colonialism and has refused to send reports (on her colonies) to the United Nations. It is hardly possible to negotiate on the basis of the Charter with a Government which takes its stand on 16th century concepts of colonial conquest by force.

"We understand that many Portuguese officials in Goa are being withdrawn. This is already leading to serious developments and will progressivly lead to chaotic conditions and the growth of violence by lawless elements as well as Portuguese soldiers. This will lead not only to grave loss and suffering but also to powerful reactions in India.

"The situation is very serious and is likely to grow more; so the Government of India, who have shown considerable restraint for many weeks past, cannot tolerate this state of affairs indefinitely."

Mr Galbraith met the Foreign Secretary on December 16 and continued his discussions in a bid to stay a possible use of force by India. The sands of time were running out rapidly, and it was clear to the Government of India that however much it disliked the use of force, there was no other method by which the Portuguese could be made to leave.

Britain found itself in a peculiar situation between its oldest ally and a member of the Commonwealth. It had withdrawn from India, but it knew that a similar call to Portugal would be in vain. The prestige of the U.S. increased. It asked both sides to abjure violence, an appeal to which there was no objection from any side. In unmistakable terms it described Goa a colony and brought pressure on Portugal to leave gracefully. India's efforts were much appreciated because the U.S. upheld the validity of India's demand.

True to tradition, the Portuguese cold-shouldered the efforts of the U.S. and the U.N. Secretary-General. Once this clear picture emerged, there was no delay on India's part in

taking a quick decision and issuing the necessary orders to the armed forces stationed on the borders of the enclaves.

With the boom of guns reverberating across the countryside, the Indian Army moved into Goa just before the midnight of December 17-18. Simultaneously, Indian warships entered Goan waters and Indian Air Force planes penetrated into the air space over Goa and dropped leaflets telling the people that their hour of freedom was at hand. Army units also moved into Daman and Diu. The main body of troops, drawn from the 17th Infantry Division, entered Goa at a number of points along its 160-mile border. Broadly speaking, it was a three-pronged drive supported by medium-sized tanks, armoured cars and artillery.

Indian troops moved into Daman also through three points and advanced rapidly.

A spokesman of the Portuguese Overseas Ministry announced that Indian troops had occupied the frontier posts of Sinquerval, Patarden and Maulinguem in the north of Goa before midnight.

The leaflets dropped by the I.A.F. planes said: "The defence forces who are now with you are for your protection. It is their task to defend the honour and the security of the motherland from which you have been separated for too long and which you largely, by your own efforts, again made your own. They will take every step to ensure your safety and uphold your dignity and honour, whatever the cost.

"At this critical moment, however, Goans must remain watchful. The Portuguese will do everything to leave Goa in ruin and the Goan people in misery. They do not care what happens to Goa now. For they must and will depart. They have nothing to lose by sowing destruction in this land. Their Portugal is at a safe distance. They will try to destroy our bridges, our railways, our temples and churches, our schools and public buildings, and the fine and God-given harbour.

"Crores of rupees and immense human endeavour will have to be respent to rebuild all that is destroyed.

"The Goans cannot, and must not, allow this to happen at any cost.

"Be calm and brave. Rejoice in your freedom and help to safeguard it."

General P.N. Thapar, Chief of Army Staff, in a message to the troops said: "You are not going into Goa as conquerors but as protectors."

Lieutenant-General J.N. Chaudhuri, GOC-in-C, Southern Command, was in overall charge of the operations. Maj.-Gen. K.P. Candeth was field commander.

Mr Krishna Menon said the army had moved into Goa in view of the complete breakdown of the civil administration there and Portuguese provocations. The army had instructions to use the minimum force necessary. He hoped the Portuguese would have the good sense not to do anything to make matters worse.

On the eve of the troop movement, the text of a note sent to Portugal by India on December 15 was released. The note could be regarded as an ultimatum. The Government expressed its serious concern at the rapid deterioration in the internal situation in the Portuguese colonies where the population was "now increasingly at the mercy of the Portuguese soldiers and anti-social elements." It said that the Portuguese should withdraw from Indian territory "forthwith" and added: "We can discuss the legalities and modalities later on but the physical handing over should be done....

"The Government of India believe that it is never too late to take the right step and hope that in accordance with the immutable principles of humanity and the irreversible processes of history, the Government of Portugal will leave their Indian colonies forthwith and remove their persistent irritants against international peace. The people of India are determined to ensure that their independence is complete and that there are no longer any vestiges of colonial rule on their territory."

Twenty-four hours after Indian troops had crossed the borders, the end of the operation was well within sight.

By midnight on December 18-19, the Indian troops had completely encircled Panjim and were a mile from it at the bay of Betim in the north. In the south-east, the troops were advancing towards the capital from Ponda. In the east,

they were moving in from Velha Goa, four miles away, and in the south they had penetrated more than 20 miles.

After reaching the creek of Goa island, the Indian troops halted for a while and entered Panjim at 6 a.m. on December 19. An instrument of surrender was signed by the Portuguese authorities and a Sikh battalion commander, and the Indian flag was hoisted over the governor-general's palace, thus ending Portuguese rule in Goa.

Gen. Chaudhuri supervized the surrender of arms by the Portuguese. The Portuguese commander walked up to Gen. Chaudhuri, saluted him and standing to attention said: "I have to report to you that my troops were ordered to cease-fire last night and to lay down arms."

Gen. Chaudhuri replied: "Your troops should remain in barracks. Other formalities will be gone through."

(Gen. Chaudhuri commanded the Southern Command forces during the police action against Hyderabad State in 1948.)

Governor-General de Silva and some Portuguese troops who had retreated to Fort Vasco da Gama near Mormagao to avoid the onslaught of the Indian forces at Panjim surrendered later in the day.

The last Portuguese resistance ended at 11 p.m. on December 19 when troops holding out in Mormagao laid down their arms after Indian warships had entered the harbour. Daman and Diu surrendered at 8.20 a.m. and 11.10 a.m. respectively the same day.

During the 24-hour advance, the Indian troops encountered only some initial resistance on the morning of December 18. Otherwise, it was practically a walk-over, with the Portuguese abandoning one position after another. The Indian troop movement was so swift that the Portuguese did not get time even to adopt a scorched-earth policy, for which plans had been made.

The historic Anjadiv island from which the Portuguese had opened fire on an Indian merchant vessel and fishing boat, precipitating the crisis, was captured earlier in the day by Indian Navy personnel.

The Portuguese first put out white flags, but when Indian ratings landed they were fired at. The Portuguese forces were

quickly mopped up and 22 men were taken prisoner, including 15 Europeans.

Ships of the Indian Navy commanded by Rear-Admiral B.S. Soman engaged the only Portuguese warship in Goan waters, the 1,700-ton frigate *Afonso de Albuquerque*, at Mormagao harbour, and silenced its guns. She was badly damaged. The crew abandoned ship soon after.

Meanwhile, the Portuguese Government announced in Lisbon that Goa's normal radio and telephone links with Lisbon had been cut as a result of bombing by Indian planes.

The air wing of the Indian forces, commanded by Air Vice-Marshal A.V.M. Pinto, went in close support of the ground forces from early in the morning strafing hostile forces. It also carried out sorties over the air base of Dabolim near Mormagao and rendered the runways unusable.

As the Indian troops advanced, the local civilian population came out in their thousands and greeted them, offering them transport, food and coconut water.

Prime Minister Nehru and Defence Minister Menon issued statements on December 19 announcing the end of the Portuguese resistance. Mr Nehru said that the extraordinarily light casualties on either side and the fact that the entire operation was over in 24 hours showed "the correctness of the Indian assessment of the situation—the colonial administration had cracked up and the people wanted and welcomed India.... If we had not taken any action there would have been vaccum there (in Goa) and only persons who would have profited would have been the lawless and anti-social elements. In fact they were beginning to do it....The justification of this action is that it lasted only for 24 hours..The Portuguese could not and did not do anything—it was only a facade with no strength behind."

The casualties on both sides were negligible compared to the magnitude of the operation. The figures were low because the Portuguese did not put up any fight except at a few places. A Portuguese officer and 16 soldiers and sailors were killed in the three settlements and on Anjadiv island. Thirty-nine Portuguese were wounded—one officer and 38 other ranks. Seventeen Portuguese other ranks and an officer were reported missing.

The Indian casualties were two officers, a junior commissioned officer and 19 other ranks killed and 53 injured.

Of the Portuguese killed, nine were in Goa, compared to 2,000 Portuguese troops taken prisoner in that settlement.

Portugal made a bold bid on December 18 to halt the Indian move by seeking an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider India's action.

In a letter to the President of the Council, Dr Omar Loutfi (U.A.R.), Dr Vasco Garin, Portuguese delegate to the U.N., said that India had launched a "full-scale, unprovoked armed attack on the territories of Goa, Daman and Diu comprising the Portuguese State of India, despite U Thant's appeal to Mr Nehru not to do anything that might constitute a threat to peace."

The letter requested an immediate meeting of the Security Council "to put a stop to the condemnable act of aggression by the Indian Union and to order a cease-fire and the withdrawal forthwith from the Portuguese territories of Goa, Daman and Diu of the invading forces of the Indian Union."

A U.S. spokesman said his delegation wanted the meeting as soon as possible. Britain told Portugal that it would be impossible for the British Government to engage in hostilities against India, a member of the Commonwealth. Lord Home, British Foreign Secretary, informed the House of Lords that Britain would support the inscription of Portugal's complaint on the Security Council agenda. "The next step will depend on what the U.N. decides," he said, and added: "The first step must be to bring the fighting to an end."

Earlier, a Foreign Office spokesman declined to comment when asked if Portugal had invoked its treaty with Britain dating back to 1386, under which they undertook to assist each other "against all people now born or who shall come to be born and who shall seek to violate the peace of others or in any way make bold to offend their status." As late as 1958, Mr Selwyn Lloyd, the then Foreign Secretary, had told the House of Commons that Britain was still bound by the treaty of 1386.

With the end of the police action, the interest shifted to the the diplomatic field at the U.N. where the Security Council met on December 19 to discuss Goa.

The Council agreed to a debate by the bare minimum of seven votes after Mr Loutfi had expressed his own country's reservations about the Portuguese charges. Soviet delegate Valerian Zorin opposed a debate on the ground that the matter was "exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of India and that Goa, Daman and Diu could not be considered as other than provisionally under the colonial control of Portugal."

On a vote, seven members supported Portugal's request for a debate (the U.S., Great Britain, France, Turkey, Chile, Ecuador and Nationalist China), two opposed (the Soviet Union and Ceylon) and two abstained (the U.A.R. and Liberia). Dr Loutfi called upon Dr Garin and Mr C.S. Jha to state their countries' cases without a vote.

The Portuguese delegate said that his country had consistently shown her peaceful intentions by refraining from any counteraction to India's numerous "provocations" on the Goan border. After detailing Portugal's earlier warnings of a strong build-up of Indian forces on the border, he said there was "absolutely no truth" in the allegations of a breakdown of law and order in Goa or the flight of Portuguese officials as alleged by India before the invasion. Portuguese forces, though "vastly outnumbered by the invading forces," were putting up "stiff resistance" and "fighting a delaying action and destroying communications in order to halt the advance of the enemy."

Mr Jha told the Council that the "elimination of the last vestiges of colonialism in India" was an "article of faith" for the Indian people, "Charter or no Charter, Security Council or no Security Council." He described Goa, Daman and Diu as "an inalienable part of India unlawfully occupied by Portugal." Mr Jha asserted that Portugal would not have been able to take such an arrogant stand on this question but for the support rendered by NATO countries and described the Portuguese contention that its possessions in India were part of metropolitan Portugal a legal fiction.

Mr Adlai Stevenson of the United States strongly criticized India for resorting to force. He said: "Let us be perfectly clear what is at stake. It is the question of the use of armed force by one State against another—an act clearly forbidden by the Charter. We (the U.S.) have opposed such action in the past

by our closest friends as well as by others, and in the Congo in 1960. We do so again in Goa in 1961.

"We are not meeting to decide the merits of this case (but) to decide what attitude should be taken when one of the members of the U.N. casts aside the principles of the Charter and seeks to resolve a dispute by force. What is at stake today is not colonialism. It is a violation of one of the most basic principles of the U.N. Charter, stated in Article 2: 'All members shall refrain in their internal relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.'

"We realize fully the depths of the differences between India and Portugal concerning the future of Goa. We realize that India maintains that Goa by right should belong to India. Doubtless India would hold, therefore, that its action is aimed at a just end. But if our Charter means anything, it means that States are obligated to renounce the use of force, to seek a solution of their differences by peaceful means, to utilize the procedures of the United Nations when other peaceful means have failed.

"If it is to survive, if the United Nations is not to die as ignoble a death as the League of Nations, we cannot condone the use of force in this instance and thus pave the way for forceful solutions of other disputes which exist in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Europe. In a world as interdependent as ours, the possible results of such a trend are too grievous to contemplate.

"This action is all the more painful to my country because we have in recent weeks made repeated appeals to India to refrain from the use of force. This has included not a series of diplomatic approaches in Washington and New Delhi but also a personal message from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Nehru on December 13, indicating our earnest hope that India would not resort to force to solve the Goa problem."

After emphasizing that the United Nations "cannot apply a double standard with regard to the principle of resort to force," Mr Stevenson concluded: "The Council has an urgent

duty to bring this dispute from the battlefield to the negotiating table. We earnestly urge India to withdraw her armed forces from the territories they have invaded. We earnestly appeal for a cease-fire. We earnestly urge India and Portugal to enter into negotiations to achieve a solution. We must ask for an immediate cease-fire; we must insist on the withdrawal of the invading forces; and we must insist that the two parties negotiate on the basis of the principles of the Charter."

Mr Zorin told the Council that the Goan question could not be considered by the Security Council. If discussion was necessary, he maintained, the subject of debate should be "the question of violation by Portugal of the declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples" (the anti-colonialist resolution adopted at the 15th Assembly). Portugal, he said "does not fulfil and is not going to fulfil this declaration and she is thereby creating a threat to peace and security in various parts of the world...."

The Soviet representative stated that neither Britain nor the U.S. had denounced Portugal when it was "annihilating scores of thousands of people in Angola," nor had they suggested a cease-fire in Angola and the withdrawal of Portuguese troops from that territory and other Portuguese colonies. As soon, however, as "the question comes up of supporting the liberation from colonial dependents of peoples and territories which constitute an integral part of India...pronouncements are immediately made of violations of the U.N. Charter...." He said Great Britain and the U.S. were "acting in solidarity with their NATO ally—the colonial power of Portugal." He expressed the Soviet Union's "solidarity with the people of India and Goa in their fight for liberation from Portuguese colonial domination."

Sir Patrick Dean (U.K.) said Britain had been "shocked and dismayed" at the outbreak of hostilities. He requested the Security Council to (1) call for an immediate cessation of hostilities; (2) call upon India to withdraw its forces; (3) encourage India and Portugal to resolve their differences by peaceful means; and (4) invite the U.N. Secretary-General to give all possible help to the two parties in bringing about a reconciliation.

The supporters of India—Liberia, Ceylon and the U.A.R.—presented another resolution which (1) stated that "the enclaves claimed by Portugal in India constitute a threat to international peace and security and stand in the way of the unity of the Republic of India"; (2) asked the Security Council to reject the Portuguese charge of aggression against India; and (3) called upon Portugal "to terminate hostile actions and cooperate with India in the liquidation of her colonial possessions in India." This resolution was supported only by the Soviet Union, the other seven members opposing.

After the defeat of the Afro-Asian resolution, a resolution presented by the U.S., Great Britain, France and Turkey received seven votes in favour (the four sponsors and Chile, Ecuador and Nationalist China) and four against (the Soviet Union, Ceylon, Liberia and the U.A.R.).

Thus the resolution was defeated by the Soviet veto—the 99th cast by the USSR.

The Western nations' resolution

(1) called for the immediate cessation of hostilities
(2) called upon India to withdraw her forces immediately to "the positions prevailing before December 17, 1961"
(3) urged India and Portugal "to work out a permanent solution of their differences by peaceful means in accordance with the principles embodied in the Charter," and
(4) requested the U.N. Secretary-General "to provide such assistance as may be appropriate."

The preamble recalled that Article 2 of the U.N. Charter made it obligatory on all members (*a*) "to settle their disputes by peaceful means and refrain from the threat or use of force"; (*b*) deplored "the use of force by India in Goa, Daman and Diu"; and (*c*) recalled that article 1 (2) of the Charter "specifies as one of the purposes of the United Nations the development of friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."

In a statement after the vote, Mr Stevenson said that the "fateful" Goa debate might be "the first act of a drama" which

could end in the death of the United Nations. After recalling that the League of Nations "died when its members no longer resisted the use of aggressive force," he declared: "The failure of the Security Council to call for cease-fire in these simple circumstances is a failure of the United Nations. The veto of the Soviet Union is consistent with its long role of obstruction. But I find the attitude of some other members of the Council (the Afro-Asian members) profoundly disturbing and ominous, because we have witnessed an effort to sanction the use of force in international relations when it suits one's own purpose. This approach can only lead to chaos and to the disintegration of the United Nations."

Following the action in Goa, the Portuguese Government ordered the internment of all Indians living in Portuguese overseas territories and the freezing of their assets and property. According to British and U.S. newspapers about 12,000 Indian nationals were believed to be residents of Portuguese territories, the majority of them in Mozambique and Macao. Indian newspapers gave the number about 3,500. Five Indian citizens who were in transit through Lisbon at the time of the Goa invasion were taken off British, Swiss and Brazilian planes at the airport and held in custody for several weeks; they were released in February 1962 through the intervention of the U.A.R. Embassy and allowed to leave Portugal.

CHAPTER XIV

CHEERS AND REBUKES FOR INDIA

GOA, Daman and Diu were jubilant over their liberation. Thousands of people came out of their houses in Panjim, Margao, Mapuca, Vasco da Gama and other towns, big and small, and mixed with Indian soldiers to celebrate the advent of freedom. The Indian flag fluttered over every house, shop and establishment. Catholics in their thousands vied with Hindus in welcoming the change, thus belying the oft-repeated Portuguese statement that Christians would be in danger once India took over Goa. Hundreds of public meetings were held, at which people for the first time spoke of freedom, democracy and election.

On the night of December 18, before the Indian troops entered Panjim, amid scenes of jubilation, a bronze bust of Dr Salazar was dragged through a street and hung from a tree. It was later demolished and thrown into the gutter. Two other statues, one of Antonio Souza, a Goan, at Mapuca, and the other of the Portuguese navigator, Infante don Henriques, at Vasco da Gama, were also pulled down by the people to wipe off the relics of Portuguese colonialism.

Indians also were equally joyous. The news of the advance of the troops was welcomed by all sections of the people. Mr K.K. Menon, a Praja Socialist leader, said: "We take this as the first step towards safeguarding the security of the country not only on the western coastal border but on all other borders." The Communist Party organized small processions in different parts of Delhi to hail the liberation march. Dr Z.A. Ahmed, a Communist leader, stated: "This is an historic event. All glory to our soldiers who are marching forward." Mr Balraj Madhok, a Jan Sangh leader,. wholeheartedly welcomed the Government's action and hoped that the troops would accomplish the task they had undertaken in the shortest time.

Leaders of the National Congress (Goa) and the Goa Vimochan Samiti in a joint statement said that they felt

confident that "our brave forces will speedily smash Portuguese mercenaries and thus remove the last blot of foreign occupation on our motherland. Today we see the glorious culmination of the long struggle of the people of Goa, particularly since 1946. We salute and pay our homage to the Goan martyrs who gave their lives for this cause." Dr Gaitonde, Mr Peter Alvares, Mr Jayantrao Tilak and Mr Nath Pai signed the statement.

At meetings throughout the country, particularly Bombay, Delhi and Calcutta, resolutions were adopted congratulating the Government on their decision to liberate the colonies.

Mr Leonid Brezhnev, Soviet President, then on a tour of India, praised the Indian action. Speaking at a reception held in his honour by the Bombay Municipal Corporation on December 18, he said: "The USSR and India agreed on the questions of the struggle for peace and peaceful co-existence and for general and complete disarmament. Of great importance was also the closeness of our countries' positions on such an important international problem as the complete elimination of colonialism in all its manifestations."

Mr Brezhnev referred to the statement of the Soviet Premier, Mr Khruschev, at the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party on elimination of colonialism and said the Soviet people warmly wished success to all those who were struggling against colonialism.

Prime Minister Nehru paid tributes to the defence forces on the clean and efficient way in which they had conducted the operations. He told newsmen in Delhi on December 19: "This operation, small as it was, deserves attention from the point of view of the efficiency of our defence services and their close co-ordination with one another. It is true that the operation is much simplified by the lack of opposition. Nevertheless, it was a highly efficient one and shows the quality of our defence services."

Mr Nehru referred to the criticism of India in the U.N. and particularly the comment by the U.S. delegate, Mr Adlai Stevenson, equating the Goa operation with Korea and Suez. He said: "Those criticizing us in the U.N. and elsewhere

are obviously ignorant of facts now as well as in the last dozen years or more."

The swiftness of the action and the few casualties on either side showed "the correctness of our appraisal of the situation—that the colonial administration had cracked up and that the people in Goa wanted and welcome us. If we had not taken some action there would have been a vacuum there and the only persons who could have profited would have been lawless and anti-social elements. In fact, they were beginning to do it."

He added: "Taking any military action is contrary to my grain. It hurts me to do it. I could only agree to this because the consequences of not taking it would have been very harmful even from the point of view of violence, etc.

"Here is something done in India which rouses such tremendous reactions in the whole of India and Goa. We all know that in Goa this event has been hailed by the people, not by the Hindus only, by the Catholics, Christians. You may have seen in the public press what the leading dignitary of the Catholic church in India has said, the Archbishop of Bombay, who is himself a Goan and a Cardinal of the Roman Church. They don't speak irresponsibly. He has welcomed this. I have had telegrams from bishops in Goa, Catholic bishops, welcoming this. All these people, in India and in Goa, are governed by facts, by the background."

The first act of President Rajendra Prasad, who resumed office on December 20 after a prolonged illness, was to broadcast a special message to the Goan people. Expressing his pleasure at the end of Portuguese rule on the Indian subcontinent, Dr Rajendra Prasad congratulated the people of Goa and said it was their resistance to foreign domination and keenness to be free which broke up the colonial regime. He also praised the Indian armed forces for helping the people of Goa to end the colonial regime quickly, using only the minimum of force.

The sarvodaya leader, Mr Jayaprakash Narayan, fully justified the steps taken to integrate the Portuguese settlements. One of the noted followers of Mahatma Gandhi, Mr Narayan said it was a great pity that India had to resort to force in Goa. But politically no alternative was open to it.

Though Indians of all shades of political opinion welcomed the integration of Goa in the Indian Union, many influential leaders were disturbed that force had been used, particularly in view of India's consistent opposition to the use of force and its known adherence to the principles of nonviolence. *The Hindu* (Madras) said on December 20, after the campaign was over: "It would be presenting a deceptive picture to suggest that everyone is supremely happy over the Goa developments without any reservation. Many in high places did hold a different view on the desirability of using force....If they remained publicly silent without ventilating their viewpoint, it is because they did not want to embarrass the Government which had made up its mind, and also because they did not want to give the impression that they were opposed to Portugal's exit from Indian soil. Their fear is that by her action India might have endangered the high esteem in which she has been held all over the world. These leaders, however, realize that the criticism India must face is not so much about the taking over of Portuguese colonies but of doing it in a way which went against her professions and principles."

A public criticism of the Goa action was, however, made by Mr Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, one of India's most respected "elder statesmen," in an article on December 27 in *Swarajya*, the organ of the Swatantra Party.

Mr Rajagopalachari said that India had "totally lost the moral power to raise her voice against militarism" and had helped to undermine the prestige and power of the Security Council. Whilst Portugal's presence in Goa had been "an offence to Indian nationalism," it was not a greater offence than Communist China's occupation of Indian territory or the social evil created by untouchability—the treatment of a wide section of the Indian population as outcasts, which Gandhi had denounced as a "deadly sin." For nearly half a century India had been sustained by the Gandhian principles of nonviolence, but the "great adventure" of seizing Goa might prove to be a turning point in India's devotion to those principles. "The question is," wrote Mr Rajagopalachari, "what faith we now profess?...What message does India

now carry in a world on the brink of moral collapse? Our nationalism has, I fear, led us into impatience at the wrong moment....We had a mission for promoting peace and a special qualification for fulfilling it...."

(Mr Rajagopalachari was for many years a close associate of Mahatma Gandhi and Mr Nehru, one of the leading members of the Congress Party and the last Governor-General of India, 1948-50, Home Minister in the Union Cabinet, Chief Minister of Madras, and Governor of West Bengal. He founded the Swatantra Party in 1959 after leaving the Congress.)

The reaction in the Western press was highly critical and hostile. British newspapers displayed the news on their front pages with big headlines. Many commented editorially. *The Times* said: "Independent India has had the Portuguese enclaves as thorns in its side for years... (but) if the matter was one for patience and negotiation five or ten years ago it is so still.

"This is not to belittle the pressures within India.... Indians hold colonialism has been powerfully reinforced so far as Portugal is concerned by what has happened in Angola. The dispute with China about the Ladakh frontier has made Indians more than ever conscious of their national dignity. No doubt, there are many who cannot see the logic of Indian troops fighting vestiges of colonialism in Katanga against Tshombe's mercenaries while being held back from the Portuguese on their own coast. Goa and other Portuguese enclaves are anomalies. They may irritate—that does not make them threats to peace, unless India wills it so."

The Daily Telegraph (Conservative) commented: "India's invasion of Goa is no less grave and deplorable because it had been daily expected. India may win some temporary acclaim from some of the Asian and African countries. That will not alter the fact that Mr Nehru will have gravely tarnished his own reputation as a man of peace and will have set a perilous precedent for the nations of Asia."

The *Daily Mail* (Conservative): "Goa is an affront to India and that she should want the 'pimple' removed is understandable. But, if she hoped to keep the respect of the world she

should have tried negotiation before resorting to invasion and accepted an international commission."

The Daily Express (Right-wing) observed that Mr Nehru's "onslaught" on Goa would leave him friendless among the free people of the world.

Some of the front-page headlines were:

The Daily Herald (Independent Labour): WESTERN PEACE PLEAS FAIL...NEHRU INVADES GOA

The *Daily Mail* (Conservative): INDIANS MARCH, NEHRU SLEEPS AS GOA IS INVADED

The Guardian (Liberal): INDIA SENDS ARMY INTO GOA... 30,000 TROOPS ON BORDER OF PORTUGUESE ENCLAVES

The Daily Worker (Communist): LIBERATORS MARCH ON GOA

The New York Times in an editorial on the Indian action in Goa said: "Prime Minister Nehru has abruptly answered peace appeals from President Kennedy and from the U.N. Acting Secretary-General, U Thant, by sending troops into the little Portuguese enclave of Goa....India's exasperation with Portuguese obstinacy, plus the pressures on Mr Nehru with a national election approaching, is understandable enough. It is, nevertheless, a serious blot on India's record as a champion of peace that she should now resort to military invasion of Goa."

The New York Herald Tribune said on December 20 that "even at this late hour, with India's domination of Goa completed, it would be a fatal error, it seems to us, to accept this triumph of aggression as irrevocable. We believe that every effort must be made to pursue the final hope that the (U.N.) General Assembly can yet be persuaded to rebuke and reverse India's predatory act—to make it clear that international crimes committed in the name of anti-colonialism are as reprehensible as any other, and that no country, no matter how sanctimonious its pretensions, has the right to impose its will by armed violence. To say that it is impossible to attain the necessary majority in the General Assembly to make these principles prevail is to admit that the U.N. is finished. If it is, let us at least know and face it so that our national policies can be adjusted accordingly."

The New York Times said: "In keeping with the Charter, which outlaws the use or threat of force for purposes inimical to its principles, the USA condemns India's use and Indonesia's threat of force over Dutch New Guinea because the purpose of both is to annex alien territory by use of arms."

The paper said there was no contradicion in the superficially opposed positions taken by the U.S. in condemning the use of force in Goa and the support of the U.N. action in Katanga. "There is, on the contrary, only the consistent application of policy based on the U. N. Charter," it added.

Although the comments were caustic, Western correspondents who saw the Goa action had a different story to tell about India and its armed forces. Mr Ian Colvin, special correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph*, who arrived in Bombay on December 20 from Panjim, said that he was struck by the swift, efficient and orderly manner in which the Indian forces marched in and took over Goa. Mr Colvin, who was in the capital of Goa the previous day a few hours after the Portuguese had surrendered to Indian forces, stated that life in Panjim was normal with most of the public utility services, including business, operating "almost normally." He said foreign correspondents who toured the town found that all was peaceful and there was no trace of fighting anywhere in the vicinity. Buildings in Panjim did not bear signs of damage. Church buildings were intact and not a single cross was touched. "We found the local people everywhere waving Indian flags and it was obvious that there was great relief everywhere that it was all over so soon."

Mr Colvin reported a case in which 28 armed Portuguese soldiers surrendered to a platoon of 20 Indian Army men "without even a pistol being drawn by the Indians." The Portuguese who surrendered were armed with Bren-guns and grenades.

Mr Paul Grimes, special correspondent of *The New York Times*, who was in Goa at the time of the action, in a dispatch to his paper said: "Well-equipped Indian forces moved forth with precision. Even many of their enemies credited them with extreme care in safeguarding civilian population, preserving historical and religious landmarks and treating Portuguese

prisoners." Describing the scene of the day the Indian Army entered Goa, he said: "Retreating (Portuguese) troops lounged briefly along the roadside. They broke open cases of beer and sardines and drank cognac freely in their canteens. In sharp contrast were the Indian troops. They quickly took over today (December 20). 'We do not want any casualties,' a Sikh Major told Captain Braz (Commander of the Goan Police). 'We would not fire if your men do not.' "

The correspondent said that the Portuguese did not put up any resistance in Goa and there were very few casualties.

In contrast to the Western press, the African and Asian press hailed the Goa action as a great event and a victory for anti-colonial forces. The Cairo, Baghdad and Beirut press supported India's action. The conservative newspaper *Al Hayat* of Beirut said India's action "is a turning point in the course of international events in Asia." The Government of Iraq congratulated the Government of India on its success. The Iraqi Embassy in Delhi said on December 20 that India's action was considered by the people of Iraq heartening and proper.

While the Portuguese had been trying their best to tell the world that the U.S. was on its side, Dr Henry Kissinger, President Kennedy's adviser on international affairs, who was on a visit to India, said at Aurangabad on January 22 that Americans had never recognized the Portuguese claim to Goa because U.S. public opinion had always been against colonialism. What shocked many Americans was the use of force, especially after repeated assurances by Indian leaders that force would not be used as far as possible. The initial shock arising from the Indian action was only a temporary phase and had not affected the bonds of close understanding and friendship between the two countries. Americans had come to appreciate the objective of the Government of India although they differed on the method adopted. He justified the U.S. reaction by citing that 1961 was a year of tension in the Congo, Indo-China and Berlin and it was disturbed by the addition of Goa to the arenas of possible conflict. Answering a question about Mr Adlai Stevenson's statement in the U.N., Dr Kissinger

remarked that Mr Stevenson had made the statement as the "best friend of India."

The behaviour of the Portuguese during and after the liberation of the settlements was as stubborn as before. They did not seem to understand what was happening. They knew too well that their military build-up in the settlements was inadequate even to stop an advancing column of the Indian Army. The military preparations were of a nature which could effectively meet only local disturbances. As soon as the Indian troops marched in, Portugal interned all Indians, estimated at over 15,000, in its colonies and froze all their assets.

The Overseas Territories Minister, Mr Adriano Moreira, attacked the Indian action and accused the Western nations and the U.N. of cowardice. In a talk with journalists on December 22, he said: "If this preoccupation with keeping the peace at any price continues, the time may come when the U.S. may some day wake up and find Russia has taken it over simply with a diplomatic note—because the people running that country are so dedicated to avoiding war." Mr Moreira said that Portugal had suffered no economic loss through the Indian take-over of Goa. "Most of the assets are owned by Goans," he said. Goa offered few posts for mainland Portuguese. There were only 15 civil servants from Portugal there when the Indians marched in, he disclosed. His Government feared that Indian arms were now being sent into the Congo for the U.N. forces in excess of their actual needs, and that these arms might some day be used against Portugal's African territories. He said: "There are many Indian soldiers in Africa now as members of the U.N. forces to the Congo. But how can we know when they might cease obeying U.N. orders and instead accept directives from their own country?" Once the Goan annexation was consolidated, he said, Mr Nehru might choose to move against Portuguese East Africa as a means of finding "living space" for India's surplus population.

There was an anti-British demonstration in Lisbon on December 21 and the Union Jack was dragged along streets. Seven cars that took part in the demonstration carried banners saying: "Down with the alliance" (the long-standing

Anglo-Portuguese alliance). The embassies of the U.S. and the U.K. were guarded by police armed with sub-machine guns.

Lisbon also mourned the loss of Goa and described it as "the fall of our civilization's biggest and dearest symbol." The usual pre-Christmas festivities gave way to bitterness as student demonstrators chanted "Goa is ours," "Goa is Portuguese" and "Glory to the armed forces." A historian, Dr Salinas Calando, told the Geographical Society of Lisbon: "The fall of Goa marks a return into the darkness that existed before Vasco da Gama arrived there in 1498." Portugal did not celebrate the New Year "on account of the loss of Goa." The Lisbon police said in a communique on December 30 that in view of the recent aggression by the Indian Union against Portuguese India they expected the people to abstain on New Year's eve from any noisy or festive demonstrations.

In his New Year broadcast, President Americo Tomas told the people that "it is to be expected that the West will finally awake from the lethargy in which it has been living, realizing that it may be rapidly walking towards the worst of all slaveries." He said he had a world of hope and faith regarding Portugal's future. "To know how to wait has always been the great virtue of the Portuguese and Portugal has on other occasions in her history recovered—several dozen years later—some territories which legitimately belonged to her and had been taken away from her."

President Tomas said the leading tragic events of 1961 were "the so-called cases of Angola and India which have cost already much Portuguese blood. In both cases we were victims and, therefore, we are accusers and not culprits. The motives of the campaign against Portugal—the alleged Portuguese colonialism—was only a pretext for others to replace us in Africa."

These misfortunes fell upon Portugal, he said, "because a great part of the West let itself suffer the contagion of erroneous ideas, unaware that they are playing the game of the enemy, and that pacifism and self-determination are cloaks which conceal very different designs" and because the U.N., rarely

independent, utterly became harmful and partial in the cases of Angola and Katanga and failed in its fundamental mission in the case of Goa.

Dr Salazar told the National Assembly on January 3, 1962, that one of the missions of the 3,500 Portuguese troops in Portuguese India was to force the Indian Union to set afoot a large military operation which would shock the world, and that this mission had been fulfilled. He said the Portuguese Government should study what positive content remained in the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and base its future attitude towards the obligations that exist between the two countries on the conclusions arrived at. He complained that the British Government delayed for a week its reply refusing a Portuguese Government request for the use of some aerodromes needed by Portugal for safeguarding Goa. Dr Salazar issued a threat that the Portuguese might decide to leave the U.N., which had not come to its aid when appealed to. Portugal refused to accept India's "occupation of Goa" as an accomplished fact.

He paid tributes to Britain and the U. S. for their efforts in New Delhi to try to prevent India from using force in Goa, but regretted their impotence in the matter. He also paid tributes to the solidarity shown in the case of Goa by Brazil and Spain and the request made in New Delhi by Canada, Australia, West Germany, Argentina, Belgium and Holland, to mention only those of which he had direct knowledge.

Referring to the U.N. handling of the Goa question, he recalled that in the Security Council a motion calling for suspension of hostilities obtained a majority of seven votes. He said: "It was nevertheless vetoed by Russia and was thus nullified....This once more drove the Indian Union into the arms of the Soviets and also clearly shows the paralysis of the so-called collective defence system against Russia or against any Power protected by her. The outcome of the appeal was foreseen but it alarmed the world. The Indian representative's declarations that his country would go on with its policy, Charter or no Charter, Security Council or no Security Council, legitimately or not, was such a challenge to the aims and legal structure of the institution that it would have been better to consider it defunct on the spot.

"The U.S. believed that what had happened foretold the impending end of the organization, but in an attempt to consolidate it they joined all the other nations the next day in a vote against Portugal and two days later hastened to assure the Indian Union of their financial support. This is no doubt correct, but it is very difficult for us to understand; above all it does not fit into the pattern of our moral sensitivity.

"We might implicitly ask what our role is in the U.N. or that of those minor Powers that do not enjoy the favour of Russia or whose solidarity with the West calls down upon them the open hostility of the anti-Western bloc. The question will also be asked how we came to enter the organization. The Indian Union has been able to wage war on us, but without us it cannot make the peace. In the same way that there has been no surrender of forces or handing over of ships, there cannot be any treaty to recognize the sovereignty of the Indian Union over those territories."

He announced that a Bill would be presented to the Assembly on the continuance of the Portuguese Government organs in the lost territories. He added: "The first consequence of this is that the parliamentary representation of the State of India will continue to be held by those elected by the people of Goa, Daman and Diu. The House will not object to this present situation and in future Parliaments means will be found to give a practicable right of choice to those Goans who live outside the territories occupied by the Indian Union and who maintain their devotion to the Portuguese homeland. The second consequence is that Portuguese citizenship would continue to be recognized in law and in fact to Goans, whether or not they are given a double nationality by the unilateral imposition of the Indian Union.

"Difficulties will arise for both sides when the programme of Indianization of Goa begins to clash with the Goans' culture and when the Prime Minister discovers that a definite individuality has been formed there down the centuries by interpenetration of cultures and by the crossing of various races."

On February 3, 1962, the Portuguese National Assembly unanimously approved a Government Bill by which Portugal formally refused to recognize Indian sovereignty over Goa,

Daman and Diu. According to this Bill, which maintains all political and administrative institutions created by Portugal, Goa would continue to be represented in the Assembly by three representatives of Goan origin. The Bill provides that for the time being all Goan officers or organizations appointed by Portugal will have their headquarters in Lisbon.

Within hours of Dr Salazar's attack on Great Britain, London retorted. Mr S.W. Roskill, Britain's official naval historian, said that Portugal was in no position to complain about Britain's lukewarm attitude in supporting it over Goa because Portugal was tardy in supporting Britain in World War II. Mr Roskill said in a letter to *The Times*: "It is pertinent to remind our Portuguese friends that they did not rush to Britain's aid in 1939, nor even in 1940 when we stood alone against Hitler and Mussolini and sorely needed the use of the naval and air bases on the coast of Portugal. Furthermore, it took two years of patient—many people at the time felt too patient—negotiation with Dr Salazar before, on August 18, 1943, he signed an agreement permitting us to use bases in the Azores, from which the central Atlantic could be cleared of U-boats. And even then so many difficulties were produced by the Portuguese Government regarding American participation in those facilities that it was not until October 1943, that the agreement became effective. Portugal, had she stood by the alliance in our time of real need, could have saved us enormous shipping losses—after the end of 1942—at negligible risk to herself."

New Delhi also sharply reacted to Dr Salazar's speech. It maintained that the statement that Dr Salazar wanted to force India to take military action in Goa only confirmed the Government of India's view that a peaceful settlement with the Portuguese was out of the question.

The British Government rejected Dr Salazar's charge that Britain had used delaying tactics when Portugal requested the use of El Adam (Libya) or Gan (Maldive Islands) aerodrome for the defence of Goa. A Foreign Office spokesman said that Dr Salazar's statement had been misleading because Britain was not in a position to grant the use of the bases the Portuguese had asked for without the permission of the host Governments.

Portugal was informed of this and was advised that an alternative would be considered. On December 14, an alternative request was received and this was being considered when India moved in.

The comments of the British press made interesting reading. *The Daily Herald* (Labour) said the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was a historic relic which had no relevance to the world today. "It should have been annulled long ago."

The Daily Sketch (Conservative) said: "It has been obvious for years that the phrase 'Britain's oldest ally' has negligible application to a regime whose colonial policy we detest."

While the relations between the two oldest allies were getting strained, leaflets calling for the nationalization of British companies in Portugal and a boycott of British goods appeared on Lisbon walls on January 5.

One leaflet said: "Britain betrayed us in a vile and cowardly fashion." Another stated: "We are with Spain for the expulsion of the British from Gibraltar. Away with the scoundrels."

Another example of how the Portuguese authorities refused to move with the times was provided by Mr Augusto Potier, Portugal's Ambassador to Pakistan, in Karachi on January 14—27 days after the liberation of Goa and other colonies—when he told a gathering of Portuguese citizens, most of them Goans holding Portuguese passports, that "Goa has not fallen," and that "Portugal will never abandon Goa." The meeting also sent a telegram to Dr Salazar condemning India's action in Goa.

Three Goan members of the Portuguese National Assembly, Mr Tomas Prisonro Furtado, Mr Valcount S. Dempo and Mr Purshottam Keny sent in their resignations to Dr Salazar from Panjim.

Mr Furtado, a leading advocate of Margao, said on February 18, that since Goa had joined the motherland, it was the duty of every Goan to work for the progress of the country and welfare of the people. He added that he was proud to be an Indian and that he would devote his time for the progress and prosperity of the nation. He and the two other deputies had been nominated to the Portuguese Parliament only the previous year. He was in Lisbon when the Indian forces

entered Goa, Daman and Diu and returned to India in the third week of January after attending the session of the Portuguese Parliament at which Dr Salazar announced the formation of a Portuguese India Government with headquarters in Lisbon.

CHAPTER XV

INTEGRATION OF GOA IN INDIA

THE Government of India prepared thorough plans not only to free the Portuguese pockets but also to bring conditions in the settlements back to normal quickly and with the least inconvenience to the public.

The personnel of the civil administration, which was to succeed the military regime once the emergency was over, moved into Goa immediately after the troops marched in. The police personnel to maintain law and order had also been drafted from neighbouring States.

The first task of the military authorities after the Portuguese surrender was to mop up the remnants of the Portuguese army and maintain law and order. These were no big problems because the Goans were happy at the collapse of the Portuguese regime and cheerfully cooperated with the military governor.

The Governor-General of Goa, Daman and Diu, General Manuel Antonio Vassalo de Silva, was found by Indian soldiers on the morning of December 20 in a small house in Margao. He and his wife were taken to a larger house and they were accorded the courtesies appropriate to their status.

The Indian troops rounded up 201 Portuguese army officers, 13 naval officers, 19 police officers lent to the police force by the Portuguese army, 2,596 other ranks and 275 policemen. No evidence was found of the Portuguese employing African troops or Goan soldiers. About 100 Portuguese civilians, including 60 doctors working in civilian hospitals, were permitted to continue their avocations in Goa. All White Portuguese women and children had been sent to Lisbon before the start of the Indian operation.

The Portuguese surrendered a large dump of military stores at a place about 10 miles from Mormagao. These stores included more than 100 jeeps and a large number of anti-aircraft guns, artillery pieces and ammunition barrels. The Portuguese had damaged a number of vehicles. Similar arm dumps were

found in Panjim, Mormagao, Vasco da Gama and Ponda. Mormagao also had stocks of weapons, anti-aircraft guns and long-range shore guns.

The Indian troops also recovered large quantities of dynamite at different places in the settlement, apparently kept for blowing up strategic installations. Because of the speed of the operation, the Portuguese could destroy only a few houses here and there, including the governor's house.

The governor of Daman, who sustained a minor injury during the action, requested the Indian authorities to repatriate him.

The Indian External Affairs Ministry announced on December 21 that India would be glad to repatriate all Portuguese nationals in Goa, Daman and Diu "if the Government of Portugal so desires," including both captured military personnel and civilians. It was emphasized that the Government of India did not intend to hold any Portuguese hostage until the Indians interned in Mozambique and other colonies were freed and that the two questions were entirely unconnected. Through the U.A.R. and Brazilian Governments several notes were exchanged between India and Portugal during January on the repatriation of Portuguese troops and civilians from India, the Portuguese Government being requested to arrange the necessary transport at an early date.

The Ministry stated on January 30, 1962, that Portugal had accepted in principle two Indian suggestions. One was that all Portuguese civilians and military personnel in Goa, Daman and Diu, including Goans who regarded themselves Portuguese, should be repatriated. It was agreed that Bombay would be the point of embarkation. Secondly, Portugal should release all Indians interned in its overseas territories, allow them to resume their normal pursuits and retain their assets. The Ministry had previously stated that the Government of India was in contact with the British, U.S. and Brazilian Governments in order to arrange sea and air transport for the repatriation of the Portuguese in India.

Within hours of their arrival, the Indian troops started repairing damaged communication lines within Goa and between Goa and the rest of India. Besides destroying a

number of minor bridges and culverts, the Portuguese had also put out of order three main bridges in Goa to impede the advance of the Indian Army. These were at Banastarim, eight miles east of Panjim, at Ass Nora, six miles from Dodamarg, on the border, and at Berim, between Mormagao and Ponda. The bridges at Banastarim and Ass Nora were rebuilt. When it was found that the repair of the mile-long bridge at Berim would take time, arrangements were made to provide ferries. The water supply cut by the Portuguese when they blew up the bridge at Banastarim was restored soon after. The water mains were running alongside the bridge. As an interim measure the military brought well-water in trucks and distributed it in the city.

The Indian Army personnel, who were eager to buy consumer goods as every citizen in India, went on a shopping spree in the towns of Goa. They purchased imported goods of all kinds, from cosmetics to transistor radios and refrigerators. Shops which reopened within 48 hours of the liberation reported record sales. Prices rose four-fold.

In spite of the army authorities' efforts to restrain their personnel, lapses on the part of individual soldiers were reported. Complaints of looting and hooliganism were sternly dealt with and certain areas were declared out of bounds for the troops.

With normality coming back to the region with the same speed as the Indian Army's advance and the surrender of the Portuguese, the Indian Government decided on a phased withdrawal of the armed personnel with immediate effect. By the end of December, a third of the army had been withdrawn from the Goa region. In the following months more personnel were withdrawn and only the minimum force needed was left behind.

This firm action and early withdrawal of surplus army personnel established the people's confidence in the new regime.

One of the first administrative acts of the military governor was the abolition of the obnoxious military and defence taxes. The defence tax was imposed in 1939 in all Portuguese colonies. The revenue formed part of the overseas budget of Portugal

for military defence and was administered by the Overseas Ministry. The tax was payable in Goa by those whose monthly income was over Rs. 550 and the rate varied from one per cent to three per cent; the tax yielded about Rs. 4 lakhs.

The military tax, introduced in Goa in 1932, also formed part of Portugal's military budget. It was levied on adults between the ages of 21 and 40 who could read and write Portuguese and whose monthly income was Rs. 100. The rate varied from four to seven rupees yearly. The annual collection was Rs. 70,000.

Another measure was the abolition of identity cards. The Portuguese issued cards or permits to foreigners, including Indians, who stayed in Goa. Temporary permits were issued on payment of Rs. 20 and annual permits on Rs. 50. The system was introduced in 1955. Foreigners, other than Indians, visiting Goa now have to obtain only residence permits. As a humanitarian act the military administration sanctioned Rs. 10 lakhs for repairing private and public buildings the Portuguese had destroyed. Half of this sum was allotted to private houseowners. The pensions of retired Portuguese military personnel were continued. The decision, enforced from December 1961, benefited about 300 people.

Within a week of the liberation, the taking over of the administration was completed smoothly. Mr R.C.V.P. Noronha, chief of the civil administration, soon after his arrival told Goan Government servants that their pay and posts would be secure under the new administration. He told them: "There will be no witch-hunting. We are not interested in what you did in the past; we want you to play fair in the future." This assurance had a welcome effect and Goan officials who were reporting for duty in small numbers started turning up in strength.

By December 26, the posts and telegraph services between Goa and India were restored and all restrictions on money orders from India were withdrawn. By December 23 postal, telegraph and telephone facilities between Daman and Diu and the rest of the country were established. In Daman an office providing telegraph and telephone facilities to the public was opened on December 22. This was in addition

to the wireless-telegraph link established between Daman and Bombay.

On December 28, the rail link between Goa and India was established. In the first week of January 1962, the airport at Panjim was recommissioned.

The Customs authorities threw a cordon around Goa soon after the liberation to keep the prices of necessities regulated and to prevent undesirable elements from flowing into Goa with the motive of making huge profits. A permit system was introduced.

But all was not equally satisfactory on the water front. Iron and manganese ores were piling up both at the mines and the harbour. Twenty-two ships lay at anchor waiting to lift the ore. The authorities found that the ore contracts with Japanese, German and Italian importers had been arranged in such a manner that the foreign exchange earned was credited in Lisbon. The documents had to be redrawn in favour of India before shipments could be resumed.

When the Indian Para Brigade was camping at Betim, across the ferry, on the night of December 18, the Portuguese in Panjim lit a huge bonfire outside the residence of the governor-general, where the secretariat is located, and burnt govermental documents and Portuguese currency notes. Few have an idea of the amount of the currency notes and the kinds of files destroyed.

The Portuguese are reported to have taken away liquid assets, including gold and overseas securities valued at more than Rs. 20 crores. Locking up of the vault possibly prevented the looting of the main bank in the city. Several Government offices and minor banks were looted during the interval between the retreat of the Portuguese troops and the arrival of the Indian troops in Panjim. On the day the Indian forces entered Panjim, the military governor announced the closure of the Banco Nacional Ultramarino and its branches until the Reserve Bank of India held an inquiry into its affairs. He also banned the export of gold and foreign currencies and the Portuguese escudo from Goa. Indian currency and the Portuguese Indian escudo were declared legal tender and the exchange rate was fixed at six escudos to a rupee.

During the two-day power vacuum before the Indian authorities took over, undesirable elements had removed properties of Government offices and buildings. The military governor promulgated an order stating that all stolen and illegally acquired property should be surrendered at the nearest police station before January 7, 1962, failing which those found in possession of such property would be severely dealt with. Shopkeepers had raised the prices of all articles, both luxury and necessities. The military governor issued an order to control the prices of essential commodities. Articles such as rice, wheat, bread, sugar, kerosene, diesel oil, petrol and coal were brought under the order. Simultaneously, Delhi announced the lifting of restrictions on the movement of goods to Goa, Daman and Diu from all parts of the country. Immediate arrangements were made to rush 50,000 tons of rice and 10,000 tons of sugar to meet shortages.

On December 24, a political rally in Panjim, attended by half of the 20,000 population, thanked the Government of India for its help in delivering the people from colonialism and the Indian Army for its exemplary behaviour. Earlier, the enthusiastic people took out a number of processions carrying the national flag and raising slogans such as "Bharat Mata ki Jai," "Jawaharlal Nehru ki Jai" and "Jai Hind." They carried posters declaring "Gratitude to our Prime Minister," "Chacha Nehru Zindabad" and "Bharat Sena Zindabad." A bust of Mahatma Gandhi adorned the dais from which speeches were delivered in Portuguese, English, Konkani and Marathi. Most of the speakers, who had been imprisoned by the Portuguese for political activities, recalled the enormous sacrifices the Goans had made for their freedom and how at last they had become free with the help of their Indian brethren. Mr Anthony de Souza, the first Goan to offer satyagraha in 1954, was among the speakers.

Independent Goans celebrated their first Christmas and New Year's Day with gaiety and good humour. Hundreds of houses in Panjim were decorated with the traditional white paper stars and festoons.

Goa's Patriarch, Mgr Jose Vietira de Alvernaz, who is stated to have been largely responsible for dissuading the retreating

Portuguese from wrecking property, particularly churches, held midnight mass at a cathedral in Old Goa, nearly 15 miles from Panjim. The cathedral, originally built in the 16th century, is surrounded by several other old churches and monuments. Within a few hundred yards of it stands a large dilapidated building which was at one time a convent but was recently used by the Portuguese as an armoury. If they had decided to blast that structure, as was widely feared, Old Goa's beautiful churches would have suffered irreparable damage. Though the attendance at the mass was poor, during the day hundreds of Christians travelled in Goa's brass-plated buses to kneel before the Holy Cross of the Miracles which rises from the floor to the ceiling of the cathedral. In Mapuca, across the Mandavi river, a mass was held in the court of the 17th-century local church which was badly damaged in the previous week when the Portuguese made an unsuccessful attempt to blow up a nearby bridge.

In the Altinho camp at Panjim, about 1,200 Portuguese internees celebrated Christmas. Portuguese soldiers and naval personnel, led by their officers, marched to an open area where a local priest led the mass. In his sermon the priest told the soldiers that the best way to forget the past was to dedicate themselves to the cause of peace and goodwill among men. The soldiers were given a rich Christmas lunch. Lt.-Gen. B.N. Kaul was present. The Goa Red Cross Society sent gifts of chocolates, cigarettes and other articles to the prisoners. Representatives of the International and Indian Red Gross societies had come to the camp and inspected the prisoners the previous day.

For New Year's Day, the citizens once again decorated their towns with bunting and festoons. On New Year's Eve, more than 5,000 Catholics attended a mass held at the world famous St. Francis Xavier's Church, six miles from Panjim. The large 15th-century church, where the body of St. Francis Xavier has been kept for over 400 years, was filled with devotees and hundreds of people knelt outside the church. St. Xavier is held in reverence even by the Hindus in Goa as their protector from evil, destruction, disease and suffering. The congregation, which included 100 Indian soldiers, prayed for the prosperity of Goa as part of India.

The Papal Legate, Mgr James Robert Knox, who conducted the mass, said in his sermon that Goans had been saved by St. Francis Xavier from "one of the world's worst destructions prepared for us by the Portuguese." If the Portuguese plan had been carried out, thousands of men, women and children would have been killed, he said. He prayed that St. Xavier might guide the people of Goa in their march towards prosperity. He thanked the Indian troops for taking every possible step to avoid bloodshed when they marched into Goa.

Hindu merchants held *Lakshmi puja* and *bhajans* to mark Goa's liberation. The merchants said that a Portuguese officer had told them a few days earlier that the whole of Panjim would be burnt before the Indian troops arrived.

On January 2, 1962, the military governor inaugurated the first branch of the State Bank of India in Panjim in the building of the former Banco Nacional Ultramarino, which was controlled by the Portuguese Government. More branches of the same bank were also opened later in Mapuca, Vasco da Gama and other important towns. Scores of people opened accounts and transacted other business which had come to a standstill for nearly a fortnight in the absence of banking facilities. Deposits ran into lakhs of rupees and a large amount of Portuguese money was exchanged for Indian.

The military governor dissolved on January 10, 1962, the Uniao Nacional, a wing of the political party in Portugal which swept Dr Salazar into power in 1928. Since then it has been the only political party permitted in Portugal and her overseas possessions. The president of the party, Mr Prisonia Furtado, is in Lisbon and is a member of the Portuguese National Assembly.

Goans held a number of meetings to celebrate their freedom and to express their aspirations. On January 3, leading members of the National Congress, Goa, decided to keep their organization separate from political parties in India and to confine its activities to Goa. Mr Madhav Bir, secretary of the Congress, said that the leaders had decided to work for a democratic rule in Goa and support the Government of India in its intention to keep Goa a separate administrative unit. He said that an *ad hoc* committee would study the special

problems of Goa and prepare for the annual conference of the organization. The committee consisted among others of Dr Pundalik Gaitonde, Dr Ram Hedge, Dr J. Martins, Mr Gopal Kamat, Mr P. Mulgaonkar, Dr Mayekar, Mr Shankar Desai, Mr V. Almeida, Mr Peter Alvares, Mr Anthony D'Souza and Mr Madhav Bir.

A delegation of Goans led by Mr J.M. D'Souza, president of the Goan National Union, met Mr Nehru on January 10, and submitted a memorandum appealing to him that the set-up in Goa should be on the pattern the Prime Minister announced in the Lok Sabha in April, namely, that "Goa will be integrated with India as a centrally administered area." It said the set-up of Goa should have a legislative council of 48 representatives, an executive committee (a sort of cabinet) of 11 representatives from the legislative council, one from each of the 11 *conselhos* and a chief executive elected by the council. The set-up should be headed by a chief commissioner or a lieutenant-governor.

A new party called the Provincial Congress of Goa was formed at a meeting of prominent citizens on January 8. One of the conveners, Mr Rui Gomes Pereira, an advocate, stated that the party stood for a separate State of Goa within the Indian Union, a freely elected legislature, a cabinet of ministers, elected municipalities and local bodies. The party would advocate the retention of the existing laws with modifications to remove the oppressive aspect of Portuguese rule. It would work for the cultural and emotional integration of Goa with the rest of the country and would demand the acceptance of Marathi, English and Portuguese as official languages.

During the second week of January, a conference of primary school teachers held at Panjim, demanded the abolition of Portuguese as the medium of instruction and its replacement by English and Marathi. The conference which was attended by teachers from all parts of Goa passed eight resolutions including one demanding adequate representation for primary teachers in any future assembly that might be formed in Goa. The school curricula, it demanded, should correspond to those in Marathi and English schools in other parts of the

country. Another resolution asked the authorities to ban the teaching of Portuguese history in primary schools. It also said that teachers who did not know English should be given 15 years to learn it.

At a meeting in Margao on January 28, an all-Goa political conference demanded that the present Central administration in Goa should be brought to an end at an early date. The main political resolution, adopted by the conference, asked Parliament to enact a Bill declaring Goa a separate State of the Indian Union enjoying full rights and responsibilities as any other State, with a government responsible to an elected legislature.

Goa observed the Indian Republic Day for the first time on January 26, 1962. The day was declared a public holiday. Throughout the settlements Goans sang the national anthem, fired crackers and held flag-hoisting ceremonies. At Panjim, the celebrations began with the presentation of a guard of honour to the military governor who also took the salute at a mammoth march-past by units of the Indian Army, the Special Reserve Police, the Goan police and hundreds of school children. This column of marchers was followed by heavy tanks of the 8th Cavalry, eight guns of the 17th Parachute Field Regiment, 1st Parachute Battalion, pipe band, the Sikh Light Infantry, the Kumaon Regiment, a naval contingent, Maharashtra and Mysore police contingents and school children. Eleven gaily decorated floats depicting various aspects of Goan life followed the parade.

On the eve of Republic Day, the military governor in a broadcast to the people of Goa, Daman and Diu asked them to work for the betterment of the country and to remove for ever the scars the Portuguese had left. A general amnesty was granted to all political prisoners and those against whom processes had been issued.

In the second week of February, the Chief Civil Administrator of Goa directed that no Government employee of a Government-aided organization should take part either overtly or covertly in activities of any political or communal body. Participation in such activities, said an order, would render such employees liable to disciplinary action.

During February, the administration not only reduced the military personnel in the region further but also took steps to cut down even the number of civilian officials who had followed the military during the operations to administer the region. These steps were taken partly because of Goa's quick return to normalcy.

The emergency following the military action having come to a successful conclusion, the Government of India took the next logical step—constitutionally integrating the settlements with India and providing them with a normal administrative set-up. On March 12, 1962, Prime Minister Nehru introduced two Bills in the last session of the Second Lok Sabha. The Constitution (12th Amendment) Bill includes Goa, Daman and Diu in Schedule I of the Constitution as a Union Territory. The other Bill provides for the administration of this territory. It also allots two seats in the Lok Sabha for the settlements and extends to them the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court.

The statement of objects of the Constitution Bill says: "On the acquisition of the territories of Goa, Daman and Diu with effect from December 20, 1961, these territories have by virtue of Article 1 of the Constitution, been comprised within the territory of India from that date and they are being administered as a Union Territory by the President through an administrator in accordance with Article 239 of the Constitution. It is, however, considered desirable that Goa, Daman and Diu should be specifically included as a Union Territory in Schedule I to the Constitution."

It also amends Article 240 to confer on the President the power to make regulations for the peace, progress and good government of Goa, Daman and Diu as had been done in the case of Dadra and Nagar Aveli.

The second Bill seeks to replace an ordinance promulgated by the President with effect from December 20, 1961. It also seeks to make provisions relating to the appointment of officers, the continuance of administering laws until amended or repealed, the extension of enactments in force in a State to Goa, Daman and Diu and provide for indemnity to the administrator and his officers against action taken by them in good faith.

Speaking on the Bill to amend the Constitution in the Lok Sabha on March 14, Mr Nehru said: "Although it is short and simple, it is a Bill of considerable importance, and in placing this before this House, the whole history of 400—451 to be accurate—years comes up before me, and I suppose before many members of this House, the whole history which started when Vasco da Gama landed in India in 1498.... The House will remember that repeatedly during these 450 years there have been revolts against Portuguese rule in Goa, suppressed in a rather bloody manner.... Later, the British came here and occupied India, a very large part of India. That process itself was a fairly lengthy one and the Portuguese remained in India, parts of India, under the cover of British rule, because the British authorities thought it fit to allow them to remain. They did not remain there because of their own strength but under the shadow of British rule they remained there.

"When we long, long ago started our movement for independence, obviously we thought that independence meant the independence of the whole of India, including the enclaves that were possessed at the time by the French and the Portuguese, but the enclaves were so small that our main movement for independence was directed against British rule, and we took it for granted that when British rule ceased in India, the other enclaves would also be freed. We never thought that there would be any difficulty about that. And so, when independence came, our thoughts went to these enclaves, French and Portuguese.

"We had repeated discussions with the French and it took a few years to settle this question with them. There were discussions based on our own Constitution, legal matters and the rest, but there were discussions as between two different countries. Ultimately they agreed and the physical possession of the French territories in India was made over to the Union Government.

"I said just now that there were discussions as between two Governments. We agreed with something. When we did not agree with something, we discussed them. With the Portuguese we tried to do the same thing. We appointed a special Minister

in Lisbon to discuss these matters and sent them a note, but they refused to take the note. Subsequently, we made various attempts to raise this question before them and they did not even discuss the question. Ultimately we had to withdraw our Minister in Lisbon.

"That had been the situation for the last so many years. But in India there was naturally very great frustration and disappointment at this, what shall I say, difficulty of moving onwards in regard to Goa. In Goa itself there was trouble, and though there had been numerous revolts against the Portuguese Government in the past, there was no such revolt now because conditions were different and people in India and in Goa naturally thought in terms of some kind of non-violent or peaceful approach, accustomed as they were to our own methods in achieving our independence. This was attempted unofficially by large numbers of people, and this was suppressed in a very cruel manner by the Portuguese, and many people were killed. Now, this went on, and all of us in India felt that our independence was not complete till Goa was free.

"Now, during this period, that is, since the independence of India, the Portuguese decided to declare that Goa was one of the overseas provinces of Portugal, that Goa was Portugal in fact, which was an extraordinary proposition, and certainly we could not accept it, nor could anyone else, although, unfortunately, in the course of the last few years, some countries did give some approval to that position. Now, at any rate, that is absolutely clear because the United Nations last year declared that Goa was a colony, which it was.

"Then came recent events, and among the recent events were not only those that happened in Goa but also what was happening in other Portuguese colonies like Angola. Although Angola has nothing to do with India, a great deal of feeling was roused in India—and it still exists—about Angola; first of all, about colonialism in general and, secondly, more especially, about Angola and the way the Portuguese were suppressing that movement in an extraordinarily cruel manner.

"I mention all this—although it has nothing to do with Goa—because it did affect people's minds in India very much, all our minds.

"Then, about seven months back, I ventured to state in this House, I think, that we could not rule out any other measures, any sterner measures, even military measures in regard to Goa. I gave them notice; I gave them and other countries notice. And even so, as I stated then, we hoped to settle this matter peacefully.

"There is another unfortunate aspect of this question which encouraged Portugal to hold on to Goa and to refuse to talk to us even. That was the active or passive approval by certain Powers, allies of Portugal, to the then existing position in Goa. I feel—I cannot say I feel sure—it might have been easier to settle this peacefully if those other powers had exerted their efforts to this end.

"Ultimately, and rather suddenly, if I may say so, although our minds had been prepared for all this, our hands were forced by what took place in and just outside Goa. There was, the House will remember, some firing on Indian shipping carrying on in the normal way, not entering Goa, and some actual incursions from outside the Goan territory into India proper. That made it difficult for us not to take any steps to prevent this kind of thing happening. And, we thereafter took steps and sent some military forces there. The fact is that these military forces functioned—they hardly functioned in a military manner there—and within a few hours—it may be called 24 hours or 36 hours—it depends upon the measure of time—the whole thing was over. We could not have done so if there had been any real resistance; it could not have been done so if the people of Goa themselves were opposed to it. In fact, the people of Goa welcomed the Indian forces to come there....

"We have made it clear that we want Goa to maintain its separate identity, separate individuality, call it what you will, because in the course of more than 400 years Goa had had a separate identity and the course of history had imparted it some. We have no intention of changing that or suppressing that identity. In fact, some people have advised us to make another change in the Constitution and to recognize the Konkani language as one of the official languages of India.

"There are many languages in India which we recognize for purposes of administration, education, etc. which are not men-

tioned in the Schedule about languages attached to the Constitution. But in any event, I want to make it clear that we want to give full place to the Konkani language in Goa and not to ignore it or to suppress it in any way. That is the main language of Goa. May be, there are very few persons who know the Portuguese language, a number of people know Marathi and a smaller number, probably, know Kannada. But Konkani is the principal language and we propose to give it full recognition in that matter....

"Thereafter, I place this Bill before this House. Although as I said, it is a small Bill, a simple one, it does mean the end of an epoch and the beginning of another for Goa and for India. Therefore, to some extent this Bill has something of history attached to it and I feel that for this House, which has thought so much and thought so much passionately about Goa in these many years, it is a matter of great satisfaction that this question has been settled; this anachronism, can I call it, of history, has been removed and the independence of India has become complete.

"I feel proud to be able to place this matter before this House and I must say the House will appreciate that this simple Bill ends a part of history which is not pleasant for us to remember and starts a new historical epoch in India."

In the course of his statement Mr Nehru gave the final casualty figures during the Goa operations as follows: Portuguese casualties—45 killed, 55 wounded, one missing, believed killed; Indian casualties—22 killed, 53 wounded.

Amid thunderous cheers from all sections, the Lok Sabha passed the two Bills on March 14, 1962.

Moving the same Constitution Amendment Bill in the Rajya Sabha on March 20, the Prime Minister said: "There has been a good deal of criticism of the action we took in Goa three months ago and I have seldom come across criticism which has been so misplaced, misconceived and misdirected. For my part I think that the Goan episode from the moment of our independence right up to the day when we took possession of Goa does great credit to India. I have no regrets about it. It is true that when we decided to send armed forces to Goa I did so with a great deal of reluctance, not because it was not right in my

opinion, not because it was not needed—that is why we sent it—but because we felt that this might be made an excuse by other countries and other people for military excursions even though they were not justified. People do not go into the long history, do not know all the facts; they only see a certain result. So in the case of Goa, people without taking the trouble even to find out what the position was, what had happened in the last many years, glibly criticized us. I think that many of these who criticized us have gradually come to realize that they were not certainly right in the expressions they had made. The simple fact is that in our struggle for independence we never thought of British India and Portuguese India and French India. We thought of India and we wanted to free it and if any part of it remained unfree the struggle continued and, therefore, I say that our struggle for independence did not end till Goa became a part of India; a part of India it was but what I mean to say is, till the colonial domain over Goa was ended. But that fact has not been realized by many people. We did not go out of our country to another country. We took a part of our country which was a part of India, which had been, is, and will remain part of India and the fact of colonial occupation of it did not make it less a part of India, because early in the fifties the Portguese Government passed some kind of legislation in their country making Goa a part of Portugal. This apparently led people with little knowledge of the facts to think that a part of Asia or a part of India had been transported bodily to Portugal and made a part of Portugal. It is a most extraordinarily fantastic thing that the Portuguese Government did and has been doing in regard to Goa. What is still more surprising is that people who should know better have been misled by it. I can only imagine that they were misled—they could hardly have been misled about the facts—but because of the coming in of the NATO alliance they looked with a certain amount of fright on Portugal and did not wish to displease Portugal because Portugal was one of their allies. I imagine, though I cannot be sure, that if the members of the NATO alliance had clearly explained to Portugal that this was not right, this continuation of its dominion over Goa, it would have had considerable effect.

"Instead, nothing was done and Portugal was patted on the back by great Powers who ought to have known better. Well, retribution came ultimately and there had been an amount of irritation and even anger in these other countries because this had happened here. It did happen here because if it had not happened in the way it did, it would have happened in a much more bloody way. We wanted to avoid it. We wanted to avoid taking any military action at all, but then there was no other door open for us and the situation was becoming difficult in India, not only because of Goa but because of the other development in the Portuguese colonies, namely, in Angola. Great feelings had been roused here. Although we could not help Angola, still most people thought that we should not tolerate Portuguese colonialism any longer in Goa. I need not go into the reasons for what we did, because I am sure every member of this House, as well as almost every Indian, understands them and thoroughly sympathizes with them.

"The Portuguese Government would not even talk to us about this. Not only with us. In the United Nations they laid stress on these places not being their colonies, on their being called upon to report to the United Nations, as all colonial Powers had to do. Thereafter in the United Nations they were condemned for it last year. It was made clear that they were colonies, and Portugal was called upon to report about Angola, Mozambique, Goa and other places. But so far as I know, they have ignored both the condemnation by the United Nations and the demand made by it.

"So, the position was that there was no way open internationally or otherwise for this question of Goa to be settled. The House will remember that some years ago, about seven years ago, I think, or may be more, a fairly large number of Indians went there across the border, unarmed Indians, and they were shot down by the Portuguese. Now, one interesting feature of the criticism in this debate in the world has been the quite extraordinary passion for nonviolence which other countries had shown. They have pointed out to us how we have not been completely nonviolent. It is very pleasing that they think well of nonviolence. For the first time they have given thought to it and discovered how we have been lacking in it. I hope this will

make them realize and understand what nonviolence is and that it will perhaps affect their policies somewhat, their thinking at any rate. We do not pretend, as the House knows, to be nonviolent in that sense. We do honour the idea of nonviolence. We should like to act up to it. But I doubt if any Government as at present constituted can do it. And it is not quite clear to me how the nonviolent technique, which we adopted in India in our freedom struggle, can easily be adopted against a foreign country or against foreign possessions. However, that may be a doubtful point. But the point is there was no way left open to us, as far as I can see, and the situation was getting worse when I declared, I think in this House, about six months before the Goa operation, that we did not rule out any stronger steps, military steps. I said that because my mind struggled with the idea of finding some way, and I could find no other way. But I added even then that we earnestly hoped that it would be settled completely peacefully. We tried it and we had been trying it. Even as late as November last, it was not our intention to take action quickly. It was in the air, partly because of certain developments in Angola, Goa, etc. Early in December certain events took place which, though small in themselves, excited our people greatly, because they had been worked up to a pitch of excitement. The House will remember those events, the firing on certain Indian ships carrying on their normal coastal trade. They were not even coming to Goa. They were going along. Certain events happened on the borders of Goa. I repeat that they were not of great importance. But coming as they did in that atmosphere of great irritation, they created a crisis in the minds of Indians. We immediately thought of doing something to protect our ships. It was not right that the Portuguese should sink our ships, fire on our ships, shooting down and killing our people, our fishermen, and our inability to protect them. So we thought of protecting our ships. One thing led to another.

"We could not protect them by putting some soldiers on the ships who could fire back, and the more we discussed the more we came to the conclusion that there could be no proper protection unless some other steps were taken. All this happened in December last, early in December, and in any event we thought

that if we took any steps even on the coast side, we had to be prepared for the consequences of those steps and the possibility of some kind of attack on the land side to us in a small way. In other words, we were logically compelled to take up the position that we should prepare our action both on the sea side and on land, and we sent our troops there for the purpose. I am trying to explain how we were dragged in although in theory we had no objection to it. In practice we did hesitate to take any such measure. When we decided to take some small measure, we were immediately made to feel that a small measure might be ineffective, and that would have been bad. So we had to prepare for a bigger operation. The operation itself, as the House very well knows, was remarkably successful, remarkably well done and on the whole remarkably peaceful. The casualties—they were 30 or 40 on either side, were largely due to certain Portuguese soldiers breaking the flag of truce, going against it. They showed a white flag and our people went there and they shot them down, and our people shot them down. Apart from two or three incidents like that, there was very little fighting—one or two bombs fell somewhere—and we had come to the conclusion that if we did not do this, the result would certainly be conflict; may be, large numbers of our nationals going into Goa being shot down and our being dragged into war anyhow under circumstances which would be much more liable to destruction and heavy casualties. However, there it is. I have repeated this, as I said before, because this whole course of the Goan affair has been so clear in our minds, so justified, so much something which we could not avoid in the circumstances that it has surprised me greatly that other countries should have felt or should have given expression to a feeling of grievance and annoyance at what we did. I should have imagined that that annoyance or grievance is partly due at least to their failure to take up this question and to their supporting the colonial administration of Goa, not Goa but the Portuguese colonial administration, in spite of the fact that it is known to be the worst in the world. Nevertheless they went on supporting it perhaps because Portugal was an ally of theirs in NATO.

"It was pointed out the other day that the Portuguese were the first to come to India, yet they are the last to leave. I think

we are justified in feeling a sense of satisfaction and gratification that the last trace of colonialism has disappeared from India." (Later, the Rajya Sabha adopted both the Bills.)

The Union Home Ministry announced on April 4 that all persons born or domiciled in Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Aveli, or either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents were born in those areas before December 20, 1961, would "automatically become citizens of India" retrospectively from the latter date. Persons who did not wish to acquire Indian citizenship were asked to make a written declaration that they wished to retain the citizenship or nationality they possessed before December 1961.

After a further exchange of notes between the Governments of India and Portugal, the Brazilian Government acting as intermediary, it was agreed on April 13 that the Portuguese troops interned in Goa, Daman and Diu, together with Portuguese civilian officials and their families, would be flown to Karachi in aircraft chartered by the Portuguese Government and thence repatriated to Portugal by sea. An airlift of about 4,600 military and civilian evacuees accordingly began on May 3 and was completed on May 15, by which date all had embarked in Portuguese liners at Karachi en route to Lisbon.

General Vassalo de Silva, the last Governor-General of Portuguese India, was among 2,000 Portuguese military and naval personnel who disembarked at Lisbon on May 22 from the liner *Vera Cruz*, together with the former governors of Daman and Diu. Among those on board were over 200 naval officers and ratings of the frigate *Afonso de Albuquerque*. They were welcomed by the commanding officer of the *Albuquerque*, Captain Antonio Cunha Aragon, who had previously been flown to Portugal.

The repatriation was completed on May 30 when the last 1,300 evacuees—about 1,000 troops and 300 civilians—disembarked at Lisbon form the liner *Mozambique*. General Correira Leal (chief of repatriation services) announced on the same day that there had been 50 flights from Goa, Daman and Diu to Karachi during the 13-day airlift and that 3,900 soldiers and sailors, 353 police and Republican Guards, and some 300 civilians had been repatriated. He praised the cooperation of the

Pakistani authorities in helping to take care of the repatriates at Karachi and facilitating their departure in Portuguese ships.

The Indo-Portuguese notes resulting in the repatriation agreement also contained the following assurance by the two Governments: (1) By the Government of India—that any residents of Goa, Daman, Diu and the Dadra and Nagar Aveli enclaves who were unwilling to accept Indian citizenship would be free to leave for Portgal, either during the repatriation or thereafter, with their assets and possessions, (2) by the Portuguese Government—that Indian nationals resident in the Portuguese colonies would be enabled to leave for India on the expiry of their visas, with their assets and possessions. Indian nationals in Mozambique, Macao and other Portuguese colonies who had been interned after the Goa attack were released following the repatriation agreement.

The Government of India announced on May 31 the appointment of Mr Tumkur Sivasankar, a senior Indian Civil Service official from Mysore, as Lieutenant-Governor of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. Mr Sivasankar took up the post on June 8, on which date military rule in Goa, Daman and Diu was ended.

APPENDICES

APPENDICES

I GENERAL INFORMATION

Area and Population

	Area (in square kilometres)	*Population (1960 census)*
Goa	3,611	595,569
Daman	57	23,093
Diu	37	15,922

Concelhos or Administrative Sub-Divisions

Pernem, Bardez, Sanguem, Quepem, Ponda, Satari, Salcete, Mormagao, Bicholim, Canacona and Goa.

Cidades or Cities

	Population (1960 census)
Panjim, Daman and Diu	34,634
Margao	15,257
Mapuca	8,260
Vasco da Gama	6,254

Important *Villas* or Towns

Ponda, Pernem, Vila de Chauri (Canacona), Curchorem and Quepem.

Rivers

Mandovi, Juari, Tiracol, Chapora, Baga, Talpona, Sal and Galgibaga.

Ferries

Panjim to Betim (over Mandovi), Agacaim to Cortalim (over Juari), Panjim to Aldonam (over Mandovi), and Dona Paula to Mormagoa (over Juari).

II HISTORICAL DATES

1. Occupation of Goa by Afonso de Albuquerque	1510
2. Occupation of Diu by the Portuguese	1534
3. Establishment of Inquisition in Goa	1560
4. Occupation of Daman by the Portuguese	1561
5. Naval treaty between Shivaji, the founder of Maratha Empire, and the Portuguese	1665
6. Invasion of Goa by Sambhaji, son of Shivaji	1685
7. Treaty with King Shahu	1722
8. Maratha war with the Portuguese for the conquest of Bassein	1737-1739

9.	Conquest of Ponda and Panch Mahal	1763
10.	Conquest of Cabo de Rama	1764
11.	Conquest of Bicholim	1781
12.	Conquest of Pernem	1783
13.	Proclamation of the Portuguese Republic	1910
14.	Beginning of the Salazarian dictatorship	May 28, 1926
15.	Satyagraha by Dr Ramanohar Lohia	June 18, 1946
16.	Liberation of Nagar Aveli and Dadra	August 1954
17.	Satyagraha in Goa	August 1954
18.	Decision of the International Court in favour of India about the right of passage from Daman to Dadra and Nagar Aveli	April 12, 1960
19.	Liberation of Goa and appointment of military governor	December 19, 1961
20.	Installation of civil administration and swearing-in of Lt.-Governor, Mr Tumkur Sivasankar	June 8, 1962

III SUPPORT FOR INDIA

U Nu, Prime Minister of Burma

I do not want the importance of the Goa affair to be under-estimated. It is a kind of spark that can lead to a conflagration.

Such a serious problem cannot be solved by accusing Prime Minister Nehru of being a Hitler or a dictator. Nothing can be more absurd than to call a man such, a man who told his Parliament that his Government would not be provoked by the killings into military action against Portugal and that he would try to seek the transfer of Portuguese India, the last foreign territory in the country, by peaceful means.

Portugal had no right to be in India, and Portugal's persistence in staying on even long after the British and the French had withdrawn was an amazing political phenomenon.

Not only Prime Minister Nehru but also those Asians who had a bitter taste of colonialism will not be able to tolerate colonialism, whether it is by Portugal or by any other country.

What is needed at present is a concerted effort on the part of all peace-lovers to bring the Portuguese and Indian representatives together to find a peaceful solution of the Goa problem.

S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon

I do not consider Goa as a part of the territory of Portugal. I do consider it as a colony....

Dr Sukarno, President of Indonesia

Our relations should be strengthened with all peoples that are trying to overthrow imperialism and we must render moral support to all people's movements in Morocco, Malaya, Goa and other regions longing to be independent.

Dr Mohammed Hatta, Vice-President of Indonesia

Macao and Goa are remnants of colonialism and Indonesia is against any form of colonialism.

MR N.A. BULGANIN, SOVIET PREMIER

The peoples of Asia are now living through the turning point in their histories. Through many decades and even centuries they were living under the rule of foreigners and fighting for their freedom and national existence.

But now colonial regimes were collapsing and slipping down into an unreturnable past. Certain European countries even now did not understand that time is past and there is no return to the old colonialism.

Fighting for the preservation of durable and lasting peace is the task now facing the peoples of Asia and India.

There is no justification for the existence of colonial pockets like Goa.... This is a shame on civilized people.

MR N.S. KHRUSHCHEV, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY

The people of India have liberated themselves from age-old colonialism and have started on the road of self-development....We are specially glad that the peoples of Asia have solidarity—the peoples of Asia who rose for a decisive attack against world colonialism and have great achievements to their credit.... Other peoples of Asia are also trying to free themselves from colonialism. They are using their own path of development without interference of other States into their home affairs.

But there are some countries yet which like insects stick to the human body and are sucking its blood. And I have in mind Portugal, the country which does not want to leave Goa, the rightful territory of India, to its destiny. I am convinced that Goa will be liberated from foreign domination and it will enter the great Republic of India as its integral part.

MR AHMED SHOUCAIRI, SYRIA'S CHIEF DELEGATE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

It is sometimes declared by U.S. statesmen that they are anti-colonial. I cannot see how this statement is consistent with the attitude taken by Mr Dulles regarding Goa when he said that Goa is an integral part of Portugal. This statement on the part of the U.S. reveals further that they not only support French and British imperialism but they go as far as to support Portuguese imperialism too.

It is true that the U.S. has no colony of its own, but by supporting colonialism everywhere in the world it takes it for granted that the whole globe is its colony. To my mind this is the worst type of colonialism. Goa is an integral part of India and centuries of colonialism do not vitiate this reality.

DR PETER VOUTOV, BULGARIAN MINISTER IN INDIA

The Portuguese imperialists, who have been holding in slavery a part of India for 400 years, should learn from history and understand that their days as colonizers are ending. Irrespective of how many years they have ruled over Goa, they have to go....Right is on the side of India and the Indian people in Goa. They will undoubtedly win. The Bulgarian people strongly hate enslavers and colonizers and therefore they support openly the right of India to free Goa.

WUNNA KYAWHTIN U THWIN, AFPFL MEMBER OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, BURMA

The House vigorously condemns the imperialistic systems whereby in Morocco and Algeria people struggling for freedom from many years of bondage were mercilessly mown down with bombs, artillery and guns and in Goa where people's nonviolent struggles for liberty are cruelly and illegally suppressed and extend its support to these oppressed peoples.

...Goans are Indians, but some 500 years ago, Portugal occupied their territory of 600,000 population and converted them into Roman Catholics. When India which could have resorted to armed forces in pressing its claims instead permitted only nonviolent demonstrations, the Portuguese have arrested about 500 of these demonstrators and are hoodwinking the world of their innocence. As the Hon'ble Prime Minister recently said in an agency report, the Portuguese have no right to be in Goa. Freedom is the birthright of a nation and imperialism has its best places now in the graveyard.

MR ANTHONY WEDGWOOD BENN, M.P., MR REGINALD SORENSEN, M.P., AND MR FENNER BROCKWAY, M.P.

Britain has been an ally of Portugal since the 14th century. Britain is associated with India in the Commonwealth. Our Government are, therefore, in a very favourable position to bring about a settlement of the conflict of Goa.

There is good precedent. In the eighteen-twenties, on the initiative of Foreign Secretary Canning, Sir Charles Stuart negotiated a treaty of Portuguese-Brazilian friendship which recognized the independence of Brazil. It would be a happy sequence if the British Government contributed to peace in the East today as beneficially as 130 years ago they contributed to peace in the West.

A settlement should be possible. Mr Nehru has proposed that Goans should decide their own future presumably by the method of a plebiscite. Cannot the British Government open discussions with Portugal and India so that a democratic solution can be found by peaceful means?

MR KENNETH YOUNGER, M.P.

Portugal by its policy in Goa was harming the Western cause in Asia.

It was top priority for all Western Powers who had colonial responsibilities to put their colonial houses in order.

I think we ought to say to our Portuguese allies quite frankly that by their policy in Goa they are doing more damage to the Western cause in Asia than could be made by the contribution they are making to the North Atlantic Treaty.

SENATOR HUBERT HUMPHREY

The National Lutheran Council resolution declares quite correctly, Mr President, that peoples overseas have interpreted recent official American statements and acts as suggesting a change in our traditional anti-colonial attitudes. There is no question that one well-known case in point was the Secretary of State's unfortunate comment on Goa, issued in a joint communique with the Portuguese Foreign Minister on December 2, 1955.

I would not raise the Goa question again, except for two facts. The first is that yesterday we had ample proof that the resentment over the Secretary of State's Goa position is still a burning question in India. The President of India took the high State occasion of the opening of the Indian Parliament to protest against Mr Dulles' behaviour once more. He did it in specific, direct and personal terms....

The second reason I mention the Goa controversy again is a more curious one. While Mr Dulles' Goa remarks continue to be important enough for Presidential comment in India, there is apparently little understanding of the significance of this issue among some of us here.

SENATOR RALPH E. FLANDERS, REPUBLICAN MEMBER OF THE U.S. SENATE

Neither Congress nor the American people will allow themselves to support actively the continuance of colonies of which the present situation in Goa is an example.

MARSHAL JOSIP BROZ TITO, PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA[1]

I consider it absolutely absurd that such a great progressive country (India) should have to wait and tolerate that small portions of its territory remain separated. Here, concretely, I mean that small portion upon which Portugal still keeps its hand.

OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN OF YUGOSLAV FOREIGN OFFICE[2]

We have no doubt at all that the territory of Goa is an integral part of Indian territory, and that consequently, the demands of the Government of India are justified and natural. More so because the Government of India is making these demands in a constructive and peaceful way.

MR CHOU EN-LAI, PRIME MINISTER OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA[3]

In the past year, the Republic of India, as one of the world's big Powers, has made important contributions to the peace of Asia and the world. The Asian-African Conference held as a result of the initiative of India and the other Colombo Powers, has greatly advanced the Asian and African peoples' common cause of opposing colonialism, safeguarding world peace and strengthening their mutual cooperation.

...The Chinese Government and people fully support India's legitimate demand to recover Goa, an inalienable part of India's territory. These demands of China and India are all just, and the just demands of millions of people are bound to come true.

RAJA GHAZANFAR ALI KHAN, HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR PAKISTAN IN INDIA[4]

Goa would have to join India ultimately and the people of the colony would have to be given the right to decide their future.

IV FREEDOM FOR DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

As early as 1941, the Atlantic Charter expressed international concern for the well-being "of all men of all lands." The joint declaration stated, on behalf of the United Kingdom and the U.S.A., that they "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live," and that "they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." Though the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of October 1944, which sketched the plan for the future international organization, made no mention of the treatment of the peoples of the colonies, it was at Yalta that agreement was reached to undertake discussions on the machinery and principles of trusteeship. Consequently, the first terms of reference for the consideration of the members of the United Nations were contained in the memorandum on the Organization of the U.N. Conference on International Organization at San Francisco. These terms envisaged a committee "to prepare and recommend... as necessary, draft provisions on principles and mechanisms of a system of international trusteeship for such dependent territories as may by subsequent agree-

[1]In an interview at Cochin (South India) on January 25, 1955.
[2]At the weekly Press conference on July 29, 1955.
[3]At the Indian Republic Day Reception in Peking on January 26, 1956.
[4]Speaking at Jullundur on December 19, 1955.

ment be placed thereunder." At a later stage the term "non-self-governing territories" replaced the term "dependent territories."[1]

The question of non-self-governing territories was a subject of animated discussion at session after session of the General Assembly of the U.N. The discussions clearly revealed the necessity for defining "self-government" or "non-self-governing territories." In November 1951, the Special Committee had prepared a list of factors which it said could not be regarded as exhaustive. The Committee's report emphasized that:

> The will of the people of the territory concerned, appropriately and freely expressed, would in all cases be the paramount factor in deciding whether a relationship between the administering authority and a non-self-governing territory has evolved to a stage whether that territory could be said to have "attained a full measure of self-government."

In the session of 1951 and again in subsequent sessions discussion on a list of factors which should be taken into account in deciding whether a territory has or has not attained a full measure of self-government continued. In a resolution in 1952 the Assembly invited the Special Committee on Information to examine "the factors which would be taken into account in deciding whether any territory is or is not a territory whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government." Finally, in 1953 the General Assembly approved such a list as drafted and adopted by the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.

The Factors Resolution

The "Factors Resolution," as it has come to be known, lays down: (*a*) Factors indicative of the attainment of independence; (*b*) Factors indicative of other separate systems of self-government; and finally (*c*) Factors indicative of the free association of a territory on equal basis with the metropolitan or another country as an integral part of that country or in any other form. Goa according to the Government of Prof. Salazar is an *integral part* of Portugal. It would be useful, therefore, to read in detail the considerations laid down in the third part of the "Factors Resolution":

A. *General*:

(1) OPINION OF THE POPULATION. The opinion of the population of the territory, freely expressed by informed and democratic processes, as to the status or change in status which they desire.

(2) FREEDOM OF CHOICE. The freedom of the population of a Non-Self-Governing Territory which has associated itself with the metropolitan country as an integral part of that country or in any other form to modify this status through the expression of their will by democratic means.

(3) GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS. Extent to which the relations of the territory with the capital of the central government may be affected by circumstances arising out of their respective geographical positions, such as, separation by land, sea or other natural obstacles. The right of the metropolitan country or the territory to change the political status of that territory in the light of the consideration whether that territory is or is not subject to any claim or litigation on the part of another State.

(4) ETHNIC AND CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS. Extent to which the population are of different race, language or religion or have a distinct cultural heritage,

[1]Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India Publication, *Goa and the Charter of the United Nations*, p. 21.

nterests or aspirations, distinguishing them from the peoples of the country with which they freely associate themselves.

(5) POLITICAL ADVANCEMENT. Political advancement of the population sufficient to enable them to decide upon the future destiny of the territory with due knowledge.

(6) CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS. Association by virtue of a treaty or bilateral agreement affecting the status of the territory, taking into account (*i*) whether the constitutional guarantees extend equally to the associated territory, (*ii*) whether there are powers in certain matters constitutionally reserved to the territory or to the central authority, and (*iii*) whether there is provision for the participation of the territory on a basis of equality in any changes in the constitutional systems of the State.

B. *Status*:

(1) LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION. Representation without discrimination in the central legislative organs on the same basis as other inhabitants and regions.

(2) PARTICIPATION OF THE POPULATION. Effective participation of the population in the government of the territory: (*a*) Is there an adequate and appropriate electoral and representative system? (*b*) Is this electoral system conducted without direct or indirect interference from a foreign government?[1]

(3) CITIZENSHIP. Citizenship without discrimination on the same basis as other inhabitants.

(4) GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. Eligibility of officials from the territory to all public offices of the central authority, by appointment or election, on the same basis as those from other parts of the country.

C. *Internal Constitutional Conditions*:

(1) SUFFRAGE. Universal and equal suffrage and free periodic elections, characterized by an absence of undue influence over and coercion of the voter or of the imposition of disabilities on particular political parties?[2]

[1]For example, the following questions would be relevant: (*i*) Has each adult inhabitant equal power (subject to special safeguards for minorities) to determine the character of the government of the territory? (*ii*) Is this power exercised freely, *i.e.* is there an absence of undue influence over and coercion of the voter and of the imposition of disabilities on particular political parties? Some tests which can be used in the application of this factor are as follows: (*a*) The existence of effective measures to ensure the democratic expression of the will of the people; (*b*) the existence of more than one political party in the territory; (*c*) the existence of a secret ballot; (*d*) the existence of legal prohibitions on the exercise of undemocratic practices in the course of election; (*e*) the existence for the individual elector of a choice between candidates of differing political parties; (*f*) the absence of "martial law" and similar measures at election times. (*iii*) Is each individual free to express his political opinions, to support or oppose any political party or cause, and to criticize the government of the day?

[2]For example, the following tests would be relevant: (*a*) The existence of effective measures to ensure the democratic expression of the will of the people; (*b*) the existence of more than one political party in the territory; (*c*) the existence of a secret ballot; (*d*) the existence of legal prohibitions on the exercise of undemocratic practices in the course of elections; (*e*) the existence for the individual elector of a choice between candidates of differing political parties; (*f*) the absence of "martial law" and similar measures at election times; (*g*) freedom of each individual to express his political opinions, to support or oppose any political party or cause, and to criticize the government of the day.

(2) LOCAL RIGHTS AND STATUS. In a unitary system equal rights and status for the inhabitants and local bodies of the territory as enjoyed by inhabitants and local bodies of other parts of the country; in a federal system an identical degree of self-government for the inhabitants and local bodies of all parts of the federation.

(3) LOCAL OFFICIALS. Appointment or election of officials in the territory on the same basis as those in other parts of the country.

(4) INTERNAL LEGISLATION. Local self-government of the same scope and under the same conditions as enjoyed by other parts of the country.

(5) ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL JURISDICTION. Degree of autonomy in respect of economic, social and cultural affairs, as illustrated by the degree of freedom from economic pressure as exercised, for example, by a foreign Power, has acquired a privileged economic status prejudicial to the general economic interest of the people of the territory; and by the degree of freedom and lack of discrimination against the indigenous population of the territory in social regislation and social development.

Goa and the Factors

In the light of these details and the earlier analysis of the administrative structure and other conditions obtaining in Goa, comment is redundant. Not only were there no democratic processes or fundamental freedoms in the colony of Goa, but in such matters as representation in the central legislative organs, participation of the population in the administrative systems and in regard to local rights and status, etc. there was decided discrimination against the people of Goa. In every respect, therefore, the *colonial* and dependent character of Goa in relation to Portugal continues to be perpetuated. Yet in reply to repeated questions addressed to Portugal by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and what does really evoke scorn and laughter, Portugal has in apparent simplicity replied to the effect that she "does not administer territories which fall under the category indicated by Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations." The Portuguese delegate to the United Nations has maintained that Portugal had no colonies or non-self-governing territories, that "the constitutional status of the overseas provinces is absolutely equal to the status of the European provinces; no overseas territory is no more and no less in its status than any other territory." He added in reply to the Secretary-General's communication that his Government had "merely observed the provisions of the Constitution of the Portuguese nation."

The Portuguese delegate went on to refer to "security and constitutional mitations" mentioned in Article 73 and said:

> It means that Article 73, no matter what situation may exist and no matter where the territories may be located, even if they are Non-Self-Governing, which is not our case, does not apply to them when constitutional provisions prevent such an application. We hold the view that Article 73 has, therefore, envisaged that national constitutions may have or may raise the limitations referred to in the Article and, as consequence, one is bound to agree that those States notwithstanding the existence of population or territories not fully developed, have reason not to transmit any information under Article 73. This is exactly our position....

A Travesty of Truth

This statement indeed shame-facedly underlines the utter travesty of truth which the Government of Prof. Salazar have been led into in seeking to support their false and untenable position in relation to the colonies. The fact that the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands whose cases were not unlike that of Portugal had agreed to transmit to the United Nations information relevant to Article 73 of the Charter highlight Portugal's brazenness. It must be remembered that the Portuguese colonies as any other colonial territories came to them as the result

of colonia conquests. There is no justification for discriminating between the aspirations and rights of one colonial people and another. In its aspiration for freedom and independence all humanity is one and equal. If the former colonies of the United Kingdom or the United States have become independent, on what ground, could it be argued, that Goa, Angola or Mozambique or any other dependent territory must not aspire to the destiny of Ghana or Nigeria and must remain content only with being integral parts of the so-called metropolitan country? Only in freedom will mankind be united for peace and prosperity, for freedom is basic to human nature and common to all humanity.

V ARTICLE 73 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories

MEMBERS of the United Nations which have or assumed responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and to this end:

(*a*) To ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;
(*b*) To develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;
(*c*) To further international peace and security;
(*d*) To promote constructive measures of development to encourage research, and cooperate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and
(*e*) To transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

VI CHRISTIANITY AND GOA

AMERICA (*Jesuit National Catholic Weekly, U.S.*)

According to Dr Cunha, the inflexible anti-colonialist renders a disservice to the West because he aids the Communist agitator, who "wishes nothing better than to remove from the arms of the Western nations territories and populations which are indispensable to our survival"; in other words, Dr Cunha would appear to make the peoples of Asia and Africa mere cold war pawns in the hands of the Western Powers.

No matter how much our political figures talk of the Christian foundations of our civilization, it is a sad fact that the Western Powers have failed to exert Christian influence throughout Asia. Perhaps only the inflexible anti-colonialist is able to read the sign of the times. (*Christmas Number*, 1955)

J.G. STRAKE[1]

There is the suggestion that Goa is one of the strongest outposts of Catholic life in Asia. But if Goa raised the essential issue of Catholicism one would have expected the Vatican to support the religious issue here; however, recently the Vatican newspaper, *Osservatore Romano*, declared that the question of Goa "is not in itself a religious question but remains acutely a political problem."... India has made repeated promises in this connection to protect the sanctity of Catholic worship.

BUND (*Berne, Switzerland*)

Portugal has, from the start, repeatedly turned down all suggestions for a discussion for an amicable settlement,on the pretext that the Portuguese colonies in India are an integral part of Portugal and, therefore, there could be no question of even a discussion as to their future. Any defensive modification of the Constitution of Portugal, to support such a plea, cannot be accepted or appreciated by anyone in India. To change the label of Goa from a "colony," which it undoubtedly is, to the "overseas province" of a country 10,000 kilometres away in Europe cannot settle the question. We are living in the second half of the 20th century, and not the 16th century any longer....

It is also alleged that the Portuguese withdrawal from Goa would be a grievous blow to the Christian Church in Asia. There were Christians in South India 1,400 years before the first Portuguese set foot on Indian soil. Today there are six million Christians (of whom some four million are Catholics) in India, who, under India's secular Constitution, enjoy absolute and unrestricted freedom, not only to profess but also to propagate their faith. Christianity is, therefore, one of the major religions in India, on completely equal terms with other religions. If six million Christians are safe in secular India today, they will be safe without Goa tomorrow, where only 40 per cent of the population is Christian. The happenings in Goa do not in any manner add to the prestige of Christianity in India....

It has been suggested that the people of Goa have been so happy under Portuguese rule that there never has been any desire for a change. According to the Portuguese official records, there have been insurrections or rebellions against the Portuguese in Goa in 1775, 1780, 1821, 1823, 1824, 1832, 1869, 1871, 1895 and 1912. In recent years, the Portuguese have employed the most ruthless means to suppress the nationalist movement in Goa.

The Portuguese want the world to believe that the Goans do not want freedom, because they are already free under Portuguese rule. We have seen above what degree of freedom the Goans enjoy. Europe knows the sort of democracy Portugal stands for herself in Europe. In Asia, we have heard this argument before. In this country, where the people know what democracy should be, this could not be logic. (August 15, 1954)

DE TIJID (*The Netherlands*)

Goa has a large number of Catholics, not less than 36 per cent. The preponderant Catholic Portugal thinks that the interests of the Goan Catholics can be taken at heart better under Portuguese rule than under the Indians.

New Delhi answered this view with a statement by the Archbishop of Bombay, Valerian Cardinal Gracias, himself originally a Goan. This Indian Cardinal has

[1]On Australian Broadcasting Commission on August 15, 1956.

said expressly that when Goa would be included in the Indian Union there would be no fear of any discrimination with regard to the Catholic inhabitants of the area.

Apart from that, Portugal is moving in a dangerous domain when she introduces religion in the Goa question. The *Osservatore Romano* recently warned that the Goa problem should not be seen as a religious question, and after the interview of Nehru with the Holy Father recently the Indian Premier declared that the Pope had recognized that Goa was a political question and no religious problem. (August 16, 1955)

EL DIA (*Argentine*)

Portugal invokes the Catholic religion of its colonists but in India there is full religious tolerance.... For centuries residence in a place does not mean that one has rights of domination.... If the criterion is *status quo*, Brazil, which was Portugal's richest colony, should still remain Portuguese. (August 8, 1955)

L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO (*The Vatican*)[1]

The Government of India, for its part, has officially and solemnly given the assurance that if the territory of Goa were to come to India the religious liberties and all the rights of the Catholics would be respected in all their entirety and safeguarded.

Therefore, contrary to the assertions of some people, the Goa question is not in itself a religious question. The political question remains, tense and acute.

It is known that the Holy See does not intend to intervene in purely political problems. On questions of that kind it is and wants to remain neutral and impartial. But, at the same time, the Holy See, true to its high spiritual and pacifying mission, cannot but wish and urge strongly that there should be no recourse to force.

WILLAIM WINTER[2]

The problem of Goa is not in itself a religious problem. It is the political problem that remains a serious and an important problem.

THE NEW YORK TIMES (*U.S.*)

In our judgment the Portuguese have been at fault in obdurately refusing even to discuss the question....Prime Minister Nehru has repeatedly assured that the religious significance of Goa would be fully respected under Indian sovereignty. (August 22, 1955)

UNION GAZETTE (*Rangoon, Burma*)

The attitude of the Portuguese Government is causing much headache to many nations. The myth of religion had already been exploded, and even the Pope had been clear enough on the subject after his talks with the Indian Prime Minister, Mr Jawaharlal Nehru. (August 9, 1955)

[1]French Edition (August 5, 1955).
[2]Broadcast from San Francisco (August 11, 1955).

VII N.A.T.O. AND GOA

WALTER REUTHER, VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOUR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

With over-emphasis on military preparedness moulding certain of our policies in Asia, the true image of America has become clouded in the world. Take the current case of India's rightful demand that Portugal withdraw from Goa as the British and French have already relinquished their colonial pockets in your country. All Americans can readily understand the rightness of your cause because the entire American national tradition begins with our own revolution against colonialism. I want to say as unmistakably as I know how that the American people are with you in your support of the Goa freedom movement. It is our failure to keep military considerations in their proper perspective which makes it necessary for me to stress this clarification. The United States and Portugal both belong to the system of defence cooperation against aggression which has been fashioned in Europe. The American people overwhelmingly support this defence system but I am sure they do not want their Secretary of State to permit this relationship with Portugal in Europe to distort American policy in Asia. Many Americans have been urging Secretary Dulles to place the United States on India's side against Portuguese intransigence in Goa so that the heart of America and the policy of the American Government will be in unison.[1]

THE OBSERVER (*London*)

Indulgence in a mixture of resentment and sentimentality endangers major British and Western good faith in renouncing colonialism. Already Goa has become a master weapon of Communist propaganda in India.... It is no use blaming Mr Nehru's indecisive handling of such demagogy. The propaganda will continue with increasingly dangerous effects until the Western Powers publicly reject Portugal's claim that Goa is covered by NATO and tell her that her refusal of self-determination to Goans is untenable in the 20th century. (August 21, 1955)

PEDOMAN (*Indonesia*)

Britain, Portugal and France, all members of the NATO, and colonialists in Asia and Africa should understand that the process of rolling up of colonialism is only a matter of time. It should therefore be regretted that blood should have been shed in Goa and Morocco. (September 7, 1955)

SENTINEL OF GRAND JUNCTION (*Colorado, U.S.*)

Without going into the historical and political aspects of this situation, it is easy to imagine how different the attitude of these anti-Indian Americans would be, had India agreed to become one of our military allies and permitted us to have bases on her soil.

WASHINGTON POST (*U.S.*)

The argument (that Goa is covered by NATO) is spurious at the start. Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty states specifically that "an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the occupation forces of any party in Europe , on the islands under the jurisdiction of any party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the parties."

[1] *News from Indonesia* (September 7, 1955).

There is no mention of Goa; and the Senate report on the treaty states explicitly that it does not cover any outlying territories other than those named. This is one dispute that the NATO powers ought emphatically to steer clear of other than to use their good offices to place it before the United Nations. (August 27, 1955)

VIII REACTIONS TO DULLES-CUNHA STATEMENT

MR ADLAI STEVENSON, LEADING U.S. DEMOCRAT

Mr Dulles' reference to Goa as a Portuguese province was "unfortunate."[1]

AL BILAD (*Iraq*)

Mr Dulles' declarations are unbelievable. They are the best example, in fact a classical example, of what we in Iraq mean when we say "he came to paint eyes but blinded the man." As Americans say, if Mr Dulles put his foot in his mouth in the joint statement, we say he put his second foot and his arms in his mouth also....On what basis does Mr Dulles want the people of Goa to remain content and chained when his ancestors refused to be yoked with these very chains and which they destroyed with fire and sword and became independent? (December 15, 1955)

BURMA STAR (*Rangoon*)

The recent statement made by Mr Dulles to the effect that Goa is a Portuguese territory has taken away much of the esteem we had entertained for past American courage against colonialism. The ancestors of Mr Dulles when they fought against British colonialism and won their freedom did not think as he does. If they did, perhaps U.S.A. would be what Goa is today. What we are concerned about is the deplorable attitude taken by Western Powers. (December 26, 1955)

CEYLON DAILY NEWS (*Colombo*)

What is curious is that the Secretary of State of a country which lays claim to leadership of the free peoples of the world should have underwritten this fraudulent title of one of the most archaic and reactionary of imperialisms. When Mr Dulles implicitly endorsed Premier Salazar's claim to the so-called "Portuguese provinces in the Far East," did it occur to him that by the same doctrine his own country should still be a British colony?... There has been no more glaring example of the denseness and short-sightedness of American diplomacy, particularly in relation to the East, than Mr Dulles' statement. (October 7, 1955)

DEMOCRACIA (*Argentina*)

That reference to Goa as a Portuguese province—what a distant province, Oh God—fell like a veritable bomb in South-East Asia jeopardizing North American prestige....Will Portugal decide to maintain by force of arms these two territories usurped some centuries ago? We think not....(December 19, 1955)

HARTFORD COURANT (*U.S.*)

Mr Dulles' statement has undermined the excellent work done in India by our Ambassador, former Republican Senator John Sherman Cooper....Had he tried, Mr Dulles could not have given Asians a more effective proof of the Soviet charge

[1]Said in Chicago on January 8, 1956.

that we are on the side of colonialism. This incident scores a major loss for us in the new war of smiles. New countries outside the iron curtain are by no means a permanent part of the Western system. We had better see that they become such if we want the free way of life to survive. (December 6, 1955)

KUANG HUA DAILY (*Bangkok, Thailand*)

The Dulles statement giving open support to the Portuguese possession of Goa will lead to unparalleled resentment among Afro-Asian nations. It will be interpreted as more evidence that the U.S.A. always opposes Afro-Asians. Although Mr Dulles has gained the friendship of eight million Portuguese he has lost the sympathy of 350 million Indian people. When the matter is considered in its proper perspective it must be admitted the loss is too big. (December 12, 1955)

KWANGMING DAILY (*China*)

It is an insult and provocation not only to the Indian and Chinese peoples but to all Asian and African countries who are against colonialism. (December 12, 1955)

LE PEUPLE (*Belgium*)

First, Christianity has nothing to gain in being coupled up with the conceptions of Albuquerque's time. Secondly, the free world's links with Salazarism are nearly as loose as with Francoism and the Portuguese presence at Goa, which can hardly be shown as a symbol of progress. The attitude of the Portuguese is that of a bad sport. Since India, because of her principles, will not use force the Portuguese will use it to maintain themselves. If, therefore, there remains no problem for Portugal nor for the people isolated by censorship there remains one for NATO countries, who do not want to have their reputation sullied by Portuguese conceptions which in morals are undefendable. (December 1, 1955)

NANYANG SIANG PAU (*Singapore*)

On account of her unexpected statement on Goa, America has not only lost the friendship of India but she has also lost the sympathy of Asians and Africans. American victory in wealth and power has not concealed her political failure. (December 8, 1955)

NATION (*New York, U.S.*)

Mr Dulles affirms we still do not take any position on colonialism in Goa. Whether Goa is technically a province, it is actually a colony. And we as a nation can no more be neutral toward the tyranny or colonialism of Portugal than we can be neutral in the face of the tyranny or neo-colonialism of the Soviets. That the Russian leaders touring Asia denounced Portugal for retaining Goa is surely no reason for Americans even to imply support for Portugal's presence in Goa. (December 17, 1955)

NEW TIMES OF BURMA (*Rangoon*)

A great blow has been delivered to the United States prestige by the signature of the Dulles-Cunha joint statement, which in effect told the world that the United States Government recognized nothing else but Portuguese claims over the Indian territory of Goa.... Mr Dulles has done a disservice to the United States and the cause of democracy that all the spies and subversive agents that the Kremlin has sent into free Asia failed to achieve. In a single stroke he has succeeded in alienating *en bloc* public opinion in this region at a time when the United States diplomacy should have been on its toes indeed.

The assertion that American recognition of Portuguese imperialism was necessary to prevent an armed conflagration is much too ridiculous to be taken seriously. India has refrained from undertaking a violent solution to the problem in the face of so many provocations from the Portuguese. Mr Dulles should have known better than anyone else that the Indian Government is pledged to solve all outstanding disputes through peaceful negotiations....It would be a pity indeed if the United States of America were to go on record as favouring colonialism in this enlightened age. Unfortunately, that is the impression created by Dulles' indiscretion. (December 12, 1955)

NEW YORK POST (*New York, U.S.*)

Of all the blunders and failures of the Dulles regime, our debacle in India may be remembered as the dreariest. The deterioration in United States relations with India was not overnight, it began when the President delivered his misguided—and wholly rhetorical—pledge to "unleash Chiang Kai-shek."

It was intensified by Mr Dulles' negative and churlish attitude toward the Bandung Conference and by other signs of his inability to recognize the depth and intensity of the anti-colonial feeling in Asia.The final folly was the recent statement Mr Dulles issued joinly with Portugal on Goa....

If our anti-colonial proclamations mean anything we should have long ago identified ourselves with India's stand. Instead, we not only let the Communists—master colonialists of all—take the issue away from us but appeared to rebuke them for supporting India's position....(December 11, 1955)

PEOPLE'S DAILY (*China*)

The United States' open support to Portuguese occupation of Goa is an open intervention in the sovereignty of India....Everyone knows Goa is an inseparable territory of India. Not till the beginning of the 16th century did Portugal occupy Goa. For more than 400 years patriots of Goa have carried on a ceaseless struggle against foreign colonial rule. Since the independence of India, the Indian people have been resolutely demanding an end of Portuguese rule in Goa and its return to the fatherland. This demand of the Indian people is completely righteous. (December 7, 1955)

TIMES OF INDONESIA (*Indonesia*)

For Mr Dulles to put the seal of approval of the United States on Portuguese colonialism in India is to line up with the Portuguese against the Afro-Asian nations with all that it means in terms of resentment against the United States and debunking of its grandiose claims that it desires the freedom of colonial people. And how convincingly Mr Dulles has backed up Russian statements that the United States is an imperialist nation allied to other imperialistic nations! (December 12, 1955)

MARQUIS CHILDS[1]

Goa is a symbol of oppression not only for India but for almost every Asian country and the unfortunate reference by the Secretary of State Mr Dulles to "the province" of Goa and American solidarity with Portugal has raised in actual form the old, deeply troubling issue of the imperialism of white supremacy, the ghost of colonialism that is a fighting word east of Suez.

THE VOICE OF ETHIOPIA (*Addis Ababa*)

Inasmuch as liberty and peace are inter-dependable, so are freedom and self-

[1] *In Washington Post* (January 7, 1956).

determination. It was with amazement that we read the speech of Dr Cunha, Portuguese Foreign Minister, printed in the last issue of this paper.

Dr Cunha, in an uncultured and illiberal speech, has stated that the Western man, by acting as an inflexible anti-colonialist, is paving the way for his deadly enemy, the Communist. We can think of nothing more egoistical and of nothing more insulting to the Africans and Asians, generally non-whites.

Dr Cunha declared that one of the last parts of the survival of the West was Goa. We take pleasure in congratulating the Portuguese Foreign Minister in speaking the truth. Yes. Goa remains the harbour of colonial domination.

To Dr Cunha, we would like to say that the non-whites are quite able to guard their liberty and independence. Some of us have managed to do that, and those Africans and Asians who will manage to get out from the clutches of colonial domination will see to it that they never fall under the yoke again.

In conclusion, we would like again to tell the Portuguese Foreign Minister that we agree that Goa is one of the last parts of the survival of the West. Indeed it is one of the very last remnants of colonial domination in the community of free African and Asian countries. Dr Cunha and his associates should give the Goans their right of self-determination and then only, could they speak of independence and liberty, for freedom and self-determination are inter-dependable, just as much as are liberty and peace. (March 8, 1956)

IX LISBON'S COMPLAINT IN U.N. COUNCIL

THE Security Council refused to go to the aid of Portugal in its efforts to prevent Indian action in Goa.[1]

The effort of Portugal's NATO allies to pass a resolution that would have called upon India to cease-fire in Goa and return to previous positions failed in view of the Soviet veto and the support of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic in the Council.

The Council adjourned indefinitely after failing to adopt the Western draft.

The U.S. and three other nations had proposed last night that the U.N. Security Council call for an immediate withdrawal of Indian forces from Goa and the two other Portuguese enclaves.

They did so in a resolution which "deplored" the use of force by India and called for an immediate cessation of hostilities. The resolution also urged a solution of Indian-Portuguese differences by peaceful means.

Britain, France and Turkey joined the U.S. in sponsoring the resolution.

The Russian delegate expressed support for the Indian move and declared that the Council apply sanctions against Portugal, unless it changed its colonial policies.

The Council met at the request of Portugal which alleged aggression by India.

At the outset, Mr Valerian Zorin (Russia) objected to the adoption of the proposed agenda in the form of Portugal's charge of aggression.

Mr Omar Loutfi (UAR) said the adoption of the agenda, in the UAR's view, in no way meant that Cairo agreed with the contents of Senhor Garin's letter.

The agenda was adopted by seven votes to two with two abstentions. Ceylon joined the Soviet Union in voting against the formulation. Liberia and the UAR abstained. The remainder of the members voted in favour.

Senhor Garin (Portugal) and Mr C.S. Jha (India) then were invited to the Council table to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

Senhor Garin opened the debate by referring to the "brutal aggression" of the Indian Union against the "Portuguese State of India."

He reviewed the background to the Indian intervention, including the statement by Mr Nehru that the time might come when India would have to go into Goa.

[1]A brief account of the debate on Lisbon's complaint against India in the Security Council on December 19, 1961.

The conscience of mankind had been shocked, Senhor Garin said, and world public opinion expected the Council immediately to "denounce this lawless act of the Indian Government."

The Portuguese delegate told members of the Council that the eyes of the world were upon them, "waiting for you to take the obvious course of condemning the Indian Union."

Mr Jha replied that Portugal's viewpoint was that of a colonial Power 400 years ago.

The Indian delegate asked who gave Portugal "sovereign rights" in India which Portugal claimed; certainly not the Indian people. Portugal had done nothing but flout the U.N. Charter since it became a member.

He said that the Portuguese, the British and the French all came to India for conquest. In the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, India was subjected to the "most insidious process of division, conquest and vivisection."

Representatives of colonial Powers had gone to India, were received as guests and then had become the masters. They had set up ruler against ruler, people against people, and they had intrigued with "quislings."

There had been the strange spectacle of a land being passed from one colonial hand to another, either for dowry or as "*quid pro quo* for treaties concluded in Europe...."

Now for 15 years India had patiently sought the implementation of the irreversible process of history. Portugal was standing against the rising tide of history and nationalism in Asia and Africa, he said. If it found itself in trouble now it had only itself to blame.

Put quite clearly, he said, Portugal had no legal right to be there. There was no legal boundary. There could be no question of aggression against one's own country and one's own people when India wanted to bring them freedom.

India accepted many tenets of international law, but the tenet quoted in support of the colonial Powers having sovereign rights in other territories was no longer acceptable. It must die; it had no right to be in the 20th century.

Mr Jha said Indians were a peaceful people, which anyone who was not blind or prejudiced would endorse.

It was not India that had engaged in provocations. It was Portugal. Could Portugal deny firing on a peaceful steamer, killing an officer? Could it deny firing upon fishing boats, killing a fisherman?

In the early hours of December 18, he said, while the Acting Secretary-General of the U.N., U Thant, was appealing for negotiations, Portuguese armed forces attacked a police post 400 yards inside Indian territory, he said. The attackers were repulsed.

"We are the victims now and in the last 15 years," Mr Jha said. "Our people have been impatient. Our Government has been accused of being too soft on this issue of ridding India of Portuguese colonialism."

India had shown great patience, and had taken the minimum action to ensure the civil administration of the enclaves and the restoration of law and order.

Anyone who said what India had done was aggression was going against the tide of history. Portugal's occupation was illegal when it started and it was illegal today.

Senhor Garin said he would reply in due time. What was essential now was a cease-fire, because people were being killed by the "Indian invaders," he added.

Mr Adlai Stevenson (U.S.) said that this was a "fateful hour for the U.N." There was anxiety about the effect of the situation on the future of the world body. The news from Goa was alarming and the Council had an urgent duty to act in the interest of international peace and security.

It deserved to be said that all at the U.N. owed much to India which had contributed the largest contingent to the U.N. in the Congo, while also contributing to peace-keeping in the Middle East, Mr Stevenson said. Few nations had done more for the U.N. and none had espoused nonviolence more actively.

Mr Stevenson referred to Mr Nehru as a friend and as "an apostle of non-violence."

What was at stake was not colonialism but a cold violation of an Article of the Charter that said that all members should refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any way inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N.

Sir Patrick Dean (Britain) said that the British Government had been "shocked and dismayed by the reports of the outbreak of hostilities in Goa."

Britain was "fully satisfied" that it was the duty of the Council to meet urgently to consider what undoubtedly constituted a threat to international peace and security.

Britain profoundly regretted that it should be necessary to meet today on a state of armed conflict between two countries with which Britain had the closest ties.

The right course for the Council now, he said, was to call at once for the cessation of hostilities and for negotiations. This would be the first essential step, The next step would be for the Government of India to withdraw its forces immediately. Then the two Governments should be encouraged by peaceful means to settle their differences, with the Acting Secretary-General helping them.

Britain would be ready to approve the Council's action along these lines, he said.

The Council, he added, should lose no time and should take such action "very soon" indeed.

Dr Nathan Barnes (Liberia) warned against the Council being drawn into what he called a "false debate" about alleged aggression on Portuguese sovereignty.

He said the Portuguese claim that the three enclaves were integral parts of Portugal was a "fiction" and he pointed out that the General Assembly by a previous resolution had declared them non-self-governing territories.The Council could not, therefore, condemn India "seriously or legally" for aggression against Portuguese territory.

Portugal should have graciously negotiated to withdraw from the enclaves years ago and joined hands with other States to redress its wrongs and work to satisfy the yearnings of all men for independence, dignity and peace.

Instead, Portuguese intransigence had led to a situation which had deteriorated to the point where force had to be employed. Liberia regretted this "exceedingly."

Mr Turgut Menemenicioglu (Turkey) said the resort to force, for whatever reasons, was never condoned by Turkey, whether those involved were its friends or not.

The statement by Mr Jha, according to which international law was made by Europeans and which could be "transgressed by others," was not acceptable to Turkey.

The U.N. Charter had been subscribed to by all members, he noted, and it pledged the renunciation of force.

Turkey was for an immediate cease-fire and a resumption of pre-hostilities positions, followed by negotiations.

Mr Zorin said what the Council should be discussing was a violation by Portugal of the General Assembly's declaration of independence of colonial peoples and territories.

When the question was one where they should assist in the liberation of a territory from colonial domination in India, immediately loud words were spoken about a "violation of the Charter."

When Mr Stevenson had said that the U.S. did not believe in the use of force, the U.S. delegate had forgotten 1958 when, Mr Zorin said, it used military force against Iraq and against the Lebanon. Last year there had been the case of its use of force against Cuba.

There was also a current threat of force against the Dominican Republic, Mr Zorin said.

Mr Stevenson's list of facts was incomplete, he said. When the U.S. wanted to apply force "everything was permitted."

Mr Zorin demanded that sanctions be applied against Portugal to bring pressure against her to free the territories that were "under her colonial heel." This was what the Council must do.

Mr Loutfi said the enclaves in India were not a part of Portugal.

He noted that Portugal had refused to negotiate with India on withdrawing from the enclaves.

The present problem was the outcome of a "prolongation of a *de facto* status flowing from colonialism and could only continue to be a threat to international peace and security. There was, therefore, no aggression by India."

The UAR would have preferred negotiations and because of "unfortunate" Portuguese intransigence, these had not come about.

Dr G.P. Malalesekara (Ceylon) said the question was whether the Indian action constituted aggression or "an act of liberation."

In Ceylon's view the enclaves were colonial territories from the day India became independent. After that independence the enclaves were illegal.

Few would deny India's right to those territories. This was not a question of Portuguese sovereignty but of Indian liberation of her territory.

Indian independence could not be complete until it had full sovereignty over all parts of the territory.

Only the colonial Powers were interested in the dismembering of territory through the creation of enclaves and the building up of States "like Katanga."

Appeals had been made to historical and moral values, the Ceylon delegate said. But the invoking of human values was curiously used by a country which had shown so little regard for the peoples of Angola. To invoke such scruples was sickening when it was done by the "inhuman suppressors of Angola."

Force was still an accepted fact of international life, he said, and India had used only the minimum force to liberate its national territory after waiting 14 years for Portugal to use reason and face reality.

The 400-year old Portuguese occupation was unjust and continued to be. In addition, the build-up of Portuguese forces in Goa could not be reconciled with peaceful intentions towards India nor was it consistent with a desire to seek a settlement on a peaceful basis.

He said some remarks already made at the meeting sounded like a "dethronement" of Mr Nehru but Ceylon did not agree. The Indian Prime Minister's greatness lay in his ability to "crossbreed" Mahatma Gandhi's passiveness with the need for practical action. The march into Goa was part of the process of liberation and if Mr Nehru's step was that of a policeman, not of a saint, it was not his fault.

The least Portugal's friends could do now was to ask Portugal to change its attitude of "intransigence." Before seeking a cease-fire they should seek from Portugal solemn and unqualified assurances that it would leave the enclaves "at once."

He noted that India was a peaceful country which had not joined any military blocs and criticized "certain Powers" who were seeking a cease-fire both in Goa and Katanga.

Once a legitimate military action looked as if it would be successful, they wanted it stopped on the grounds of international morality.

Ceylon could not accept that the Indian action was aggressive. Besides merchants and civilians, there were 12,000 Portuguese in the enclaves. This was a cancer in India today; tomorrow perhaps there might be a nuclear base.

Ceylon could not call on India to negotiate because India had been trying to negotiate for years. It could not ask India to withdraw from its own territory and it could not accuse India for being on her own territory. Therefore, she would vote against any resolution seeking these moves.

The Council then adjourned after a brief procedural discussion on the timing of its next session.

The U.S. delegate proposed an evening meeting, while the Ceylon and Liberian delegates urged a postponement, until later, so that they might obtain instructions from their Governments. Mr Zorin supported their request.

The Council voted seven to three, with the UAR not participating, to meet later the same day.

Mr Armand Berard of France spoke of his Government's "surprise, regret, and deep feeling" at learning of the Indian action, which he described as a "typical case of military aggression."

Senor Leopoldo Benites (Ecuador) supported the U.S. appeal for a cease-fire to be followed by negotiations.

"We would also like to know," he said, "that Portugal would agree to comply with its international obligations by observing the resolutions of the General Assembly and would take the necessary steps leading to a decision about the destiny of the peoples in question by self-determination."

Dr T.F. Tsiang (Nationalist China) said that no Asian State could be "entirely unsympathetic to India" but China deplored the use of force in violation of the U.N. The plea of provocation was not impressive and "could not justify the Indian armed invasion," he said.

Dr Tsiang said colonialism was evil, but war was a greater evil. Throughout history nations had declared their particular wars just, and even holy. In this generation they should be sophisticated enough to know this was not so.

Senor Daniel Schweitzer (Chile) said the parties to the dispute over the enclaves should take into consideration the will of the inhabitants.

Portugal should act in accordance with the resolutions of the Assembly and provide information on the territories which, from the point of view of the U.N., were non-self-governing.

Senhor Garin, speaking again for Portugal, urged the Council not to adjourn tonight without taking a decision that would prevent further bloodshed. "I make this appeal on behalf of the Goan people who are now living in moments of mortal anguish. Every moment counts."

Senhor Garin and Mr Jha clashed when the Indian delegate said: "Let the African delegates around contemplate what was happening in Angola. I will leave it at that. This is what is happening also in Goa."

Mr Jha strongly opposed the Western four-Power draft resolution tabled tonight calling for an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of troops and negotiations.

He said it had no basis in justice and no relation to the "great tide of history which the U.N. itself has realized."

Mr Stevenson said it was clear as crystal that the issue before the Council was not the right or the wrong of Portugal's colonial policy.

It was the right or the wrong of one nation seeking to change a legal and political situation by the use of armed force.

That was expressly forbidden by the Charter. There were no exceptions, except self-defence. Could anybody believe that huge India was acting in self-defence against this little territory?

The winds of change were man-made and man could and must control them in the interests of all.

"They must not blow us into war," Mr Stevenson said.

Mr Zorin said he would vote against the Western draft and for the Afro-Asian one.

Mr Zorin, who had earlier tried to block Council consideration of the Portuguese charge of Indian "aggression," said the Council should be debating Portugal's violation of the General Assembly's declaration of independence for colonial peoples and territories.

Of the Western draft, Mr Zorin said, it did not in its operative parts correspond to the principles proclaimed in the Charter and the declaration of independence.

The operative paragraphs were "artificial" and unlikely to meet the requirements of "present-day events."

After the voting the Council adjourned without setting another date.

X. DR SALAZAR'S SPEECH TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

In a speech to the Portuguese National Assembly on January 3, 1962, Dr Salazar said: "Since we do not accept the validity of the *fait accompli*, the Goa question has not yet ended and we might truthfully say that it is only just beginning. The reasons which prevented us from negotiating the cession of the Portuguese State of India are the same that absolutely forbid us to recognize the act of their conquest. The Indian Union has been able to wage war on us, but without us it cannot make peace....

"We shall have to wait for the international community to redress the offence done to Portuguese sovereignty and restore to Portugal her legitimate rights before a normal situation can be re-established. That is why a Bill is to be submitted to the National Assembly to assure the functioning of the organs of government of the Province of India in the present circumstances. The first consequence will be that the parliamentary representation of the Portuguese State of India in the National Assembly will continue to be held by those elected by the people of Goa, Daman, and Diu. In future Parliaments means will be found of giving a practicable right of choice to those Goans who live outside the territories occupied by the Indian Union and who maintain their devotion to the Portuguese homeland....

"The second consequence is that Portuguese citizenship will continue to be recognized in law and in fact for Goan, whether or not they are given a double nationality by the unilateral imposition of the Indian Union.

"It is quite likely that the occupying authorities will at first adopt a policy of allurement and ingratiation. Difficulties will arise for both sides when the programme of Indianization of Goa begins to clash with the Goans culture, and when the Prime Minister (Mr Nehru) discovers that a definite individuality has been formed there down the centuries by interpenetration of cultures and the crossing of various races.

"I believe that violence will be exerted in direct proportion to the difficulties which will make themselves felt and that, if the reintegration of Goa is not effected soon, spoliation and forced equality in poverty will be followed by a loss of liberty which will lower the Goans in their language, their religion and their culture. It is therefore to be expected that many will wish to escape from the inevitable consequences of the invasion, and all will be made welcome at any point of the national (Portuguese) territory.

"The (Goa) question was put before the (Security) Council on the first day of the invasion of Goa and soon after it had begun. It was a case of unprovoked aggression; in fact, an extraordinarily simple case for the application of the principles embodied in the Charter. The motion which ordered a suspension of hostilities was approved by the majority of seven votes, calling on the invading forces to retire to their initial positions and for negotiations for the solution of the conflict. It was nevertheless vetoed by Russia and was thus nullified.

"The naturally parallel attitudes of the President of the Soviet Union, who (in Bombay) had incited India to invade Goa, and the Russian representative in the Security Council who vetoed the motion approved by a majority, not only drove the Indian Union into the arms of the Soviets but also clearly showed the paralysis of the so-called collective defence system against Russia or any Power protected by her.

"The outcome of the appeal to the United Nations was foreseen, but it alarmed the world. The declaration by the Indian representative that his country would go on with its policy, 'Charter or no Charter, Security Council or no Security Council,' was such a challenge to the aims and legal structure of the organization that it would have been better to consider it defunct on the spot.

"With the transfer of powers from the (Security) Council to the (General) Assembly, the first dominated by Russia and the second by the Communists and the Afro-Asian countries, the Western Powers—in which I include South America—

have lost every possibility of employing their wider experience in conducting the affairs of the international community, moderating certain unthinking impulses, and preventing the government of the world from domination by an intolerable dictatorship of racial passion and irresponsibility....I do not yet know whether we shall be the first country to leave the United Nations, but we shall surely be among the first. Meanwhile we shall refuse them our collaboration in everything that is not in our direct interest.

"Between Portugal and Great Britain there exists an old alliance which both Governments consider to be still in force....It has been the view of the two Governments that the alliance is not automatic; its application depends on the *casus foederis*—that is, the opinion formed by each of the States on the war situation and the possibilities of intervention therein. This refers to the alliance as such, because the obligation of the British Government to defend the Portuguese overseas territories cannot be legitimately understood by us or by anybody else to be dependent on the *casus foederis*, since it is expressed in so precise and absolute a manner in the Treaty of 1661.

"The very prudent British school of diplomacy has one special feature that I greatly admire—which is, to make every effort, even in the gravest circumstances, to obtain concrete undertakings in exchange for vague promises. In view of this tendency, a mere parliamentary declaration, not the result of an agreement between the two Governments, has not seemed to us to be valid as the genuine interpretation of a treaty which contains, furthermore, an express reference to the advantages which Portugal has yielded in exchange for the obligation accepted by Great Britain.

"In more than 30 years of government I had never appealed to the treaties of alliance, it being my belief that a constant fidelity had transformed them from documents to be invoked into deep feelings and permanent attitudes in the policy of the two nations, but Great Britain has expressly invoked the alliance. One example is the request for facilities in the Azores in 1943 in spite of our declaration of neutrality at the beginning of the war...."

After saying that British obligations under the alliance were "without any possible argument those enshrined in the treaties of 1661 and 1899" (the latter extended the British guarantee to the Portuguese colonies), Dr Salazar continued: "We therefore based our request to Great Britain concerning Goa on those two undertakings. My personal dislike of asking for the services of others, even when they are due by contract, had to give way before the gravity of the cause. On the basis of our interpretation of the 1899 treaty... the Portuguese Government asked the British Government on December 11 to indicate what measures it could adopt to cooperate with the Portuguese forces to stem the Indian aggression.

"The reply of H.M. Government consisted, in essentials, of the following: 'In the eventuality of an attack on Goa there would be inevitable restrictions on the aid the British Government would be in a position to give the Portuguese Government in a struggle with another member of the Commonwealth.' This euphemistic reference to *inevitable restrictions* had to be interpreted as meaning that the British Government was execusing itself from carrying out its obligations under the treaties.

"I am convinced that the British Government made many more efforts and much more urgent appeals in this emergency to prevent the Indian aggression than those reflected in the press or directly communicated to us. The reason for this is a simple one. Although Goa could never represent for the British what it means to us—an integral part of the Portuguese nation—it is extremely disagreeable for the honour and prestige of a simple Power to avoid fulfilling definite obligations which were duly balanced by benefits conceded by Portugal.

"But if the *inevitable restrictions* invoked mean that it is impossible for Great Britain to act effectively in the case of armed attacks by members of the Commonwealth on Portuguese territories, there is another aspect of the matter to consider. Given the extension of the Commonwealth and the aggressiveness and expansionist ambitions of its new members the Portuguese Government should

now study what positive content still remains in the Declaration of Windsor of 1899. On its conclusions it should base its future attitude towards the obligations that exist between the two countries....

"We also asked the British Government for permission to use some airfields necessary for connections with Goa. I am sorry to say that the British Government took a week to inform us that we could not use them. Had it not been for this delay we should certainly have found alternative routes, and we could have rushed to India reinforcements and material for a longer sustained defence of the territory.

"The United States was very active, both in Washington and Delhi, in its attempt to dissuade the Indian Union from attacking Goa. It seems that President Kennedy even wrote to the Indian Prime Minister, while a last appeal to dissuade Mr Nehru was made by the American Ambassador in Delhi no more than two hours before the order to attack was given.

"We cannot doubt the force of these requests and those made by Great Britain....Both were afraid that the pacifist legend of the Indian Union would finally and completely disappear, and also that it would be recognized how fragile and ineffective was the edifice they had so lovingly built and maintained for the preservation of peace. But in what case we must realize that today in India there is a small country deprived of its territories by force, and that at the gates of Goa two great Powers, Great Britain and the United States, were also defeated, foreshadowing a fearful catastrophe for the world."

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
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
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